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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EXPERIENCING DISPLACEMENT AND STATELESSNESS:
FORCED MIGRANTS IN ANSE-À-PITRES, HAITI
In 2013, the Dominican state ruled to uphold a 2010 constitutional amendment that
stripped thousands of Dominicans of Haitian origin of their citizenship and forced them
to leave the country during summer 2015. About 2,200 of these people became displaced
in Anse-à-Pitres, where most took up residence in temporary camps. I use the term forced
migrants or displaced persons interchangeably to refer to these people. Many endure
challenges in meeting their daily survival needs in Haiti, a country with extreme poverty,
considerable political instability, and still in the process of rebuilding itself from the
devastating earthquake of 2010. Drawing on fourteen months of ethnographic field- work
in Anse-à-Pitres, I examine how these displaced people, in the face of statelessness and
amid their precarious social and economic conditions, create survival strategies by
drawing upon everyday labor mobility and informal economic activities within and across
their communities. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the involvement of these displaced
people in community life through socio-economic practices attests to a sense of belonging
and produces a form of substantive citizenship in their absence of legal citizenship. This
kind of substantive citizenship is also shaped by the ability of the displaced people to redefine life goals, participate in local meetings with the local state and organizations on
the ground, and challenge systems of power that seek to impose their choices upon them.
In this dissertation, I argue against construing the displaced people as hopeless by focusing
on the forms of power and agency that they exercise in and over their lives, which make
them agents of their self-development.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 2015, thousands of undocumented Haitian migrants and Dominicans born of
undocumented Haitian descent were forced to leave the Dominican Republic. They
arrived in Haiti where most still currently live in makeshift camps in the border region
between the two countries. This displaced population is diverse in age because members
of this population are from several different generations. The oldest members of this
population were born in the 1940s-50s, with the youngest ones born in the 1990s.
However, regardless of age, all members of this population are equally affected by the
decision of the Dominican state to uphold a 2010 constitutional amendment that revoked
birthright citizenship to children of undocumented Haitians. Drawing on fourteen months
of ethnographic fieldwork with this group of people in the Dominican-Haitian border
town of Anse-à-Pitres (Figure 1), my dissertation ethnographically examines how
members of this displaced population, in the face of statelessness and amid their
precarious social and economic conditions, create substantive citizenship by mobilizing
resources within and across their communities.
While doing preliminary research fieldwork with members of the Haitian community in
Chicago in the summer of 2015, news about a series of events that involved Haitians in
the Dominican Republic started to spread through local and international news media.
Haitian and Dominican newspapers reported the killing and disappearance of Haitians,
and the displacement1 of thousands of Dominican-Haitians and undocumented Haitian
1

In 1994, the World Bank estimated that 10 million people per year were displaced in developing countries
by development programs, producing 100 million people displaced per decade (Cernea 1994; Cernea and
Maldonado 2018). This raises important issues of human rights, and causes the impoverishment of
populations that are often already marginal or poor. Cernea contends that, if not mitigated by policies and
approaches that restore oustees to their previous living standards, displacements tend to lead to

1

migrants. Those events garnered my attention while I was in the United States and
motivated me to conduct research with Dominicans of Haitian origin and undocumented
Haitian migrants displaced in Anse-à-Pitres in order to investigate their everyday
experiences.

[Figure 1 Anse-à-Pitres: a small Haitian city located on the Haitian-Dominican border
and close to the Dominican city, Pedernales].

impoverishment by processes that include marginalization, food insecurity, and social disintegration.
Completely abandoned by the Haitian state and the Dominican state who displaced them and considering
the fundamental challenges they are facing in their daily lives, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres have
experienced all these issues.

2

Among the events reported in the local and international media was the lynching
and hanging in February 2015 of a Haitian known by the nickname “Tulie,” described as
a young man who worked shining shoes around the area of a park. His body was found
hanged in a park in Santiago (the second largest city of the Dominican Republic) with his
hands and feet bound. (Huffington Post 2015).
According to most news reports, the Tulie’s lynching was committed by a crowd
of Dominicans--portrayed as a nationalist group—which sought the deportation of
Haitians (Danto 2015) and which saw mob justice as necessary in light of the perceived
incompetency of local authorities in judicial matters (Liberato 2015). Following the
lynching, an attorney with the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights
declared: “frankly it is all too reminiscent of shameful denials of southern officials during
the decades of terror lynchings perpetrated against African Americans here at home
(HuffPost Latino Voices 2015).” Even though lynching Haitians in the Dominican
Republic may not be considered a routine (Perloff 2000) as it was in the case of African
Americans in the late 19th century, Tulie was not the first Haitian lynching victim in the
Dominican Republic. Back in 2009, the lynching of another Haitian named Carlos
Nerilus led the Haitian government to call its ambassador from the Dominican Republic
amid tensions between the two countries (Rosario 2009).
This public and outrageous crime committed against these Haitians was the
precursor of a violent storm to come: Dominican civilians and soldiers made constant
verbal and physical threats to people of Haitian descent including intimidation and
breaking into the homes of Haitians in an attempt to force them to leave the Dominican
Republic. These actions are part of a form of structural violence, which Galtung (1969
3

cited by Simmons 2010) refers to as those social structures—economic, political,
religious, and cultural—that prevent individuals and groups from realizing their full
potential. This structural violence is based on a historically political divide between Haiti
and the Dominican Republic that led to an anti-Haitian sentiment called antiHaitianismo, conceived of as a manifestation of the long-term evolution of racial
prejudices, the selective interpretation of historical facts, and the creation of a nationalist
Dominican “false consciousness” (Simmons 2010; Sagas 2000). Anti-haitianismo was
created and perpetuated by the Trujillo regime, which appropriated it as a state ideology
in the creation of Dominican nationhood in the 1930s (Sagas 2000).
Such blatant and long established patterns of anti-Haitian discrimination
transpired in 2010, when the Dominican state adopted a new migration law called la
sentencia that revoked birthright citizenship to children of Haitian origin. This law
changed a constitutional provision that had been in force since 1929 and that recognized
the jus soli according to which all children who were born on Dominican soil, except
children of people in transit, automatically acquired Dominican nationality. This change
left thousands of Dominican-Haitians stateless. Indeed, in 2015, thousands of these
stateless people, along with other undocumented Haitian migrants were forced to leave
the country, where many became displaced in the Haitian-Dominican border region.
During the months of June and July, 2015, an estimated 2,203 forced migrants arrived in
the border town of Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. In this region, they took up residence in six
camps: Parc Cadeau 1 and 2, Tête-à-l’Eau, Fond-Jeanette, Maletchipe, and Savanne
Galata (GARR et al. 2016). Haiti is a country with extreme poverty and considerable

4

political instability; thus, this population of forced migrants has had to try to find ways to
make a living and many endure challenges in meeting their daily survival needs.
Indeed, Haiti’s constant economic and political instability is rooted in historical
and structural factors that are both external and internal. For more than two centuries, the
country’s children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren continued to be largely
dominated and terrorized by tyrants and military juntas from within the country and by
occupying superpowers from outside (Leiderman 2002). In 1915, after Haiti’s failure in
redeeming its debts to US business, the U.S. invaded the country (Middleton 2010: 34).
The U.S. controlled the country’s finances, putting the Haitian unique national bank
under the control of the national bank of New York (Pamphile 2001). At the same time as
the U.S. invasion of Haiti, Americans were also settling in the Dominican Republic and
Cuba. However, investments were eight times less valuable in Haiti than in the
Dominican Republic and a hundred times less valuable than in Cuba (Audébert 2004),
which pushed many Haitians to migrate. Between 1925 and 1926, about 23,000 Haitians
were working in Cuba and by the 1930s this number had increased to around 80, 000
(Souffrant 1974).
Haiti has also been affected by structural problems, including dictatorship and a
series of coup d’états; from 1957 to 1986 the country was submitted to twenty-nine years
of dictatorship by François Duvalier and his son Jean Claude Duvalier. During these
twenty-nine years of governance of the Duvalier regime, at least 200 million dollars were
transferred to the Duvalier private accounts in Switzerland while the population was
living in extreme poverty (Stepick 1982). In addition, the country has experienced many
coup d’états including those against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004, keeping
5

the country in almost perpetual violence and instability. In 2010, an earthquake added the
chaos of a natural disaster to this sustained period of political instability, creating a
window of exciting opportunities for NGOs.
In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, which claimed the lives of more than
230,000 and left more than one million homeless (Theodore and Dupont 2012), Haiti
simply became the “republic of NGOs” (Johnson 2011). This produced what is
conceived of as disaster capitalism: using people’s suffering as an instrument to
accumulate financial and political capital. Donors favored NGOs over the Haitian
government, giving many NGOs the power to coordinate and distribute humanitarian aid
to the victims of the 2010 earthquake. This collaboration is reminiscent of Haitian
professor Jean-Anile Louis-Juste’s definition of NGOs as government bodies: i.e.,
another category of government, which is mingled directly with the “international
community,” but acts locally (Louis-Juste quoted by Schuller 2010). The Haitian
government received only 1% of the emergency aid sent to Haiti (Schuller and Morales
2012: 57), which seems to corroborate Buss’s argument that donors will fund everything
in Haiti except democratization, governance, and public sector reform (Buss 2008:5). As
Moore stated, “The sovereignty of life within Haiti became de-politicized,
internationalized, and negotiable” (Moore 2012: 113). In 2015, therefore, impoverished
forced migrants entered a country where many millions of people were already living in
similar precarious conditions. However, the precariousness of these forced migrants is
not only created by the conditions of the country to which they migrate, but also by their
condition of “statelessness” and a feeling of being foreign in a country that many have
never seen before.

6

I aim to accomplish several things in this introduction. First, I describe the
research site and the methodological approach to the study. Second, I address the
challenges faced by the forced migrants in their experience of displacement and
statelessness, their livelihood strategy, and their capacity of agency. Finally, I examine
how they build an alternative form of citizenship conceived of as substantive citizenship.

1.1

Contextualization and theoretical contribution
There is an ample literature documenting discrimination against Haitians living

and working in the Dominican Republic (Simmons 2010: 10-11). Simmons (2010)
describes the terrible experience of and discriminatory practices against Haitian
agricultural workers on Dominican bateys2. Simmons (2009) and Derby (1994) evoke the
racial practices rooted in anti-Haitianism created by Truijillo. Sagas (2000) also shows
that Dominican elites—in particular historians—contribute to maintaining an anti-Haitian
ideology through a process of “national engineering” that consists of legitimizing
traditions and shaping national culture (Sagas 2000: 5). The facts that wrap identityformation and nation-building run high in the process of exclusion in the Dominican
Republic and the extension of violence against Haitians. While this literature helps us
understand the root causes of the displacement and statelessness of people of Haitian
backgrounds in the Dominican Republic, I argue that, by crossing an international border,
the interpretation of these displaced people’s lives and their constant shifting between the
boundaries of two nation-states needs to be contextualized within a larger theoretical

2

Bateys are shantytown communities that have developed around sugar plantations, and they are known to
have some of the worst living and working conditions in the country: no potable water, no electricity, no
means of waste disposal, constant surveillance and policing by Dominican authorities, endemic diseases
such as dengue, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and malaria to name a few (Simmons 2010:11)

7

frame. To develop this argument, I engage several lines of theory such as border and
labor mobility, informal economy, and substantive citizenship in order to craft a sociocultural analysis that leads not only to an understanding of people’s experience of
displacement and statelessness, but also of their self-determination to cope, fight back,
and survive (Cornell 1997). This dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of
border, mobility, informal economy, and citizenship in several important ways.
First, borders are generally defined as instruments that empower the state, which
can employ “coercive efforts to build a nation-state by excluding outsiders and to
distinguish between members and unacceptable residents of the territory” (Fassin 2011:
214 citing Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). In the context of Haitian migrants, both borders
and boundaries played a significant role in forcing and keeping them out of the
Dominican Republic. I refer to the border as the physical delimitation that resulted from
agreements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and that is secured by the
Dominican state’s legal measures, such as the establishment of checkpoints and soldiers
to control the flux of undocumented Haitian migrants. By boundaries, I mean forms of
social constructs establishing racial differences and producing distinct cultural identities
(Fassin 2011) that lead to the marginalization and exclusion of people. In the Dominican
Republic, these boundaries take the form of prejudice and discrimination against
Haitians, and spatial and social segregation of Haitian agricultural workers (Simmons
2010) that finally led to their exclusion. Border crossers such as the forced migrants
going to Pedernales are not only threatened by the enforcement of legal procedures in the
Dominican Republic, but also by the multiplication of illegal practices of border guards,
who are deployed by the central Dominican state. These officials replace migration

8

officers in the regulation of people and transform the border into a window of
opportunities that allow them to generate income illegally. I call this misuse of power
conferred to these officials “border power” to describe how state power has been turned
into an instrument used by official to accomplish personal goals. The border power
between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales has two components: soldiers acting as migration
officers and the implementation of corrupt practices. By examining the border as a space
of daily actions and the exercise of power relations, my dissertation contributes to
understanding the border as both a bridge and a barrier, but also as a site for the exercise
of agency and power. This agency and power is expressed in the capacity of the forced
migrants to use communication networks and to articulate notions of time and space as
strategies that enable border crossings.
The second theoretical line is mobility, which has been imposed upon the forced
migrants struggling to maintain stability in their lives since their displacement in Anse-àPitres (Mason et al 2011). The forced migrants are part of a large-scale movement of
people, flow of goods, capital, and objects across the world—what Sheller & Urry (2006)
consider to be the ‘new mobilities’ paradigm. All categories of people—including
tourists, workers, and migrants—are involved in these mobilities (Sheller, Urry, and
Hannam 2006). Their movements are enabled by infrastructural and institutional
moorings (Sheller, Urry, and Hannam 2006) which provide these people with strategic
advantages (Alan Smart 1999) for the creation of multiple interlocking networks of social
relationships (Levitt, Schiller 2000). When it comes to forced migrants caught in transit
between states (Gill, Caletrio, Mason 2011), these migrants do not all possess the
necessary infrastructural and institutional resources to facilitate their movements. Under

9

the myriad of constraints and uncertainty surrounding them, these displaced people are
forced into everyday labor mobility in the hope of remaking their lives. In this sense,
mobility has a double meaning for them. It involves both forms of agency, but also
reflects a lack of choice or autonomy. My dissertation contributes to theoretical
conversations that see mobility as an expression of “power to” and agency. It describes
the capacity of the displaced people to act with the purpose to change their lives.
The third theoretical foundation is the informal economy. The informal sector
remains the ultimate resource for these forced migrants to create opportunities and
livelihoods. Their informal economic practices include selling goods (sometimes these
include second-hand clothes retrieved from the garbage) at the local market, selling their
labor, collecting pieces of tree branches to sell or with which to make charcoal, and
performing domestic labor. In addition, the Service Jesuite aux Migrants (SJM) has
provided some forced migrants, particularly women, with a microcredit loan in order for
them to create their own small business. My perspective on microcredit loans is based on
their impact on social economic processes beyond the immediate project environments,
instead of on quantitative indicators (Fernando 2006). This allows an examination of how
microcredit helps people improve themselves, but also of the role these loans play in
people’s social transformative capacities (Fernando 2006). Informal activities undertaken
by forced migrants, I suggest, allow them to build their self-reliance and reduce their
dependency on NGOs—whose aims often deviate from those of local communities’
interests due to their need for accountability to their donors (Schuller 2010). Indeed,
Schuller points out accountability as one of the problems of NGOs operating in Haiti. He
contends that these NGOs show a strong commitment towards their donors while
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ignoring local communities, a process he terms “trickle-down imperialism.” I perceive
the forced migrants reliance on informal economic practices in order to create survival
strategies as modes of resilience that express agency and a sense of individual
responsibility (Freeman 2014) in a country with limited resources, high unemployment,
and political instability. My dissertation broadens our understanding of the informal
economy not simply as a means of income generation, but also as a source of motivation
that endows the displaced people with courage and endurance, expressed in a mentality
animated by local expressions such as m’ap degaje m, or ti degaje (literally, “I am doing
a little something”) that help them survive and keep going. This way of perceiving the
informal economy as something more than just income contributes to the conception
developed by economic anthropologists of economics as not simply about market or nonmarket institutions as in the debate opposing formalists and substantivists, but as
something that also includes the dimension of human culture and the behavior of
individuals (Cliggett and Wilk 2007). The engagement of these people in practices to
improve their lives describes their desires and aspirations to be better, but also illustrates
the gestation of a form of citizenship, which, in the absence of their legal citizenship, I
conceptualize as substantive.
Finally, the forced migrants created an organization to help them acquire visibility
and make their voices heard. This organization, the Organization for the Defense of the
Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA), plays a significant role in substantive citizenship
making by allowing the forced migrants to assert their human rights. Without legal
citizenship, this substantive citizenship takes shape through their social dynamics in
organizing themselves, the sense of belonging that they earn from their residency in

11

Anse-à-Pitres, and the recognition they receive from organizations that have negotiated
with them. In this way, following Miller (2000), the stateless people contribute to shaping
the direction of their communities in Anse-à-Pitres, which then displaces the role of the
state as the sole guarantor of citizenship. From an anthropological perspective, they build
substantive citizenship, which takes into account not only their collective actions, but also
their personal experience in their communities, which the legal conception of citizenship
does not account for (Greenhouse 2011: 262). My dissertation suggests an understanding
of substantive citizenship as part of the forced migrants’ initiatives to enact changes in
their lives in a community where they are marginalized, and as something that is
differentiated due to the inequalities created by the organizations on the ground and the
local state in their assistance to and relationship with the forced migrants.

1.2

The research and the fieldsite
I learned about Anse-à-Pitres, a small city located in the south-east of Haiti,

during my years in primary school. At that time, I could hardly locate it on the map and
did not know its significance as a southeastern border town conceived of as a potential
site for tourist development. I later came to be aware of this place more profoundly
through the social and political events that aggravated the relations between Haiti and the
Dominican Republic in 2015, and that led to the displacement of hundreds of DominicanHaitians and undocumented Haitian migrants to the area. Anse-à-Pitres is located on the
border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It has a surface area of 185.19 km2
and a population of about 23,500, as of the 2005 census (Mairie de Anse-à-Pitres 2008)3.
The downtown area is only 3 km2 and is inhabited by people who have travelled there
3

This was the demographic data available at the City Hall during my research in 2016
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from different parts of Haiti. Anse-à-Pitres attracts the interest of people from other
regions of the country due to the access to the Dominican Replublic that it affords them,
and because of the opportunity for the development of commercial activities along the
border, particularly the commerce of second-hand clothes. Generally, after being bought
in the Dominican Republic, the merchandise crosses the border in Anse-à-Pitres to be
stored, sorted, and packed on trucks to be carried to other Haitian cities such as Jacmel
and Port-au-Prince. Like Ouanaminthe, Belladère, and Fonds-Parisien, Anse-à-Pitres is
one of the official crossing points, on land, to the Dominican Republic. It is separated
from its Dominican sister city Pedernales by the Pedernales River, over which a small
footbridge facilitates access to the binational market located on the Dominican side of the
border. Because of the poor infrastructures that connect Anse-à-Pitres with other main
Haitian cities such as Port-au-Prince—the capital of the country— Anse-à-Pitres remains
isolated and rarely benefits from state investment.
Anse-à-Pitres (Figure 2) is characteristic of remote Haitian areas where the state
has only a marginal presence and provides few public services (Schwartz 2009). The city
is about seven hours by bus from Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. The bus (a Toyota
Land Cruiser with its seats rearranged as a mini-bus) from Port-au-Prince takes
passengers to Thiottes, the final destination, an area about two hours by motorcycle from
Anse-à-Pitres. This means that, for my trip, after getting off the bus in Thiottes, I had to
take a motorcycle to complete my trip to Anse-à-Pitres, where I arrived in the middle of
the night in early September 2016. My travel to Anse-à-Pitres was endangered by the
poor state of infrastructure in the area. The road is rocky, with cliffs on both sides all
along the route. The bus was swinging and shaking passengers; in the absence of a
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seatbelt I directed my head towards the roof to prevent the shaking movement from
happening. Despite the turbulence, the other passengers were very quiet and were joking
as though it was a normal routine for travel in the area. I tried to be relaxed and to keep
my feet still on the floor, but deep down I was scared and remained attentive to each jolt
of the bus. Travelling in these conditions is extremely risky and perilous. People from the
area complain about the passivity of the state in building or even maintaining
infrastructure; the safety of passengers is not a state priority. I lived in Anse-à-Pitres for
about a year and a half; I had to take the risk of travelling on that road every time I had to
run errands in Port-au-Prince. However, I was a bird of passage. For hundreds of people
who live in the area, this risk is a part of their everyday life as they have to travel
frequently for their basic needs. The damaged state of the infrastructure explains the
marginalization of many regions of the country, including Anse-à-Pitres, which, all the
same, remains a dynamic city.
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[Figure 2 Anse-à-Pitres and surrounded areas].

Despite its isolation from the rest of the country, the city of Anse-à-Pitres enjoys a
vibrant nightlife animated by disc jockeys playing music at nightclubs, hotels, and in
open-air bars. The public includes mostly local residents but a few Dominicans also cross
the border to join with the leisure activities, which are an occasion for people to meet and
socialize while enjoying Haitian and Dominican songs of various rhythms such as konpa,
meringue, bachata, and Creole rap songs. The musical diversity reflects the border culture
and aims to attract an equally diverse audience; for example, younger people tend to be
interested in rap songs and are open to foreign music such as the Dominican meringue
and bachata. More importantly, though, this musical atmosphere is essential to the city’s
economic life, as many people go out at night to sell their products such as alcoholic and
natural drinks, sodas, and fritay4. This nightlife usually finishes around 1:00 or 2:00 AM,
but it sometimes end with verbal and physical violence. Very often, while I was sleeping
in the middle of the night, I heard people yelling, insulting each other copiously, and
throwing stones.
Anse-à-Pitres, as with other border towns, experiences a two-way flow of both
goods and people; i.e., goods and people going to the Dominican Republic and goods and
people coming back from the Dominican Republic. Cockfighting provides one example
of this flow. The economic and social dynamics of the city of Anse-à-Pitres are reflected
in the practice of cockfighting; Dominican gamblers cross the border every week to
participate. This activity usually takes place twice a week and displays moments of

4

Fritay is a special Haitian dish made of fried plantains, meat, and salad
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passion for the participants. Engagement in this event can be understood through the lens
of Geertz’s cultural and economic interpretation of cockfighting. Geertz (1973) showed
that cockfighting is a social and cultural process, but also he showed that it was a source
of public revenue in precolonial Balinese states. In fact, the participation of the two
peoples—Haitian and Dominican—in this event is part of a cultural construction between
them, but also symbolizes the conflicts that exist between them. For instance, Wucker
(1999) described cockfighting as an important aspect of Dominicans and Haitians’ daily
life on the island, Hispaniola. At the same time, he explained that this does not prevent
the two peoples from sharing a history of violence and, like two roosters, they fight,
disputing over border issues. Overall, cockfighting remains an economic activity for both
the organizers and the Dominican and Haitian participants. Generally, the forced
migrants do not participate in the city’s cultural activities; among other things they lack
the economic resources needed to participate and are isolated from the downtown area of
Anse-à-Pitres.
1.2.1

The camps: structure and navigation of the place

The majority of forced migrants arrived in Anse-à-Pitres in June 2015. They
include old and young families with children, and singles (both men and women)—
basically, everyone, because no-one was spared when they were forced out of the
Dominican Republic. Based on my conversations with the forced migrants, very few had
existing contacts with people in Anse-à-Pitres. This made it difficult for many to find a
place to stay after they were forced to cross the border to Haiti or were deported by
Dominican authorities at the official gate, a journey that was far from pleasant in its own
right. The camps (Figure 3) remained the only viable option for them upon their arrival
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in Anse-à-Pitres, and the forced migrants have spread through different camps on the
border: Tête-à-l’Eau, Fonds-Jeannette, Parc Cadeau #1, Parc Cadeau 32, Maletchipe, and
Tête Source.

[Figure 3 A typical configuration of the camps with no infrastucture.]
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The camps are linked to downtown Anse-à-Pitres by a dusty and stony road
frequented mostly by motorcycles. Some residents were able to access the border market,
but they were still isolated from the larger Anse-à-Pitres community. Like the whole
city, the residents of the camps have no electricity. A Puerto-Rican group called AMAR
gave those forced migrants living in Parc Cadeau #1 a generator after an activity in the
camp. However, only a very few people had a light bulb in their small houses, which
were made only of straw and cardboard. This same camp also held an open-air school for
children, although the school operated poorly because of the lack of both funding and
material support. Water is the only resource to which people have access because they
can get it from a relatively nearby source in the Pedernales River. As one woman
explained, “The water source is not far. This is where people get drinkable water. The
river is close and it is where they go to do laundry.” It only remains for them to filter the
water by adding water purification tablets called aquatabs; however, some people do not
always purify the water because they do not have aquatabs. Aid organizations used to
give the forced migrants the ingredients to purify the water upon their arrival, but now the
forced migrants must get the aquatabs themselves. Apart from water, the camps are
completely destitute. Even though some organizations have placed prefabricated toilets in
the camps, these toilets are insufficient. Josemar, a man in his thirties from the camp of
Parc Cadeau #1, said: “The toilets are almost full. So we need new ones in the camp.”
While touring the camp with Josemar for the first time, I observed into a large, open-air
hole in the middle of the camp that constitutes a danger for children playing nearby.
Josemar told me that the hole was dug by an organization in order to build a toilet for
residents, but the members of the organization never came back to finish it.
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This case exemplifies how organizations progressively withdrew from helping the
forced migrants, who were ultimately left on their own. The forced migrants would
mention the names of some of the organizations that used to assist them, such as Groupe
d’Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Rapatriés (GARR), Heart to Heart, or even the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). However, during my research, all these
organizations almost disappeared. This withdrawal may be because NGOs and agencies
do not often have defined goals beyond their immediate projects. The absence of any
good infrastructure at the camps is a reflection of a group of displaced people who are
marginalized and the withdrawal of the state from ensuring the well-being of its people.
The consequences of this state abandonment are noteworthy, as forced migrants
are vulnerable to exploitation and there are attempts to profit from their precarity. That is
why many forced migrants seem to be reluctant to give their names to outsiders. For
instance, during a visit to Parc Cadeau #2, I was surrounded by a small group of people
who were curious about what I was doing at the camp. Having an outsider such as myself
among them creates both hope and disappointment; because of the lack of support from
the state and their marginalization, the forced migrants hope that my presence means that
someone (or even an organization) may be interested in them, but they also experience
disappointment because they are mistrustful towards those who pretend to help them.
This was evidenced in one man’s words: “It was only GARR that helped us. Some people
came, took our names, and made money out of migrants. For example, a director is being
paid for the schooling of our children but our children are not even accepted at his school.
Even though people are taking our names, we are hesitant because we were too often a
victim. There are always things coming for us but we don’t get them. People are being
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paid in our name but we don’t get anything.” This discomfort towards outsiders is not
unique to forced migrants. Trust is often, if not always, a concern for displaced people in
all parts of the world, as they are subject to manipulation and exploitation from others. As
Knudsen and Valentine (1995) argue, “In the life of a refugee, trust is overwhelmed by
mistrust, besieged by suspicion, and relentlessly undermined by caprice.” This may help
explain forced migrants’ paranoiac attitude towards outsiders.
1.2.2

Methodological approach

My ethnography of these displaced persons involved fourteen months of
participant observation, one-on-one interviews, informal conversations, and focus groups.
These displaced people include undocumented Haitian migrants and Dominicans of
Haitian descent. They are a diverse population of both genders and all ages since no one
was spared from being forced from the Dominican Republic. These people have one
thing in common: they were materially dispossessed after having been forcibly removed
from their homes in the Dominican Republic, leaving behind all their belongings behind.
Between January and March 2016, about one year after the displaced persons occupied
the camps, the intervention of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) led to
the relocation of more than 200 migrants in the town of Anse-à-Pitres only, but far from
stabilizing their lives, this relocation only seems to create more precarity and uncertainty
about their future. In an environment where the migrants lack almost all basic resources
and do not have control over their own destiny, forced migrants are simply “existing not
living” (Koch 2015).
Everyone in the displaced population is subject to this uncertain and insecure
situation. They all have to go through this painful experience. For instance, Fredo, a
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young Haitian-Dominican man, was forced out of his own country of birth to enter
Haiti—a new country where he did not know anybody—after his father died and he was
forced to separate from his mother, who stayed in the Dominican Republic. He is having
a nightmarish life in Anse-à-Pitres where he is suffering hunger, an ever-present situation
that cannot be easily escaped from in his mind. His trembling voice expressed his reality,
“We are eating the dust. There is no work. I bought a cup of salt and I suck a grain every
morning. That is life here. You don’t have any help here.” As Fredo’s words suggest, he
is not alone in this experience; most were experiencing tremendous challenges in meeting
their basic survival needs and finding ways to make a living in the camps. The population
of Anse-à-Pitres suffers from poverty, a lack of opportunities for young people, who do
not have any institution of higher education to pursue their studies after secondary
schools, a documentation crisis that sees many people effectively stateless, and women
who are subject to domestic violence. For the most part, the forced migrants are unable to
acquire wage work in the formal economy because of the lack of documentation and
formal jobs in Anse-à-Pitres. As a result, the forced migrants had to develop informal
economic activities and continued to go back to the Dominican Republic to do odd jobs.
I conceive of my ethnographic fieldwork with these displaced persons as a
descent into the ordinary (Fassin 2013), one that embraces the precarious reality of these
people’s everyday lives in Anse-à-Pitres. I was both an insider and an outsider, a
positionality which is not fixed, but processual as every anthropologist exhibits a
"multiplex subjectivity" with many shifting identifications (Rosaldo 1989; Narayan
1993). On the one hand, I am a native Haitian; I grew up in a poor family, and have faced
considerable obstacles in getting an education, securing livelihoods, and seeking out a
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better life for myself. In this sense, I was able to relate my family experience to the kinds
of everyday challenges the group of displaced people were facing, as well as the daunting
experience of settling into and adapting to new environments. On the other hand, as
someone who has attended foreign universities and lived abroad in both France and the
U.S., my cartography of the daily reality of Anse-à-Pitres was distinct from the one that
might be drawn by the forced migrants, who are experiencing various kinds of social and
economic challenges such as critical poverty, statelessness, and displacement (Monroe
2016). Establishing myself in the city of Anse-à-Pitres was a challenge as people were
already disappointed by outsiders, who sometimes sought to exploit their suffering. I
relied on the connections I had developed with the SJM (Service Jésuite aux Migrants)
before going to Anse-à-Pitres.
SJM is a lay organization that works to protect the rights of undocumented
migrants. The SJM staff in Anse-à-Pitres is composed of Haitians, including two
promoters and many monitors, depending on the project in progress. They are all from
the Anse-à-Pitres region except Inès, who was from another city also located in the southeast department of Haiti. I collaborated with the organization with which I had
volunteered during the whole period of my research fieldwork. This relationship allowed
me to engage with the forced migrants through participation in community-based and
outreach activities, where I led discussion and spoke on behalf of the forced migrants.
Knowing that I was seeking to make their voices heard led people to accept me and view
me as a member of their community. People were very happy to talk about their
experiences and hoped that their conversations would be brought to the attention of the
international community. For example, when I went to participate in the meetings of
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ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres—a migrants’
organization), the president would invite me to talk so that I could inform them of SJM
projects. People would applaud me and come to talk to me after the meeting, asking me
to visit their homes. When I visited them at their homes people opened their doors to me,
gave my assistant and me a chair to sit and talk to them, and offered me their food. I felt
people’s appreciation, but they also tried to remind me of my indebtedness to them such
as when a woman told me: “you forgot us. Longtime ago, you said you were coming but
you never came. We are hungry.” The legitimacy that I gained from them was reinforced
by the talks I gave about documentation and women’s and children’s rights at a series of
events organized by the SJM in Anse-à-Pitres.
During my fieldwork, I participated in different activities and gave talks where I
informed people about the importance of documentation and some of the fundamental
rights to which women and children are entitled. I argued for the integration of women
into society and gave them advice about how they could be engaged in both the
development of their community and their own personal development. These activities,
organized by the SJM, brought together people from the entire population in Anse-àPitres: long-term residents, local state authorities, and the forced migrants. I found this
collaboration with the SJM productive, as it gave me a profound insight into people’s
lives. Many people have reacted and made comments about the reality of life in the
community.
In addition to my involvement with the SJM, I developed individual strategies to
make myself accepted by people and gain access to them. In the field, I adopted a simple
way of life that reduced visible differences in status between myself and the displaced
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people. I developed a close relationship with people by visiting them, comforting them
when they were sick, sharing with them, and having informal conversations with them on
various topics including the news and common life stories. This provided me with some
legitimacy in their community and also, as Malkki (1995) suggests, led me both to
understand and experience what displacement and statelessness mean in their lives,
instead of simply making them the object of my study. This was fundamental in
conveying to me the meaning of doing ethnography in that it encouraged me to build
relationships with my research population, interacting positively with their lives by
placing myself in their conversations (Kingsolver 2011), listening to them, and opening
space for them instead of imposing my own categorization upon them (Rosaldo 1993).
The establishment of these kinds of connections between ethnographers and the research
population is always beneficial in providing valuable insights. For example, in her
fieldwork with Palestinian refugees in the Shatila camp, Allan (2014) lived among her
research population for a long time in order to develop close relationships and build trust
with them. This cohabitation with the people helped her understand the living
experience, values, and daily predicaments of the community. Similarly, in Anse-à-Pitres,
I lived near the camps and with the guide of a local assistant that I hired upon my arrival,
I performed daily visits to forced migrant’s homes, which enabled me to observe and
participate in their activities.
In addition, as a native anthropologist, I was able to develop a unique perspective
that allowed me to develop cultural intuition that I conceive of as the automaticity and
instincts I have acquired about the displaced people’s cultural values and knowledge
through immersion and constant interaction with them. This intuition helped me grasp the
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meaning of their cultural expressions, saying, and riddles, and also find the truth behind
common stereotypes by sharing and experiencing the stories of their lives that were being
told in the news.
My ability to speak their languages, Creole and Spanish, was also helpful in order
to connect with people more easily and quickly. Creole was the most common tool of
communication for my interviews and other interactions with the forced migrants. Their
mastery of Creole surprised me because many were born in the Dominican Republic. For
instance, I met with Chana at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. She was born in Aguas
Negras, Dominican Republic and had spent her whole life there. However, she said: “I
don’t speak Spanish, but sometimes when the Panyol (Dominicans) speak, I understand.
Sometimes I can answer. Sometimes I can’t.” As this reveals, Chana speaks only basic—
or what I would consider to be functional—Spanish. Their inability to speak Spanish
resides in the fact that the displaced people were living far away from Dominican urban
centers and proximous to Haitian fellows where Creole could still remain the primary
language. While some do speak Spanish fluently, they also still speak Creole.
Finally, while sharing their values has provided me with a kind of cultural facility and
proficiency into their community, I consider my interpretation of their lives and their
narratives two aspects of the same history (Lyon 2011; Wolf 1982).
1.2.3

Participant Observation, Interviews, and Focus Groups

I undertook participation observation at several sites. I participated in activities
organized by the SJM in which I was an important actor and in ODRA meetings (the
Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres) where I often
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intervened, giving advice to members in their fight to make their voices heard. Also, I
performed daily and weekly visits to migrants’ homes in downtown Anse-à-Pitres and at
the camps. In addition, I went frequently to the border market on Fridays where I learned
about the transactions, interactions, exchanges, and practices that enfold their daily lives
in the area and above all connect them with the Dominican Republic. I observed and felt
the feverish atmosphere of the market through the movement of people—loading and
unloading goods for merchants, arguing, bargaining and purchasing a variety of local
goods such as rice, plantains, vegetables, meat, and seafood. I witnessed motorcycle
riders transporting people and goods, making weird noises by sounding their horns.
During my observations, I was also able to have informal conversations with people and
schedule appointments for semi-structured interviews with them.
My interviewees were from different categories of adult people ages eighteen and
above and included long-term residents in Anse-à-Pitres, representatives of the city hall,
and forced migrants from distinct places: Anse-à-Pitres downtown, Parc Cadeau #1, Parc
Cadeau #2, Fond-Jeannette, Tête Source, and Tête-à-l’Eau. In total, I conducted one
hundred two (102) semi-structured interviews of which forty eight (48) were with
females and fifty four (54) were with males, all between the ages of eighteen and seventy.
I had the help of my local assistant, who is from Anse-à-Pitres and who already had
experience working with the forced migrants. People generally volunteered to be
interviewed and were not happy if they were not included. This made it both easy and
difficult for me. On the one hand, in a context where people hardly trust outsiders, I was
lucky they were available to me. On the other hand, some people may have felt excluded
because I did not interview them.
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I encountered a similar situation with the focus groups. I organized six focus
groups (Figure 4), one in each of the places I mentioned above, but also with another
group of people of forced migrants who received financial microcredit from the SJM. I
tried to limit the number in each focus group to fifteen people. However, more people
came and the final number often increased to as many as twenty-five. The focus groups
took place in the open air, in schools, churches, and at the SJM office (for people living
in downtown). The questions were general and included asking about their experiences
and how they see themselves in Anse-à-Pitres. The focus groups provided the participants
with the opportunity to talk freely about their experiences, from learning about the
Dominican state’s decision to remove them from the country to their current way of life
in Anse-à-Pitres. I avoided asking them specific questions related to their feelings about
their forced displacement so that I did not traumatize or offend them.

[Figure 4 Focus group in Parc Cadeau #2].
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1.3

Livelihood, agency
Despite the multiple stresses and forms of hardship—vulnerability, limited

financial opportunities (Koch 2015), and visible and invisible post-traumatic stress
(Vincanne et al. 2009)—that members of displaced populations endure, my own
conceptual standpoint in my research is one that argues against construing these forced
migrants as hopeless. Forced migrants work hard to make a living in Anse-à-Pitres. They
undertake informal economic activities in order to develop coping and survival strategies.
These activities include gathering and selling wood, selling second-hand clothes, and
starting small businesses. Through such activities, members of this displaced population
generate sources of income, however meager they are, to help them sustain their lives in
Anse-à-Pitres. For instance, Lidor went to the Dominican Republic in 1980 and was
displaced in Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. Even though he was experiencing hardship, Lidor did
not want to be dependent on humanitarian aid. He said: “I don’t get any job from
organizations or the state. I use my ten fingers to work. If I find wood, I make charcoal. I
see people in line fighting for food. I wouldn’t do that. If they give me, I say thank you.”
Like many people Lidor, tries to be self-reliant. The informal economy appears to be the
best alternative for forced migrants to develop this self-reliance and resilience. Their
personal practices and modes of participation in the informal economy are prevalent
throughout the poorer countries in the Caribbean. Browne (2004) refers to these informal
practices as ‘Creole economics’; they offer possibilities for the building of autonomy in
the face of people’s inability to work in the formal economy.
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Even though forced migrants are largely fighting alone to create livelihoods, some
of them obtained a small loan from the SJM to run a small business through a microcredit program. Their small businesses were sometimes worth less than $20 USD. For
instance, when I visited the camps, I saw some people hang a bag in front of their tent;
the bag contained some products such as candies, detergent, and soaps, and this was their
business. The strategies used by the forced migrants in order to create livelihoods
demonstrate that they are fighters and believe in change and improvement. Their attitude
is similar to that of other refugees and displaced people in the world. For example, Indra
(2000), in her study of forced migrants in rural Bangladesh, explains how the poor
develop innovative strategies such as selling goods from their houses and growing
vegetables on patches of land in order to survive in a context of severe economic, social
and political disenfranchisement. Similarly, Stepick (1990) demonstrates how Haitian
refugees who arrived in South Florida during the 1970s and 1980s developed a richly
varied range of adaptations in the informal sector in order to survive. Through economic
activities such as dressmaking and tailoring, petty commerce, food preparation, childcare,
transportation, and the like, these refugees managed to make ends meet. Even though the
income generated from these activities was meager and, in fact placed them very close to
the US poverty line, Stepick (1990) describes how they constituted a mode of livelihood
and a mechanism by which these new migrants avoided seeking welfare assistance. This
is a way for these people to prove that they are not just displaced, but people with ideals
working hard to make do in order to maintain themselves (Senior 1991). The strategies
employed by the displaced people in order not to succumb to the poverty that plagues
their environment are supported by the sense they make of their lives and their culture.
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Their courage to survive and fight is embedded in local cultural values, which describe
the agentive mentality of these people. They are animated by a philosophy of life that
pushes them to act with tactics that exceed the boundaries of the legal and the formal.
Going to the Dominican Republic illegally is seriously discouraged by Dominicans, who
are taking drastic measures to stop the illegal crossing of migrants. Forced migrants know
the risks, but they consider that their actions are motivated by a good cause. This
mentality is expressed by a common expression in Haitian larger society degaje pa peche,
which basically means: “working off the books is not a sin,” and which approximately
implies a Machiavellian method of “the end justifies the means.” Thus, we need to
question the aim of these people’s projects before calling into question their strategies. In
this sense, degaje pa peche aims to show that using the informal sector to make a living
or illegally crossing the border—the unique strategies available to them—to create
livelihoods is a good cause that eclipses the forbidden, the formal, and the legal.
Although the informal economy is generally understood as the result of practices that
take place outside formal institutions and that escape state control, they consider this
infringement of legality and formalities a way to take back from the Dominican Republic
what they have built through their labor. The meaning of the expression degaje pa peche
approaches the concept of debrouillardism as described by Browne (2004) to show how
the informal practices of these people to create ways of life are tinged with savvy and
smartness. Their strategies resonate with the practices of the slave underground
economies that included working their own gardens and trading articles sometimes taken
from the plantations in order to meet families’ needs. The historian Forret (2004) has
demonstrated that slaves were involved in the underground economy by developing
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unlawful trades with poor whites in the antebellum Carolinas. According to Forret, the
slaves traded products that included poultry, corn, and pigs while they sought
commodities such as liquor, shoes, blankets, and rugs from poor whites. In a colonial
system that oppressed people from every aspect of their human lives, slaves were
required to develop such survival strategies in order to reduce their dependency on
miserly food rationing provided by colonizers. For instance, slaves were able to survive
by taking advantage of the small amount of time they were given to garden and undertake
food collecting activities and marketing (Handler and Wallman 2014: 448). For the
forced migrants, most of their informal economic practices take place beyond the border.

1.4

Labor mobility or the unsettled experience of life
The daily labor mobility of the forced migrants is reflected in Manolo’s unsettled

life. Manolo had already lived at the camp of Tête Source for two years when I met him
in 2016. His life means closing his eyes in Haiti with the sunset and opening them in the
Dominican Republic before sunrise. He said, “It is in the Dominican Republic I am
living. I almost know nothing about Haiti. Every morning I get up at 6 a.m. and
sometimes as early as 3 a.m. to go to put in a day of work in the Dominican Republic.”
Tête Source, a peripheral area of the city of Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, is so close to
Pedernales, Dominican Republic that it is difficult to separate the two cities. During my
first visit to Tête Source, people were pointing to a small tree that was supposed to serve
as the Dominican-Haitian border, which means that Pedernales is visible through
Manolo’s window. Pedernales is a region with a green landscape, in contrast with a great
part of Anse-à-Pitres that seems to be a desert because the biggest trees have been cut
down for charcoal and commercial logging. Pedernales serves as the breadbasket for
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many forced migrants who return to the Dominican Republic to sell their labor. In
Pedernales, most work as sharecroppers or daily laborers on the agricultural fields located
in the mountainous regions.
As suggested by Manolo, the Dominican Republic is fundamental in the creation
of livelihoods for the forced migrants, who contend that for every basic thing, they have
to go to the Dominican Republic. For many of them, it is the only place they can go in
order to scavenge for their daily bread. Even with the reinforcement of border security by
the Dominican state, they continue to increase their trips between the two countries. Their
dynamics, as expressed through their everyday labor mobility, demonstrate that they
exercise agency and forms of power. This form of power resides in the capacity of the
displaced persons to pursue purposeful goals in their lives. I refer to this power as “power
to” (Miller and Tilley 1984), which emphasizes the ability of these people to control their
destiny through the actions they are taking to improve their lives. My dissertation favors
this side of power, which conditions people’s agency, over a conceptualization of power,
as something associated with domination or control (power over) and conceived of as a
form of power geometry that defines mobility as set up differently for diverse citizens
(Gogia 2006 citing Massey 1994). In this sense, in my work, I am unconcerned with the
kind of unequal relationship people have with power, but I am concerned with what
makes people agentive and able to take actions. My approach to mobility is defined
within this perspective of “power to” showing that labor mobility is fundamental to
forced migrants’ creation of livelihoods, but at the same time imposed upon them because
everyday border crossings are undertaken under the constant threats imposed by border
securitization. In this sense, I argue that labor mobility is both an exercise of agency and
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constraint. Among the displaced population, both men and women attest to this ability
through drawing upon mobility to challenge marginalization, precarity, and insecurity in
their lives.
Among other things, the engagement of women in labor mobility challenges
cultural constructions of them as dependent on their husbands. Indeed, women are
generally construed as followers of their migrant husbands or as people who stay behind
to take care of children. This cultural construction of gender roles in labor mobility tends
not to hold, as women are increasingly as equal agents of mobility as men. For instance,
in Latin America, Collins (1995) showed how Mexican women migrated to other parts of
Latin America, such as Brazil and Chile in order to do agricultural work. In order to
respond to the constraints of home responsibility, those women were engaged in labor
mobility in the same way as men. Similarly Sanchez (2013) highlighted how a few
“single” women, considered heads of households, became sharecroppers in a maledominated system in order to supply the needed labor in Californian strawberry farms.
This active participation of women in labor migration changes the construction of a
patriarchal society that considers women dependent on men. To be sure, in the case of
forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres, there exists a kind of male dominance in labor mobility
because men tend to move more than women to go to work in the agricultural fields in
the Dominican Republic. However, some women brave the risks and go out on their own.
They cross the border on a daily basis to go to work in the Dominican Republic. Even
though a very few women may accompany their husbands to the agricultural field in the
Dominican Republic to prepare food for them, the majority go to sell their labor. The
majority of those migrant women go to carry out domestic work at Dominicans’ homes
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and to sell as mobile merchants in the streets and at the binational market. The
significance of these women as agents of labor mobility in their own rights changes
gender perspectives in a labor mobility generally considered men’s prevalence. The
involvement of these women in labor mobility increases their agency and empowers
them. For those left behind, their lives are equally shaped by everyday labor mobility
because many are dependent on the bread coming from the men’s border crossings. They
experience the same fear and stress as their husbands who have to face soldiers to go to
work.

1.5

Building citizenship
The removal of citizenship of Dominican-Haitians was fundamental to the

displacement of thousands of people to Haiti. The decision of the Dominican state to
adopt a constitutional amendment that stripped thousands of people of Haitian
backgrounds of their citizenship has gravely affected these people, who were forced to
leave the Dominican Republic. In addition to their state of precarity, many displaced
persons who are Dominicans of Haitian origin have also found themselves stateless in
Anse-à-Pitres. Their statelessness or the lack of a nationality seems to have also been
confirmed by Prime Minister Evans Paul of Haiti when he proclaimed on June 25, 2015,
“it is about migrants [these people are migrants], mostly Dominicans. They are, for the
most part, children born in the Dominican Republic and have no identification (Louis
2015).” Legally, he meant, they are not citizens of Haiti. The inattention of the local state
toward the displaced is a reflection of the central Haitian state, which rejects these
people. However, this rejection seems to be more an effect of the incapacity of the state
to support these people based on the political economic factors I have described above,
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rather than to be a deliberate choice. In the absence of legal citizenship, I argue that these
people build a limited form of citizenship through everyday social, cultural, and
economic activities (Danahay and Brettell 2008). I conceive of the kind of citizenship
that they create as substantive citizenship and it goes beyond the legal scope of
citizenship. It is both an individual and collective making process, which is determined
by the forced migrants’ personal engagement in improving their lives and organizing
themselves to make their voices heard. These sorts of engagement help the displaced
people who lost their citizenship to participate in society and construct some form of
social life in the face of marginalization and exclusion. All displaced people in Anse-àPitres demonstrated this dynamic as someone valuable, capable of contributing to society
like all legal citizens.
In anthropological literature, citizenship is understood as not simply a set of rights
and duties but as a set of practices or experiences. Anthropologists seek to displace the
state as the sole reference in the definition of citizenship (Caglar 2004: 284) emphasizing
the significance of individuals’ personal experience, something that the legal conception
of citizenship does not account for (Greenhouse 2011: 262). These practices and
experiences include how people live in their community, how they are engaged in
personal and collective enterprises, overall, what they actually do in their daily lives
(Lazar 2013). Therefore, marginalized people create substantive citizenship as an
outcome of their exclusion from political and legal citizenship by claiming belonging to
their place of residence (Vora 2013), acquiring social and civil rights (Lazar 2013).
Forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship in ways that are different
from many other people in the world. For example, they are different from the wealthy
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members of the Chinese diaspora that Ong (1999) describes in her book, Flexible
Citizenship, who can instrumentalize citizenship through flexibility and transnational
mobility due to their economic capital and who seem to constitute a kind of stateless
economic power (Tölölyan 1996). Forced migrants also differ from members of the
Indian diaspora in Dubai who can work in the formal economy even if it is in the form of
“modern-day slavery” (Vora 2013). Forced migrants, who are caught within the
boundaries of a very poor country where they are both unrecognized and unauthorized
(Sassen 2002) and also excluded from the formal economy, create substantive citizenship
that can be defined in several ways.
First, their substantive citizenship is expressed in the ways forced migrants trigger
a set of collective actions that highlight their presence in Anse-à-Pitres. They created
their own organization called the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of
Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA). Not only does the organization define and re-define their goals as
people who know what they want, but it also gives them visibility in the community of
Anse-à-Pitres.
Second, their substantive citizenship is asserted by local and international
organizations from which they enjoy some recognition and which sit and negotiate with
them. For instance, the IOM supported these dispossessed people during a short period
after their displacement, providing some with the financial assistance needed to relocate
from the camps and promising to give them money for their survival (even though the
IOM completely withdrew from helping them while I was on the ground). The SJM also
provided support to the displaced people, advocating for their rights. The organization
implemented a documentation program called PwoKontram to provide stateless people
37

with a birth certificate. This effort constitutes an important step toward building legal
citizenship for some of these people.
Finally, substantive citizenship is also an individual making process for the
displaced people and refers to the daily actions they undertake in the course of their lives.
For instance, while living in Anse-à-Pitres, forced migrants continued to move to the
Dominican Republic for multiple purposes. Some people considered themselves as still
belonging to Dominican society even after having been in Haiti for more than one year.
Therefore, this dual belonging, reflected in the economic opportunities that the
Dominican Republic represents to them and the residence that Haiti grants to them,
expresses a way that these people forge citizenship that encompasses the two different
countries, which I conceive of as transnational substantive citizenship. This transnational
substantive citizenship can be illustrated through Manolo’s involvement in everyday
labor mobility. While his practices are considered a survival strategy, they show that his
life is a construction of the in-between and that both countries play a role in defining his
citizenship.

1.6

The structure of the dissertation
The second chapter provides a historical background of the border, particularly its

role in connecting and disconnecting Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This
controversial role can be explained by the relationships between the two countries that
attest to strong economic bonds, but at the same time are fraught with violence. I also
show how the border is both secured and porous. On one hand, the Dominican Republic
has established its military presence and checkpoints on the border. The constellation of
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soldiers deployed strategically to control the official crossing points places the border
under constant surveillance. These soldiers often manipulate the border to their
advantage, making it a site of illegality and illicit transactions, and the imposition of
illegal taxes. I conceive this misuse of power as “border power” to describe how power is
made into an instrument that serves illegal causes. On the other hand, the forced migrants
find ways to circumvent soldiers and cross the border on a daily basis, making the
Dominican Republic their backyard. This porosity is attested to by the dozens of longterm residents and forced migrants who claim that they go to shop and work in the
Dominican Republic every day, without legal documents. Forced migrants rely on the
communication networks they develop with their neighbors and a nuanced understanding
of time and space that allows them to find the right moment to cross the border and locate
resources in the Dominican Republic. These strategies are the product of creativity and
smartness and have increased their agency.
The third chapter examines how the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres continue to
live in continuous marginalization, as many contended that they did not have legal
documents. They are the victims of the incapacity of the state to integrate its members
into society. During an informational session on documentation organized by the SJM,
the registrar in Anse-à-Pitres deplored the bad working conditions at the civil registry. He
maintained that the state did not provide the required documents so that the clerks could
fulfill their duties. As a result, they could not respond to people’s needs for multiple birth
certificates. It should be noted that all the social categories of the population in Anse-àPitres are victims of the malfunction of the registry. The civil status—which is the state
institution in charge of delivering identity documents to people—is deficient and operates

39

just like the state, which is inefficient and absent. The inefficiency of the state is
illustrated, for example, by the delivery of invalid birth certificates to people. This creates
an exciting window for racketeers, who extort people who want to have legal documents.
The absence of the state appears in its incapacity to document people, leaving a vacuum
to be filled by organizations. For instance, the Service Jésuite aux Migrants (SJM) leaped
to the rescue of the civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres by implementing a program of
documentation called PwoKontram that aimed to provide a limited number of forced
migrants and their children with a birth certificate. The program helps some stateless
people re-establish their identity and assign them Haitian nationality. However, SJM
cannot replace the state, which excludes and marginalizes its own people, handicapping
them so far as their full participation in society is concerned in comparison to other legal
citizens.
The fourth chapter focuses on the role of forced migrants as agents of their own
survival and self-development in the absence of state support and the limited help
provided by organizations working on the ground. The displaced people exercise
important forms of agency by undertaking informal economic practices such as selling
their labor, gathering wood to sell, doing domestic work, and turning themselves into
mobile merchants that allow them to generate a little income. These informal economic
activities are intertwined with colonial history and are embedded in larger Haitian
cultural context in the way it shapes their economic behavior. In particular, when
comparing the motivation of the forced migrants in undertaking their informal economic
activities, there are some similarities between their practices and the slave-based
economies. The displaced people and enslaved people’s informal economic practices

40

show how these groups of people exercise forms of agency in and over their lives, but
this economic enterprise does not free them from a world of economic and social
inequalities. Furthermore, the combativeness of the forced migrants is stimulated by
Haitian culture through a mentality of debrouillardism and moral values such as degaje
pa peche anchored in a philosophy of life that motivates them to take actions when it
comes to creating livelihoods.
The fifth chapter argues that despite statelessness, illegality, and infrastructural
and institutional constraints, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres exercise power over their
lives by relying on everyday labor mobility as a resource. Despite the risks of
imprisonment and death that border crossings entail, forced migrants go to Pedernales on
a daily basis to sell their labor in the Dominican Republic. These labor mobilities
undertaken by both men and women are an attempt to create livelihoods. They are
constitutive of power in that they show the capacity of the forced migrants to act in the
world with the aim of building and rebuilding their lives. Drawing on Miller and Tilley
(1984), I refer to this form of power as “power to” to distinguish forced migrants’
exercise of power drawn upon everyday mobility from power associated with domination
and coercion.
Finally, in the last chapter, I argue that the stateless people create a kind of
substantive citizenship that fills in the gap left by the absence of legal citizenship and that
allows them to participate in community activities and exercise forms of agency in a
context where they are highly constrained to act legally, politically and economically.
There are several ways they try to build this form of substantive citizenship that
emphasize belonging and community involvement, and that go beyond the legal category
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and bureaucratic considerations. These are: 1) creating their own local organization
(ODRA), 2) participating in local meetings with the city hall 3) participating in
organizations on the ground, and 4) resisting systems of power such as when they
opposed a program of relocation by the SJM. Because their practices take place in both
Haiti, where they seek to re-settle, and the Dominican Republic where they go on a daily
basis for labor purpose, their lives remain a continuum between these two countries, so
they are transnational substantive citizens.
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CHAPTER 2: THE BORDER AS A SITE OF SOCIAL MEANING AND AGENCY
I was in Tête-Source to meet with some forced migrants. Tête-Source is one of
the most remote localities of Anse-à-Pitres and sits 10 to 20 meters from the DominicanHaitian border. During his interview with me, François, a resident of the area, explained,
I am from Tête Source. I came here three years ago. I have my sister in
Saint Domingue. I go to the Dominican Republic. It is not far. I cross the line
around Altagracia. I always enter those areas to look for casual work. I go to put
in a day of work in the Dominican Republic regularly even though they
(Dominican soldiers) are mistreating and humiliating us.
François’ involvement in border crossings is typical for many labor migrants around the
world who take advantage of the porosity of borders to look for job opportunities. What
is specific about François and almost all forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres who go to the
Dominican Republic, and which is not obvious to everyone in François’ statement, is that
border crossing is not only about fearing Dominican soldiers (who have the monopoly of
the legitimate means of violence, and who also are the incarnation of a kind of “border
power” that works to perpetuate the Dominican state ideology) but also about fearing
Dominican civilians, who participate in policing the movement of Haitian migrants
across the border. The ability of these forced migrants to persist in crossing the border—
despite all the forces that threaten, frighten, and kill—to make border crossing into a way
of life is an expression of agency and power. Following Dobres and Robb (2000), I
understand agency as the carrying out of actions by the forced migrants to accomplish
intentional goals in their lives. This agency attests to their credible power to make
decisions on their own.
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In this chapter, I examine how the Dominican-Haitian border (Figure 5) serves as
both a bridge and a barrier (Ortiz-Gonzalez 2004) for displaced people in Anse-à- Pitres,
Haiti, who engage in everyday border crossing practices as a survival strategy. The
border holds multiple functions in the relationships between the two peoples, especially
socially and economically. The border area is host to a vibrant formal and informal
economy upon which residents of border cities rely. From 1993 to 2002, for example,
border trade accounted for a reduction in poverty on a scale of 12 to 18 percent in border
cities where free open markets take place (Coupeau, 2008). While the border plays a
central role in the maintenance of socio-economic relations between Haitian and
Dominican people, at the same it constitutes a barrier between them. The Dominican
state, in particular, has taken steps towards securing the border in order to control the flux
of Haitian migrants. I argue that the enforcement of border security by the Dominican
state to control waves of migrants transgressing the territory produces “illegal migrants”
(Fassim 2011), but, at the same time and paradoxically, this makes the border a space in
which agency and power are exercised by these “illegal people.” This agency and power
are expressed by forced migrants’ development of various strategies, including relying on
communication networks, time, and space, that allow them to circumvent border officials,
reduce the risks of crossing, and succeed in their daily border jumping practices.
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[Figure 5 People from Anse-à-Pitres crossing a small bridge on the Pedernales River that
serves as the border between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales].

In the first section of the chapter, I examine how Haitians and Dominicans have been
connected through the border that represents a dynamic place of social and economic
exchange between the two peoples. At the same time, I demonstrate how the border
embodies violence and enmity between the two countries, which are rooted in the
building of Dominican nationhood and identity.
Second, I demonstrate how border officials deployed by the Dominican state are
sometimes involved in illegal practices and negotiations with crossers that are part of
what I consider a form of border power.
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Third, I show the risks that crossing the border entails for the forced migrants. In
addition to border guards, forced migrants must also face Dominican civilians who scare
and threaten them, making the border a barrier and their crossing into Pedernales a highly
dangerous adventure.
Finally, I examine how forced migrants exercise forms of power and agency by
adopting strategies that allow them to minimize risks in crossing the border. Their
capacity in using resources that include communication networks, space, and time to
carry out their intentional goals increases their visibility, power, and agency.

2.1

Historiography of the border
The current border experiences of Dominican and Haitian people need to be

contextualized within a historical framework that explains their historically evolving
relationships. The border is best understood as one that has had different economic,
cultural, social, and political meanings in different historical eras.
Haiti and the Dominican Republic share the same island, Hispaniola, but have two
distinct colonial experiences. Hispaniola used to be a Spanish island during the colonial
period, with the arrival of Christopher Columbus, but in a 1697 treaty, Spain conceded
the western part to France, forming the colony that is now Haiti, and retained the eastern
part, which is now the Dominican Republic. The two countries are separated by a land
border with four juxtaposed Haitian-Dominican towns that are official entry points for
migration and traffic. The four Haitian border towns are coupled with four Dominican
sister cities: Malpasse (western Haiti)/Jimani (Dominican Republic), Anse-à-Pitres
(southeast Haiti) /Pedernales (Dominican Republic), Belladères (central Haiti) /Elias
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Pinas (Dominican Republic), and Ouanaminthe (northeast Haiti)/Dajabon (Dominican
Republic).
Historically, the border has been porous in another way: the movement of
Haitians across the border was entirely undocumented before 1915 (Martinez 1999: 66).
During the U.S. occupation of 1916-1924, an effective national police was created, but
clandestine entrance at the frontier was still common. According to Martinez (1999: 69),
“law enforcers were spread thinly across the countryside and held tenuous control at most
over the rural populace. The central authorities were hard pressed even to collect duties
on the Haitian frontier, let alone keep tabs on immigrants entering Dominican territory”
(Martinez citing Baud 1993: 49-56). Border control became a priority when a national
guard was created and more importantly with the accession of the Dominican dictator
Trujillo to power after the US occupation, where the “establishment of the national guard
made policing the movements of Afro Caribbean immigrants a practical possibility”
(Martinez 1999:69). Since the early 20th century, Haitians have been migrating to the
Dominican Republic to work in agriculture, tourism, the sugar industry, and the
construction sector (Wooding and Mosley-Williams 2004; Mariner 2002). The migration
of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic was a prosperous enterprise that profited
the two countries. For instance, in the 1950-60s, there existed a series of annual contracts
between the Dominican and Haitian governments to recruit Haitians to go to work as
seasonal laborers in Dominican sugar cane fields. This migration “by contract” has
ranged from 10,000 to 14,000 per year (Grasmuck 1982: 369). In 2015, of the 8,000 to
10,000 sugar cane workers in the Dominican Republic, the majority were Haitian
immigrants (Kanaar 2015).
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Following Derby (1994), before the Dominican Republic developed
infrastructure, Dominican provinces were not integrated into Dominican towns but
maintained networks of commerce with Haitian urban centers inherited from the colonial
period. Therefore, border markets have been an economic mainstay for the region’s
residents since the colonial era and were closely tied to large commercial hubs in Haiti as
a result of the relatively sparse settlement—and thus infrastructure—of the western part
of the Spanish colony (Mallon 2018:339).
Therefore, for a long time, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been
connected through the border that was sometimes unregulated (such as before 1915), and
sometimes regulated by the Dominican state. This relationship between the two countries,
however, is also fraught with violence and discord. For instance, from 1822 to 1844, the
Haitian president Jean Pierre Boyer governed the entire island, until the Dominican
Republic obtained its independence from Haiti in 1884. This twenty-two-year occupation
by the Haitian army has been long remembered in Dominican history as “the Haitian
Domination” (Vergne 2005) and used to promote anti-Haitianismo sentiment (i.e., antiHaitianism), which reinforces both borders and boundaries (Fassin 2011). This sentiment
is also provoked by the wave of Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic, a kind of
ideology that appears in the discourse of the Dominican president Mejia, who once spoke
about a “peaceful invasion of Haitians” (Martin et al. 2006). In addition, anti-Haitianism
consists of making Haitians the scapegoats of an economically weakened Dominican
society and also politically, a situation evoked by Sagas (2000) by maintaining that “it is
a political strategy that has worked before, to distract the people from other issues and
rally the troops”. This anti-Haitianism is apparent in the refusal of legal citizenship to
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Haitian children born in the Dominican Republic (Simmons 2010), which aims to keep
Haitians away from the country, and in the expression of racial prejudices such as seeing
blackness as incompatible to Dominicanness (Simmons 2009). These kinds of racial
discrimination are at work in housing, where sex workers are forced to cluster together
and rent their own houses in Haitian neighborhoods, and in the sex industry where
Dominican women distance themselves from their poor, dark-skinned Haitian neighbors
(Brennan 20004: 36). Tracing the historiography of the Dominican-Haitian border, by
referring to Moya Pons (2010), the historian Paulino (2016) summarizes the history of the
border in terms of three significant cycles or periods that describe how the border has
been established from its creation to the role it plays today.
The first cycle includes the history of the border during the colonial period, where
it served to set the limit between France and Spain, who shared the island, Hispaniola
(1700s-1800s). The second is the history of the political border, which is the period
where the two countries—Haiti and the Dominican Republic—implemented treaties to
settle an official demarcation and territorial boundaries (1874-1936). This is the period
where the Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo, declared war on Haitians who lived
around the border. An estimated 15,000 to 35,000 Haitians were tracked down and
executed by the Dominican regime (Clammer et al 2012) in 1937. The border was turned
into a wall of blood (Paulino 2016: 9), as “the blood of innocent Haitians flowed freely
into the water and transformed the border from a place that had once been a refuge from
persecution and slavery into a memory to forget, to flee” (Wucker 1999).
The third cycle, according to Moya Pons, is the social border, which began in the
aftermath of the massacre, and particularly after Trujillo’s assassination, where
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“Dominican scholars move beyond issues of territorial boundaries, directing themselves
to new themes such as racial prejudice, economic domination, political class relations and
Haitian presence” (Paulino 2016: 7). The social boundaries that Moya Pons refers to are
the embodiment of Haitian immigrants’ racialization within Dominican territory. This
process is manifest in the process that excludes Haitians from the nation-state, through
both the definition of Dominican identity in opposition to Haitians (Howard 2001) and
their removal from the country in 2015. This cycle appears to be a continuation of the
anti-Haitianism that Trujillo forged in the front line of his politics of governance. Paulino
(2016: 7) extends his reflection of the post-massacre period to what he calls la
dominicanizacion de la frontera (dominicanization of the border), highlighting the aim of
the Dominican Republic to institutionally and ideologically distance Dominican border
residents and the nation from their Haitian neighbors, who are unwelcome to the country
(Orenstein 1995).
After the cholera outbreak that hit Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake,
the Dominican Republic has reinforced its border security against Haitians who sought to
cross the border, considering them impure and dangerous (Mallon 2018). As reports of
cholera in Haiti surfaced in October 2010, the Dominican Republic deployed 1,500
soldiers alongside hundreds of public health professionals to the border between the two
countries (Mallon 2018: 339). Health surveillance has been enacted in a way that
restricted immigration, conflating the spread of disease with the movement of people
across the border, and pathologizing Haitian bodies (Mallon: 340). Simmons (2010), in
previous contexts, demonstrated that health was always used by the Dominican state as
an instrument with which to establish boundaries in Dominican society; Haitian workers
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were geographically marginalized, did not have access to hospitals and clinics, and were
forced to work without protection, which increased their vulnerability. In this way, the
body of Haitian people is not only considered a threat to the border, but it is also
expandable (Agamben cited by Zigon 2011), as it is instrumentalized by the Dominican
state to enact its power and sovereignty (Foucault 1977). The “danger” mapped onto
Haitian bodies by Dominican identity politics conflates race with epidemiological
pollution, identifying the border spaces of economic exchange as a threat to Dominican
nation building (Mallon 2018: 342).
The Dominican state’s effort to control or simply “own the border” (OrtizGonzalez 2004) and make it a barrier to undocumented Haitian migrants seems to find its
support from Dominican civilians—who take part in a campaign of exclusion of Haitian
migrants—and border guards—who are in charge of regulating the flow of migrants.
First, border residents, particularly Dominican civilians, have usurped state power and
threatened Haitian border residents. Similar scenarios, where civilians illegally intimidate
and persecute border crossers, were underlined by Oscar (2006: 4), who contends that “in
many cases, zealous citizens have, on their own, undertaken unlawful incursions intended
to detach possessions of neighboring countries.” This is what happened in the Dominican
Republic in 2018. After a seeming calm between the two peoples following the migration
crisis of 2015, a resurgence of hatred resurfaced when a group of Dominican extremists
from the region of Pedernales took to the street to ask Haitian residents to leave the city.
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The state was forced to intervene by reinforcing military presence and police in that
province5.
Second, I conceive of the power exercised by border officials as border power.
This border power is the exercise of power by border officials to control border crossers,
but they also work to legalize the illegal or render the legal illegal. Specifically, isolation,
weak institutions, and lax administration can lead to a deviation from the norms of
interior zones and a development of institutional patterns and interests quite separate
from those of the centers of power (Oscar 2006). I do not consider the illegal practices on
the Dominican-Haitian border a separate institutional pattern as suggested by Oscar
(2006), but these practices do illustrate the definition of power as a multishifting strategy
(Foucault 1981) which actors can exercise according to their desire to accomplish
specific goals.

2.2

Border power
I define border power as a discrete kind of power exercised by border officials to

regulate both crossers’ lives and the flow of goods. Border power is an
instrumentalization of power by officials. This border power can take different forms. On
the Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales border, border power includes soldiers acting as agents
of migration, and enacting corrupt practices, during which they channel state power for
independent interests. While officials deployed at the border are generally expected to
take legal enforcement action according to state and international policy, border power
deviates from legality in order to produce illegality. The zone of illegality and opacity
5 https://rtvc.radiotelevisioncaraibes.com/diaspora/ultimatum-dun-groupe-dextremistes-dominicains-aux-

haitiens-residant-pedernales.html
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produced by border power is characterized by the intervention of soldiers in the role of
migration officers and by corruption that includes bribing, trafficking, smuggling, and the
like. The role of soldiers as migration officers is linked with the structure at the border.
For example, when someone is crossing the border from Anse-à-Pitres to Pedernales,
they must go directly through the soldiers at a checkpoint, instead of migration officers.
This means that soldiers are conferred all the power with which to fulfill all related tasks.
Their total power erases the authority of any migration agents. The other way that border
power is exercised is through the il-legalization of the legal and the legalization of the
illegal.
The il-legalization of the legal consists of border officials taking advantage of the
power conferred upon them and using that power to serve illegal causes. In order to
facilitate the border officials in the exercise of border power and obtain people’s consent,
officials often put a legal face on the illegal and the illegitimate, a process that seems to
be at work at the Dominican customs point on the border between Pedernales and Anseà-Pitres. During a conversation at the SJM office with Berard, who has monitored the
movement of people on the border, Berard explained to me how Haitians in Anse-à-Pitres
have an illegal tax imposed upon them by Dominican border officials when they make
their passports in the Dominican Republic. He said:
Dominican authorities at the gate seize their passport and ask them
(Haitians) to pay 25,000 pesos at the customs contending that the passport made
in the Dominican Republic is not good. They claim that this money will be used
to legalize the passport. Usually, Haitians pay $100 USD for the passport. From
the $100, $20 will go to racketeers. In reality, the passport costs only $ 20.
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I am not familiar with the procedure of making passports in the Dominican
Republic, but this knowledge has educated me. While it is generally said that borders are
corridors of opportunities for border residents who can maintain some freedom of
movement across and around them (Flynn 1997) or benefit from economic activities, the
borders may also become corridors of opportunity for state delegated officials. By
focusing too much on border crossers, we often forget about the agency of the border
officials (Chalfin 2001) and how they exercise their power to make the border
impermeable.
Chalfin (133-134) argues that “the agency of border officials is often portrayed as
vulnerable to two sorts of compromise, where on the one hand, state agents' public
responsibilities are shown to be subverted by personal interests and assimilation into
border communities (Chalfin 2001 citing MacGaffey et al. 1991; Maliyamkono and
Bagachwa 1990) or, on the other hand, the autonomy of border agents is compromised by
the imperatives of ruling individuals and groups (Chalfin 2001 citing Reno 1998).
Similarly, border agents on the Dominican-Haitian border are motivated by personal
interests. However, I did not notice any significant interactions between Dominican
agents and Haitians crossing the border that could be interpreted as compromising border
power. The imposition of soldiers’ power does not favor any kind of amiability between
these state representatives and migrants. In this way, the exercise of border power works
to reinforce the border as a barrier.
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2.3

The border as the site that unites and divides
During my research, I traveled frequently to the border market in order to shop,

but also to observe the back and forth movement of people between Anse-à-Pitres and
Pedernales and their interactions. People cross from Anse-à-Pitres and as far as Jacmel, a
distant city in the southeast department of Haiti, in order to join the market place.
According to Horst and Taylor (2014: 158), Anse-à-Pitres was a popular place to cross
into the Dominican Republic after the earthquake of January 2010, as hundreds of
Haitians entered the region to seek refuge with their relatives in Pedernales and other
parts of the Dominican Republic. Even though people do not need documents to access
the border market located on the Dominican side, Dominican soldiers are present and
sometimes check people at the gate. For example, one day while Makdo—a friend who
worked at the SJM—and I were moving towards the entry gate of the market, a
Dominican soldier asked him for his ID. According to both local people and the city hall,
this contradicts the existing agreement between Dominican and Haitian authorities
according to which Haitians can go as far as the Dominican city of Pedernales without a
Dominican visa or even a passport during market days. The market is fundamental to the
connection of the two cities and attracts both Haitian and Dominican merchants and
buyers. While a diversity of goods is displayed on the trestles and the bare floor, these
products are mostly Dominican, because Dominican authorities forbid Haitians to enter
with their products in order to prevent competition with Dominican sellers. Haitian
merchants or retailers are then only able to buy and resell Dominican products. During
market days, many people are turning around, buying, bargaining, selling, and talking to
each other. The market smells of good, cooked food. It is a warm atmosphere, with
people unloading trucks full of plantains, yams, tubers, vegetables, and fruits. All around
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are merchants of second-hand clothes, staple products, and seafood. On both sides of the
border, there are currency traders and motorbike taxi drivers sound their horns while
waiting outside for their client-passengers. In this way, the border is a key site through
which both people and goods flow, connecting Pedernales and Anse-à-Pitres. From this
one perspective, the border is permeable.
The role of the border in bridging the economic life of the two peoples can be
seen, for example, in Mirta’s frequent border crossings to the city of Pedernales. Mirta is
a woman in her late twenties who gave birth to a child at a hospital in the Dominican
Republic, like many women who cross the border in order to give birth in the Dominican
Republic because of the poor access to healthcare in Anse-à-Pitres. The same agreement
that authorizes Haitians to go to Pedernales without a visa, allows pregnant women to go
to the hospital for regular checkups until they give birth. However, these women cannot
register their children in the Dominican Republic because, like children of diplomats or
tourists, they fall into the category of people in transit. Even though, according to earlier
versions of the Constitution, legal interpretation has long restricted the category of
"foreigners in transit" to persons in the country for less than 10 days, since the 1990s,
many Dominican civil registrars have refused to register the children of Haitian parents
born in the Dominican Republic (Amnesty International 2015: 6). In 2010, a
constitutional amendment officially put an end to the birthright citizenship of children of
Haitian descent. Therefore, Mirta could not register her daughter, born in Pedernales, at a
Dominican registry.
After delivery, Mirta wanted to eat a particular type of hot soup to energize her
body. For such a soup, she needed the head of a goat, which she had to buy at a
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Dominican slaughterhouse. She called her father, a well-known man in his late sixties
who owns a cockfight in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, and sent him to get the goat head. In
less than one hour, her father was back with the goat meat. Usually, in a week, Mirta
would make up to three to four trips to the Dominican Republic. She would go for this
special luxurious head of goat, for her baby milk, and for bags to wrap the ice to sell in
Anse-à-Pitres. Mirta’s frequent crossings attest to how the border connects Anse-à-Pitres
and Pedernales, but also reflect the greater need of people in Anse-à-Pitres to travel than
Dominicans, due to their isolation from other Haitian town centers and a range of other
social and economic factors (Heather et al. 2014: 158).
For the most part, Haitians cross the border to go to Pedernales for a variety
of reasons that range from going to work, to buy, and to access services that are not
offered in Haiti. In fact, with the Dominican state becoming the facilitator of global flows
of capital during the last decades which has opened the country to foreign investments
(Gregory 2014), the Dominican Republic has reached a higher standard of living, enjoys
a better developed and more robust economy, and has access to better services in
comparison to Haiti. This explains why Haitians cross the border, which is in stark
contrast to Dominicans, who cross into Haiti for entertainment; Dominicans cross to
Anse-à-Pitres in order to go to clubs and cockfights in which they are significant
stakeholders. Generally, these Dominicans enter the Haitian side of the border at the
official gate without having to show any legal document. According to the inspector of
migration—a Haitian whose office is on the border—Dominicans are allowed through the
entry gate even without an identity document because they are simply considered as
gwògman (drinkers) (Joseph 2018). In Anse-à-Pitres, although those Dominican crossers
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are not too many, their presence in the city was visible at the bars that constantly play
Dominican music in order to please them. Also, at least twice a week, Dominicans cross
the border to participate in cockfights with Haitians. The socio-economic and cultural
relationships that develop between the two peoples show that the border can sometimes
be less a boundary dividing them into two nations than a bridge linking them in mutual
interdependence (Flynn 1997). Flynn has demonstrated how the border can become a
deeply placed stable identity, a way in which locals define themselves and their
relationships to others. On the Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales border, this border culture
has developed through cockfighting. However, as Alvarez (1995) argues, the notion of a
border culture either glosses over or essentializes traits and behaviors and obliterates the
actual border problems. Indeed, there exist multiple internal boundaries among the two
peoples including experiences of racism, anti-Haitianism, and exclusion from the global
economy; these are at the root of many conflicts that loom large in their history and that
continue to occur in recent years. In this way, the Pedernales River that the two peoples
share both joins and divides at the same time, explaining the complexity of border social
relationships (Grimson 2002). Therefore, the border is also a place that has born witness
to the violent history that has divided the two countries and its peoples.
Today, the border is secured by Dominican soldiers, who are present on the four
official crossing points, including the border of Pedernales-Anse-à-Pitres, where
Dominican border guards known as CESFRONT watch official checkpoints and patrol
unofficial points to look for illegal migrants, who live off everyday border crossings.
These measures of security aim to scare forced migrants who are very much dependent
on crossing the border for creating livelihoods. Sanika has lived all her life in the
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Dominican Republic, having been brought to the Dominican Republic by her mother
when she was a child. Now, displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, a new country to her, Sanika is
having a difficult life with four children to feed. Her border crossings to gather wood in
the Dominican Republic are stressful, as she has to deal with border security and soldiers.
Sanika said: “I don’t feel good at all. I have four children I am in charge of. I don’t have
any support. Sometimes I go to the Dominican Republic to look for small charcoal
wood. They (Dominican soldiers) ran after me. I used to run and hide up to three days in
the forest.” Crossing the border is crucial to Sanika’s survival since her displacement
from the Dominican Republic. Precarity, insecurity, and uncertainty in Anse-à-Pitres
force her to face the danger of crossing the border illegally to go to work in the
Dominican Republic. Forced migrants’ daily back and forth movements to Pedernales for
their basic needs only increase their stressful experiences and dangerous relationship to
the border.
Generally, crossing borders has always been a risky enterprise, where violence
has become naturalized and embodied. As Dorsey and Barriga (2010) argue, ‘‘Borders
everywhere attract violence, violence prompts fences, and eventually fences can mutate
into walls’ (citing Charles N. Bowden’s 2007). The idea of the border as a barrier is
inevitable, as states feel threatened by the waves of people entering their territory. The
modern state has engaged a plethora of technologies and employed special officials to
monitor the border in order to reduce transgression and control the flux of illegal
migrants. With the rapid increase in migration, where thousands of people are
continuously fleeing their countries and braving the sea in search of security, Europe, for
example, has adopted drastic measures ranging from sea patrols and advanced
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surveillance machinery to fencing in order to keep migrants out (Andersson 2014).
Similarly, since the mid-1990s, the United States has reinforced its border with Mexico
by militarizing the border, more than doubling the U.S. Border Patrol budget and
personnel, building a security wall, and introducing other technologies to deter migration
(Cornelius, 2001; Whitaker, 2009 cited by Kyoko and David 2012: 167). This border
militarization has led to grave consequences for crossers such as deaths, torture,
imprisonment, family separations, and the like. Yoko and David (2012) have underlined
a sad revelation about the regime of violence on the US-Mexico border that has led to the
loss of many lives. According to them, “U.S. government agencies, academic researchers,
and nongovernmental organizations concur that the death count is in the thousands and
that estimates based on recovered bodies consistently undercount the actual number of
deaths (167).” This account is frightening, when considering the millions of people who
are forced to cross borders. Moving across border is risky. The forced migrants are not
exempt from the danger and risks created by crossing the Haitian-Dominican border.

2.4

Crossing the border: the risks of mobility
Many forced migrants have chosen to stay in Anse-à-Pitres, in part so that they

can take advantage of the border proximity, as it gives easy access to the region of
Pedernales, Dominican Republic. Among other things, the border deserves attention
because of its role in both preventing mobilities and affording new potentials (Richardson
2013). While the Dominican-Haitian border has generally been considered porous due to
the lack of documentation of people moving across it (Martinez 1999), since the 1990s,
with the creation of the National Guard, the Dominican state has taken steps towards
securing the border and has made it a space of constant surveillance and regulation
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(Gogia 2006 citing Verstraete 2001). Furthermore, for forced migrants, crossing the
border is not simply about fearing the state, but also fearing violence from Dominicans
more generally. Despite the militarization of the border by the Dominican state at official
crossing points and the threat of Dominican civilians to make the border inaccessible to
illegal migrants, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres develop strategies to cross into
Pedernales, Dominican Republic.
Generally, forced migrants living in the different camps in Anse-à-Pitres are close
to the Haitian-Dominican border. For example, for those who live in the city center of
Anse-à-Pitres, the border is a ten-to- fifteen minute walk. The camps of Maletchipe, Parc
Cadeau 1, and Parc Cadeau 2 are in the peripheral areas of the town of Anse-à-Pitres and
are also located close to the border, which is demarcated by the Pedernales River. This is
where the forced migrants get fresh water. The other camps of Tête-à-l’Eau, Tête Source,
and Fonds Jeannette, are in the remotest areas of the town of Anse-à-Pitres, but close to
the Dominican-Haitian border. These peripheral areas are closer to the region of
Pedernales than to the city of Anse-à-Pitres. Living close to the border means a lot to
forced migrants because they continue to see the Dominican Republic as the land that can
offer them the opportunities that Haiti does not. However, the deployment of Dominican
soldiers along the border and the establishment of checkpoints at entry gates aim to limit,
regulate, and anticipate the movement of the forced migrants (Richardson 2013; Hannan,
Sheller, and Urry 2006). Crossing the border entails severe risks for them that can include
death, imprisonment, or deportation. For instance, when Emile, a young man in his midtwenties, decided to go to the Dominican Republic, he felt sick with fear. Yet, Emile was
born in the Dominican Republic. Like many other young Dominican-Haitians, he never
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got a Dominican identity card. In the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, where he lives in a small
tent made of wood, cardboard, straw, and pieces of clothes, a return to the Dominican
Republic to look for small, odd jobs seemed inevitable to him; his future in the camp in
Anse-à-Pitres is unclear and uncertain because the land does not belong to him, and he
may face eviction anytime. However, crossing the border is no easy task for him because
of the soldiers patrolling the border. He had already been apprehended by these soldiers,
an incident that he described to me during an interview at the camp:
“I went to make a small charcoal in the bush where everybody seeks to
make a life, making small charcoal to get food to eat, and me, bad luck for me, the
soldiers took me; they attacked me. They went to Pedernales with me. I spent
eight days in prison. After the eight days of jail, they made me pay 2,000 pesos. I
didn’t have the 2000 pesos. It was friends who contributed to giving the money so
that they released me.”
Emile not only served time in jail, but he was also fined. These are the kinds of
punishment that people are incurring, which can also be aggravated by Dominican
“extremists,” who sometimes clash with them.
Dominican civilians also contribute to perpetuating this fear. According to the
forced migrants, in 2015, many members of the Dominican population threatened them
and forced them to leave the country in massive numbers. Even after their departure from
the Dominican Republic, forced migrants continue to be the target of Dominicans who
may insult the forced migrants and violently attack them when they try to cross the
border. When Emile returned to the Dominican Republic just a few months after he was
forced to leave, he was surprised. The place that he used to call home was no longer
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ready to welcome him back. He has simply become a black sheep. Not only did he face
soldiers who arrested him, he also experienced fear of and violence from Dominican
citizens, as he explained,
They (Dominicans) always threaten me. I went to work there. I was
passing by, a Dominican called me while I didn’t do anything wrong. He said:
people from Anse-à-Pitres must not go up there because those people are used to
stealing our things. I say: you can’t tell me something like this. How many things
have you already put somewhere and they told you I was the one who took them?
At the same moment, he threw me a machete. I had a machete in my hand. I
spared his machete. He threw me another one, I spared it. Then I went to him and
I threw him a machete too. By seeing that I could injure him, he moved away.
Like many other undocumented migrants, Emile was able to cross the border by avoiding
the soldiers who were watching the entry and the exit points. This strategy is commonly
used by clandestine migrants, who often follow several devious paths that avoid official
checkpoints in the border zone (Musoni 2016). However, Emile not only has to escape
state officials, but also civilians, who are unofficially also a part of the surveillance
apparatus of the Dominican-Haitian border.
The multifaceted nature of the border as both a bridge and a barrier that
characterizes fear embodied by Dominican soldiers and civilians, and the symbolic
violent history that continues to haunt people’s minds, makes the border both a terrain of
danger and agency. The danger for the forced migrants is based on the fact that corporeal
mobility remains the greatest means available to them to cross the border. Such physical
mobility puts them at risk crossing the border because of Dominican soldiers’
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surveillance and civilians’ potential threat. The agency is reflected in their ability to
concoct strategies that include drawing on communication networks, time, and space to
challenge both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized border forces.

2.5
The Communicational, Temporal, and Spatial Dimension (CTS) in border
crossings as resources for agency and power
Thanks to an array of resources available to them, migrants residing in the global
north are able to undertake activities that connect them with people and places across
borders without necessarily having to move (Louie 2000). Despite their lack of
technology, the forced migrants develop strategies that include sharing information
among members of their groups and using space and time to facilitate their border
crossings. This section is a description of the strategies that shape and enable the forced
migrants’ transnational mobility, that is, their movements across the Dominican-Haitian
border.
First, being informed plays a significant role in guiding and enabling the forced
migrants’ transnational mobility. As Louie (2000) argues, the creation of social networks
across borders is essential to migrant’s practices. The networks that allow migrants to
connect with people and their homeland can be part of both local and global circuits
(Smart 1999). Forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres lack a constituted global network.
Information about the danger that crossing the border may entail is locally constituted
and generally spread by word of mouth between group members. Through verbal
networks, friends may advise each other against crossing the border at a specific time.
When I met Willy, a man in his forties who arrived in Tête-à-l’Eau in 2015, he was
worried about the risks of crossing the border everyday to go to work. During my visit, he
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stayed in Anse-à-Pitres and he explained to me why he did not go to the Dominican
Republic: “I don’t go to St Domingue because of information I got from people;
sometimes they (fellows) tell us to sit down here, to not go out. Therefore, we stay here.”
Willy was informed by friends about the potential threat of crossing the border. When
spreading information to alert someone about the threat of crossing the border, people
also tell each other stories about people who were caught in the Dominican Republic and
their horrific experiences. Therefore fellows constitute a great resource despite the lack of
access to technologies. While I was in Anse-à-Pitres, many forced migrants said that they
did not even have a phone.
Like communication networks, knowledge of time and location help coordinate
movement. For instance, Cresswell (2006) suggests that movement is made up of time
and space and that any consideration of movement that does not take time into account is
missing an important facet. Therefore, people’s everyday mobility is imbued with a
relationship to time (Munn 1992). In the context of my work, time is shaped by
Malinoskian functionalism that views time as a means to coordinate activities (Munn
1992). Malinowski’s view of culture is rooted in utilitarianism, a theory according to
which every feature of any people past and present must be explained in relation to the
biological needs of individual human beings (Radcliffe‐Brown 1949). I refer to this
utilitarian aspect to show how forced migrants rely on time to coordinate their border
activities. In this context, time is not simply a system in which events come in succession,
but functions as a system that directs and shapes forced migrants’ daily practices. For
instance, Evans Pritchard relied on time to explain "social activities" or the "relation
between activities" (Munn 1992), in particular the daily movements of cattle and seasonal
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passages between villages and camps. In the same way, forced migrants use time as a
safety net to coordinate their movements across borders.
Forced migrants know when soldiers are not in service and when it is the right
time for them to cross to the Dominican Republic to undertake their activities. Although
soldiers do not have a constant presence on the unofficial points of the border, there are
times they patrol the mountainous regions where most forced migrants go to work. If
someone is unlucky enough to find themselves in the wrong place and time, they risk
being apprehended by Dominican soldiers. Therefore, forced migrants get up early at
dawn to cross the border, predicting that the soldiers will not be around so early in the
day. Knowing the right time to cross the border is a concern for Melinord, who has been
displaced in Tête-à-l’Eau since 2015 and whose precarious family life obliged him to turn
towards the Dominican Republic. He explained: “sometimes, it is in the Dominican
Republic we go to make small charcoal to improve our lives. Soldiers are watching us.
We can’t go all the time.” As a result of the soldiers’ surveillance of the border, Mélinord
often stays in Anse-à-Pitres in order to avoid crossing the border at an inappropriate time.
Sometimes, forced migrants must wait days for the best time to cross, especially after
rumors had spread or they had been informed from fellows of people who have been
apprehended in the forests by soldiers. Therefore, time shapes and guides the forced
migrants’ border crossings, and together with space, it constitutes two fundamental axes
around which their everyday mobility revolves (Cresswell 2006).
Third, in addition to communication and time, forced migrants use space to enable
them in their mobility through their conception of Pedernales, a Dominican Region, as a
continuous space of the Haitian border town of Anse-à-Pitres. This way of
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conceptualizing place allows them to mentally insert and project themselves in spaces
that are geographically imagined even before traversing them. Through this kind of
geographical imagination, the forced migrants have become less place-based and placebound (Daniels 1992), making Pedernales simply their next door. Taking advantage of
this proximity, people from Anse-à-Pitres go to Pedernales for healthcare services and
even school. This continuity is expressed in how people talk about the border and how in
particular, they perceive the region of Pedernales as a continuous space of Anse-à-Pitres.
As a matter of fact, in their narratives, forced migrants reframed Pedernales as a
continuous space of Anse-à-Pitres than a discontinuous one, which appeared in the way
they interchanged the names of places. In the Dominican Republic, the majority of forced
migrants were living in poor, mountainous, and peripheral areas of Pedernales such as
Avila, Mencía, Aguas Negras, Los Arroyos and others. A number of forced migrants I
had conversations with perceived these areas as distinct from St Domingue. In fact, St
Domingue, is the Spanish equivalent of Santo Domingo. Informally, Haitians refer to the
Dominican Republic as Saint Domingue and use the name of Santo Domingo to officially
refer to the capital of the Dominican Republic. Many forced migrants use Saint
Domingue and the Dominican Republic as two distinct places, where Saint Domingue is
seen as just the other side of the border or simply as in juxtaposition with Anse-à-Pitres.
For example, Alina, a young woman who was born in the Dominican Republic,
maintained that she was not in Saint Domingue during an interview: “I wasn’t in Saint
Domingue. I was in a mountain on the other side of the border.” Another woman, Tisia,
when talking about her migration history from Haiti to the Dominican Republic,
maintained that: “I come from Croix-des-Bouquets, Haiti. I crossed to the Dominican
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Republic. From the Dominican Republic, I went to St Domingue.” In the first story,
Alina’s statement expresses a form of geographical continuity when she vaguely situated
where she was living as the other side of the border without referring to the Dominican
Republic. It means to her that the place was so close. The place she refers to is one of the
peripheral areas of the region of Pedernales where the majority of migrants were
working. Tisia’s statement expresses a form of discontinuity between the Dominican
Republic and Saint Domingue as if they were two different countries. Yet, the two places
refer to the same country. These border narratives are sometimes confusing and require
geographical and historical knowledge from audiences in order to understand where
people stand when they talk about space. However, these narratives broaden our
understanding of place as something that is not so much fixed (Hannam, Sheller, Urry
2006), but something that is a center of meaning (Cresswell, 2006) and that can be
culturally constructed by people (Coe 2011). The conception of continuous space rooted
in people’s stories expresses an appropriation of space. Also the forced migrants rely on
their visual knowledge of Pedernales in order to avoid soldiers and cross the border
strategically.
Indeed, the sense of geographical knowledge of Pedernales is an asset in
strategically crossing the border in that it helped forced migrants locate resources and
reconfigure the visual space. Mobility is fraught with risks, so sometimes, the forced
migrants need to run away when soldiers are around and watching the border. Not
knowing the space can be dangerous as they can be forced to surrender and be trapped.
Forced migrants know how to navigate the mountains in order to be at the right place
during their transnational endeavors. The way they define and redefine space illustrates
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how we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how people represent the
world to themselves (Levitt, Schiller 2004). This re-configuration of space according to
people’s desire reflects in Kannèl’s strategies to cross the border. As an undocumented
migrant, going to the Dominican Republic cannot be more perilous for him, but his
knowledge of the space plays an important role in helping him succeed in his move and
circumvent Dominican soldiers. Kannèl explained his strategies crossing the border:
“I have a sister who lives in the Dominican Republic. I always go to see
her, but you know, I don’t have papers. When I am going, when I get in front of
the barracks, sometimes they let me pass. Other times, when they don’t want to let
people cross, I pass behind under the bush. There is a speed bump; once you pass
under it, you appear on a street. They won’t make me return because I appear on
the other street.”
The technique used by Kannèl, juggling different reference points to cross to Pedernales
and recreate space for himself, corroborates Cresswell (2006)’s idea according to which
moving people are agents in the production of time and space. The new space of crossing
created by Kannèl is a transnational space that goes beyond the borders connecting the
two countries. The previous experiences of the displaced people living in Pedernales
helped them develop a good sense of the place and time, which allows them to speculate
about when soldiers are patrolling the border and where they are in the mountains. Those
previous experiences are stored in their memory, recalled, and reused at any given
moment. As Boyarin (1994) suggests, memory becomes the principal medium through
which the forced migrants manipulate time-space.

69

Other migrants use the Pedernales River as a reference point to cross to the city of
Pedernales. I was in the office of SJM with Makdo, Josie, Inès, and Zamy. The latter,
Zamy, has sisters in Pedernales. He does not have legal documents to go to the
Dominican Republic, but by exploring the notion of space, he found a way to go to his
sisters’ house almost every afternoon in Pedernales, which is within a twenty minute
walk from Anse-à-Pitres. He went sometimes to spend time with his sisters and took the
opportunity to charge his phone. Like Kannèl, he was capable of juggling with space.
Zamy usually went to take a bath in the river—which serves as the border between the
two countries—with Dominicans and merged with them. As a “light-skinned man,” he
was invisible to Dominican soldiers. This allowed him to cross to Pedernales once he
finished his bath in the Pedernales River. Each time forced migrants create a small space
within a larger space beyond the border, they challenge imposed fixity by inventing and
reinventing transnational space, which takes shape with the movement of these people
across the border and their agency to produce and reproduce transnational structures.

Conclusion
Finally, an understanding of the event of 2015 that resulted in the displacement of
thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent needs to be contextualized within the history
of the Haitian-Dominican border that informs of the connection and disconnection
between the two peoples and their practices. In fact, the border has played a significant
role in building social and economic relationships between the two peoples. However, the
connecting role of the border is limited, as the Dominican state seeks to own the border,
keeping Haitians out. In complicity with Dominican civilians, the state has secured the
border, making it a barrier to Haitian migrants. Galemba (2013:276) argues that “at
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borders, states may be both present and absent—in terms of providing services and
responding to citizens (Donnan and Wilson 1999).” In the exercise of border policing on
the Anse-à-Pitres border, the Haitian state is totally absent, which gives the Dominican
state the power to impose its domination at the border. Despite the risks that crossing the
border involved, the forced migrants employed many tactics that enabled their mobility
and challenged Dominican surveillance and border power. Their ability in shifting
strategies to brave the danger of crossing is constitutive of power and agency, but this
does not erase the need for documentation to cross the border, something that many
people in Anse-à-Pitres lack.
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CHAPTER 3: DOCUMENTATION AND ID PAPER: THE MATERIALITY OF
DISPLACED PEOPLE’S LIVES
“I was born in Abila (Dominican Republic). I don’t have a cédula. When I
was a child, I think they (my parents) could do it for me but because of their lack
of intelligence, they didn’t. Now it is harder, people can’t register their children.
In the past, it was possible to do it but they didn’t do it for me. My mother and my
father are Haitian. The fact that I don’t have an ID paper; I can’t live on
Dominican land.”
In this statement, Manchina expresses her regret for not having a Dominican identity. As
she was born in the Dominican Republic, according to the law of jus soli, which was in
force in the country at the time she was born or until 2010, she had the right to have a
birth certificate. She blames her parents for her stateless situation. Even though parents
have to be held responsible for providing their children with legal documents, Haitian
parents faced many challenges when registering their children at a Dominican registry.
The absence of a legal document has cost her the right to reside in the Dominican
Republic. Manchina is simply an example of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian origin
who became excluded on the basis of documentation.
This chapter examines how the displaced people have continued to experience
forms of statelessness in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, as most are living without legal documents,
which contributes to marginalizing them. These newly displaced people to Anse-à-Pitres
are living in a state of civil death. By civil death, I refer to the incapacity of these people
to enjoy civil and political rights in society in the same way as legal citizens. As a result,
they are marginalized and isolated from the larger Anse-à-Pitres community. I argue that
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the absence of legal documentation contributes to marginalizing the displaced people,
excluding them from society, leaving them in a state of civil death that constitutes a
barrier to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The lack of a legal document that
confers them Haitian nationality attests to the absence and laxity of the Haitian state in
guaranteeing and protecting the rights of its subjects.
Generally, the invention of a documenting system forms a well constituted
bureaucracy that guarantees administrative control and the construction of subjects,
objects, and socialities (Hull 2012: 253). Documenting individual identity allows modern
governments to control their populations by rendering them legible (Caplan and Torpey
2001). According to Torpey (2000), documenting people gives the state the monopoly of
the legitimate means of movement, endowing the state with the capacity to embrace its
own citizens in order to extract from them the resources they need to reproduce
themselves over time (Torpey 2000). On the other hand, people who are documented are
not only controlled by the state, but they are also endowed with some kind of
empowerment that allows them to exercise political and civil rights in society i.e., engage
in society as full members. In this chapter, I am focusing on specific forms of
documentation that includes birth certificates, passports, and ID cards, which can be
conceived of as technologies of identification that enable states to make their subjects
“legible”— an operation that is essential to modern, democratic state-making (Reddy
2005: 255-256 citing Scott et al.). These kinds of identity document are fundamental to
modern society in most of its aspects and institutions, including government,
employment, education, health, transportation, recreation, social life, property ownership
and legal defense.
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Documentation allows the state to accomplish multiple goals that include labeling
individuals both on its territory and abroad, distinguishing them from outsiders, and
regulating their movements inside and across the boundary of the nation-state. On the one
hand, identity papers force the state objectively to recognize and comprehend people’s
existence (Kaufmann 2004). As such, people who hold identity documents can benefit
from access and communication with the state and institutions that are extensions of the
state (Abrams 2006). On the other hand, documented identity is central to the process of
subjectification, where identity itself becomes akin to paper or material, constantly
shifting into and out of reach—but also capable of being possessed, moved, disregarded,
stored away, and dissolved (Bolker 2018: 319). Through this process of subjectification,
man’s existence is directed and controlled by central agencies (319), hereby, the state.
These ideologies based on processes of subjectification that are central to documentation
can help us to understand the relations between stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres and the
Haitian state. First, by not giving these people ID papers, the state frees itself from all
kinds of responsibilities towards these people. Second, as a result of this gap, the
displaced people become more subjects of themselves than of the state. This lack of
documentation prevents these people from making their identity corporeal (Bolker 2018:
324) i.e., physically visible to the state. In Anse-à-Pitres, many displaced people remain
stateless, as they did not possess any document that granted them Haitian citizenship. I
suggest that their lack of legal identity is attributable to the absence and laxity of the
Haitian state that fails in its state-ness, leaving a gap that fill by designing programs to
document people in Anse-à-Pitres.
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In this chapter, first, I discuss the legal context that led to the statelessness of
Dominicans of Haitian descent and their displacement to Haiti. Through documentation,
the Dominican state concocted a mode of governance that helped it identify and deidentify people on its territory including people of Haitian backgrounds that were stripped
of their citizenship.
Second, I show that the civil registry, which is the institution responsible for the
delivery of birth certificates, is confronted with a series of structural problems because
the state neglects the institution and does not fund it. This lack of attention to the civil
status in local areas is also the consequence of the politics of former Haitian leaders that
aimed to favor urban development over rural.
Third, with the support of CRS (Catholic Relief Service) and USDOL (US
Department of Labor), the SJM has implemented a program of documentation called
PwoKontram (literally Protecting People’s Work Conditions), which helped some
vulnerable people, such as undocumented forced migrant families, to secure birth
certificates. This step towards re-establishing identity papers for these people confers
them citizenship or quasi-citizenship, but also fills in the gap left by the state.
Fourth, I examine how the absence of legal documentation contributes to the
marginalization of the forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres. Their condition of statelessness
constitutes an impediment to their social, economic, and political participation in society
in the same way as legal citizens.
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3.1

Becoming stateless and displaced
In 2010, the Dominican state officially upheld a constitutional amendment that

revoked birthright citizenship to children of undocumented Haitians (Hazel 2014). This
new migration law was followed by a decision of the Dominican Constitutional Court in
2013 after Juliana Deguis Pierre—a Dominican born of undocumented Haitian parents,
who was denied a Dominican ID in 2008—filed a complaint to the court for
discrimination. In 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court decided against her and
made the sentence, called “la sentencia,” retroactive to 1929 (Mahoney and Nolan 2015).
This retroactivity means that not only did this decision (known as decision 168-13)
remove the citizenship of Haitian children born at the moment it was adopted, but the
Dominican state also decided to apply this law against those who were born of
undocumented parents who had entered the country since 1929 (Andreopoulos and Arat
2014). This decision made thousands of Dominicans born of Haitian parents stateless.
Dominican-Haitians, even those who were part of families that had resided in the country
for many generations, were no longer considered Dominican by the state. Being stateless
means that they were not legally authorized to participate in Dominican society such as to
vote, attend schools at a certain level, or work. There was a delay in the application of the
law due to protests by the Haitian government and human rights organizations, but it was
finally implemented in 2015. According to Amnesty International (2015: 6), “a large
number of these people consider the Dominican Republic as their country, since they
were born there and lived there all their life. Often, they have no connection with Haiti,
have never been there, and can barely speak the language. Many of them are the children
or grandchildren of people who are also born on Dominican soil. For these families, the
Dominican Republic has been their homeland for generations.”
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The Dominican state made documentation a mode of governance, whereby
documenting serves as a strategy to exclude Dominican-Haitians from Dominican
citizenship. It is by referring to the Dominican constitution that one may understand how
documentation has been used not simply as an instrument of bureaucratic organizations,
rules, ideologies, knowledge, practices, and subjectivities (Hull 2012: 253), but also as an
instrument of privilege and exclusion (Huffman 2013). As De Genova (2002 cited by
Reeves 2013) suggests, as an anthropologist I do not pretend to become a legal historian
in examining the statelessness of Dominican-Haitians in relation to Dominican law, but I
believe that the knowledge of the legal context allows me to apprehend prior moments
and movements (Coutin and Yngvesson 2006) that are at the root of these people’s
statelessness. In fact, for many decades, the Dominican Republic has recognized jus soli,
which gave the opportunity to anyone born on Dominican soil, except children of people
in transit such as tourists or diplomats, to be entitled with birthright citizenship. This
principle was consecrated by Dominican constitution in its article 11, “all persons born in
the territory of the Dominican Republic” are Dominican citizens (Human Rights Watch
2002). However, children born of Haitian parents have been the object of discrimination
and were not automatically recognized as citizens of the country although their right to
citizenship was clearly stipulated by the law. They had to satisfy a number of
requirements, which is a complex process. When a child is born, Haitian parents need to
obtain a paper that identifies the date and location of the birth of their children from the
hospital’s maternity ward or visit a civil registry to obtain a birth certificate. The registry
requires maternity papers or an affidavit to prove the birth in the country, both of which
are difficult for applicants to find. In addition, at the registry, parents are expected to
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show proof of Dominican citizenship, which officials sometimes reject, presuming that a
child’s parents are Haitian because they are black. Therefore, many Dominican-Haitians
could not obtain a Dominican identity document. This means that the majority of these
people of Haitian origin were stateless and, according to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, were living in a state of permanent illegality (Human Rights Watch
2002). Dominican-Haitians found themselves in the same category as people in transit
who include children of foreign diplomats or of foreigners who were in transit in the
Dominican Republic at the time of birth (22). Those discriminatory practices have been
institutionalized and in 2004, a new immigration law was promulgated, officially treating
temporary foreign workers and undocumented migrant workers as "in transit (Amnesty
International 2015: 6)," which put an end to any possibility for Haitian parents to register
their children born in Dominican territory acquiring Dominican nationality. The refusal
of legal status to Dominican-Haitians forced them out of the Dominican Republic.
Between 2015 and 2016, hundreds of these people arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti where
they expect to be provided with an identity document and conferred Haitian nationality.
In Haiti, they need to go through the civil registry, which is the main state institution in
charge of delivering basic legal documents.

3.2

The Haitian civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres
We cannot talk about documentation in Anse-à-Pitres without talking about the

civil registry, which is in charge of registering people, providing them with birth, death,
and marriage certificates. Generally, the civil registry plays a significant role in the
control of populations in a nation-state. For instance, since 1972, the legislative assembly
of France showed its interest in regulating its citizens’ civil status by adopting a decree
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that stated that “[t]he legislative authority will establish for all inhabitants, without
distinction, the manner in which births, marriages, and deaths will be certified; and it will
designate the public officials who will receive and maintain these files.” (Gérard Noiriel
in Caplan and Torpey 2001: 28. The registration of members of the population was a
governing strategy of the French government but also a way for an individual to become
a member of the civil community. Therefore, the civil registry plays a significant role in
integrating people into society. Following Noiriel (2001) today, the formalities of civil
status are part of administrative routine and constitute the basis for the entire logic of
modern identification practices in society. As a former French colony, Haiti has been
greatly influenced by France in many domains including law. This can be seen with the
creation of Haitian civil registry. Indeed, since the 1970s, Haiti has established a civil
registry, which is evident in the Haitian civil code that requires that each commune has a
civil registrar in office at the center of the community. The tenured civil official is
authorized to receive birth, marriage, recognition, adoption and death certificates, and to
make modifications or rectifications requested by a justice decision. The civil status is
facing many challenges such as the lack of budget and personnel, which prevents it from
responding people who want to obtain a birth certificate. This causes a great number of
the Haitian population to live in effective statelessness. By effective statelessness, I refer
to the type of statelessness that affects children who are living within the country but
whose birth has never been registered (Bhabha, 2011). Indeed, a significant percentage of
the Haitian population is not registered due to problems that are attributable to the
dysfunction of the civil registry.
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Bertin and Drogue (2012), volunteers at the GARR and a representative at a
Haitian community in France respectively, allude to structural and sociological factors in
order to explain the malfunction of the Haitian civil status. First, structurally, they discuss
the lack of civil status offices covering the whole Haitian territory. The registrars and
their clerks are often not qualified for the work because there is not a school they can go
for this purpose. The choice to fill these positions is often political. In addition, there is
no budget to fund the civil registry. This lack of funding is typical of Anse-à-Pitres,
where there is no state investment to support the civil status. Second, they mention that
the population often ignores the procedures and do not value or see the importance of
identity documents. Accordingly, people are often illiterate and do not know what to do
when the procedure to obtain a document is complicated. However, their argument that
Haitians do not give too much importance to documentation does not match the behavior
of people of Anse-à-Pitres toward documentation, especially the forced migrants. The
attitude of forced migrants towards documentation suggests that they possess
documentary literacy, which is the set of skills required to possess and store documents,
so they can be easily accessed (Robertson 2014: 75). For example during my home
visits, some displaced people would pull an identification card or a small piece of paper
that they were given by such organizations as the GARR or UNCHR that serves as
identification out from their wallet. They preserved their identity documents. Besides the
structural and sociological aspects mentioned by Bertin and Drogue, I see, in the
dysfunction of the Haitian civil status, a political line adopted by Haitian political leaders
for decades, that concentrates all efforts in the urban area while abandoning the
countryside (Stepick 1982). This allows urban people to get a birth certificate more
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quickly than people living in the remote areas of the country, including Anse-à-Pitres,
that lack material support and funding. For example, the only press that provides
materials to registries is located in Port-au-Prince, the capital. The difficulty forced
migrants in Anse-à-Pitres faced in obtaining a birth certificate is the consequence of the
politics of marginalization of the state towards a category of Haitian citizens.
Trouillot (1990) gives an idea of how those political and economic choices
worked in poor people’s lives during the Duvalier dictatorship period of 1957-1986 in
Haiti. The Haitian peasants were politically marginalized while they were the productive
force of the country, providing surplus to rich civil servants. Besides taxes that the
peasants had to pay to the state, landlords could also extract additional surplus from them
through various forms of sharecropping (Trouillot 1990: 77). This split of the Haitian
population between urban people and peasants promoted by the former leaders after the
independence of the country was also evidenced in the civil status. Carl Denis argues:
“Even from the point of view of civil status, the difference is clear. The birth certificate
and other civil status documents contain mentions defining the origin of the Haitian. The
native has a "birth certificate (city-dweller)", the peasant a "birth certificate (peasant)
(Pierre 2006: 12).” The politics that consisted in dividing the Haitian people into two
categories have favored urban dwellers over marginalized peasants, who are facing
challenges to register their birth at the civil status in many areas of the country. The
politics of documentation makes peasants doubly marginalized: legally and socially. This
is not without any consequence on the civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres, which works in
poor conditions without any substantial state budget.
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I visited the office of the civil status in downtown Anse-à-Pitres during my
fieldwork to learn more about the challenges that it was facing and how it worked to
provide people with legal documents. A small room in the house of the registrar was used
for the office. When I arrived, there was a clerk working, but there were not many people
with him. In this tiny room, there is no electricity, nor any ventilation in a tropical
country where temperature can escalate to 90-950 Fahrenheit. In the middle of the day,
people are simply sweating. According to the civil registrar, the state does not provide
him with the necessary means to work, such as an office to house the civil status and
forms to do certificates. Therefore, he is using a room in his own house to house the civil
status, because the state gives him only 500 gourdes (USD 31) to rent a location. The
dreadful circumstances in which the registrar is working attest to the negligence of the
state, which does not care about serving its people, and also to the lack of importance
granted to people’s documents that can be easily lost in an insecure place. Almost
everyone I met in Anse-à-Pitres was complaining about the inefficiency of the civil status
in responding to their needs for identity documents. Some people possess a birth
certificate, but they maintain that it is not registered in the national archives located in
Port-au-Prince, which makes it difficult for them to obtain an official copy of their birth
certificate when they need to obtain a passport, for instance. This may be one reason
some institutions, including the French embassy, are suspicious about legal documents
issued in Haiti (Bertin and Drogue 2012). Due to all these difficulties and administrative
problems, many people in Anse-à-Pitres end up not having an identity document or any
valid documentation. This makes Anse-à-Pitres a city of unregistered people, a fact that is
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reflected in people’s stories about their challenges to obtain a birth certificate or a
passport.
In fact, there are two problems that people commonly face in Anse-à-Pitres when
they want to obtain a passport. Some people do not have a birth certificate and others do
have one, but it is not registered in the national archives, so people consider it just a piece
of paper. In fact, an unregistered birth certificate does not have any legal standing.
Missolo lives in Fond-Jeannette and may be considered one of the elites because he is
one of the most educated people in the area. He guided many forced migrants to FondJeannette after they were forced out of the Dominican Republic. As a result, all forced
migrants in the area know him as he has continued to support them in the absence of the
state. During a focus group, Missolo talked about his own experience when he wanted to
get a passport. He paid about 12,500 HT gourdes (USD 208), 25 times higher than the
normal price, for a passport that was supposed to cost him 500 HT gourdes. During a visit
with an SJM employee, Missolo said: “I am happy you come here. In Fond-Jeannette
only my brother and I have a birth certificate. I had to pay 12,500 HT gourdes to have a
passport, spending much to go to Port-au-Prince.” In Anse-à-Pitres, all categories of the
population are the victims of the lack of documentation. Among the migrant population,
though, the absence of documentation is more blatant.
The majority of forced migrants did not have a birth certificate at the time of my
research in Anse-à-Pitres, between 2016 and 2017. Even though their children were born
in the Dominican Republic, they could not register them because the Dominican state
rules out this possibility. They could not obtain a delivery certificate from the hospital,
which pushed many people to give birth at home. Without such a document, they were
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not able to register their children at the Dominican local civil registry. Their fate was
sealed when, in 2010, the Dominican state abrogated the jus soli replacing it by jus
sanguinis (right of blood), ruled to prevent Haitian children from being registered at the
Dominican civil status, and removed the citizenship of people of Haitian descent. In
2014, due to pressure from human rights organizations, the Dominican Constitutional
court that declared Dominican-Haitians stateless has ordered the National Council of
Immigration to create a regularization plan called PNRE (National Alien Regulation
Plan) in order to allow the stateless people to apply to re-acquire Dominican nationality.
However, the procedure was complicated, considering that the documents required by the
Dominican state constitute a barrier to these people who do not have any identification
papers and the short deadline within which people had to submit applications. At the end
of this program of regularization in 2015, organizations of Dominican and Haitian civil
society such as GARR (Groupe d’Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Rapatriés) and CEDESO
(Centro de Desarrollo Sostenible) simply considered it a failure by maintaining that: “We
express our grave concern over the closing date of the National Alien Regulation Plan
(PNRE), which leads to the acceleration of abusive and illegal deportations by
CESFRONT's immigration agents and soldiers in the Dominican Republic (Jean Baptiste
2015).” As a consequence, thousands of Dominicans born of Haitian descent were
already stateless before they became displaced in Anse-à-Pitres. When adding these
forced migrants to long-term residents without documentation a significant number of
stateless people now live in Anse-à-Pitres.
In 2017, after a visit in the Dominican Republic, where many thousands of people
of Haitian backgrounds were facing a lack of documentation preventing them from
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applying for the regulation of their status, the elected Haitian president, Jovenel Moïse,
promised to facilitate these people’s acquisition of identity documents, particularly ID
cards and passports. With the intervention of the president, structures were created in
Port-au-Prince, with the hope that they would be extended to the rest of the country, in
order to deliver identity documents. However, in reality, the documentation crisis
persisted, as the system remains corrupt and slow to respond to peoples’ requests for
documentation. In Anse-à-Pitres, some organizations or agencies, such as SJM and
GARR, entered the process in order to help vulnerable people acquire documentation,
especially birth certificates. The SJM has launched campaigns of mobilization about
documentation, organizing meetings and focus groups to which it invited local
representatives and representatives of the national state. However, these representatives
failed to attend apart from some local authorities from the rural area (CASEC) who do
not exercise any real power. The intervention of the SJM came in support to a state that
remains passive and sluggish despite the increased number of stateless people in the
commune after the arrival of the forced migrants.
3.2.1 Towards supporting the civil status: SJM’s documentation project of
PwoKontram
When the forced migrants were entering Anse-à-Pitres in 2015, representatives of
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] were present at various
border crossings. The UNHCR workers issued papers to some families, that contained
individual’s names and pictures of family members, but those papers did not indicate
places of birth. The purpose was limited, but essential, namely to provide something from
the United Nations that recognized these migrants and refugees and enabled them to

85

request replacement birth certificates from civil registrar’s offices in Haiti. Also in the
border region, particularly in Anse-à-Pitres, the SJM, a non-profit, lay organization,
dedicated to the realization of social work, accompanies migrants, supports them, and
helps them resettle and re-establish their lives.
The alarming situation of people without documents in Anse-à-Pitres has been
taken seriously by the SJM, which, with the support of the CRS and USDOL,
implemented a project called PwoKontram (Literally Protecting humans’ work
conditions) to provide birth certificates to a few forced migrant families and other
vulnerable persons in the commune of Anse-à-Pitres. To launch the project, the SJM,
through its promoter and monitors on the ground, organized information sessions with
local authorities, the civil registrar, representatives of local and international
organizations, and members of the civil society of Anse-à-Pitres. It also organized three
focus groups: one in Fond-Jeannette and two in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, during which
people discuss the documentation issue. According to SJM agents in Anse-à-Pitres,
PwoKontram is the continuation of a documentation project that started in 2013. At that
time, the project worked in a specific area in Anse-à-Pitres called Bas-Réfugiés with
people who were repatriated from the Dominican Republic. These people were given a
birth certificate by the SJM. PwoKontram is more inclusive though. It encompasses not
only migrants, but also vulnerable people throughout the commune of Anse-à-Pitres. SJM
also hired more monitors and increased the number of birth certificates issued.
PwoKontram was a continuing opportunity to prove the usefulness of SJM/SFw-Haïti’s
accompaniment mission. Through this program, SJM used a bottom up approach,
whereby its employees went to meet with people seeking the best way to serve them.
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During the course of the documentation project, SJM staff met with different
categories of the population through informational sessions and focus groups, inviting
people to discuss how they would like SJM to assist them in the process of obtaining a
birth certificate. People underlined many issues that result from the fact that people do
not have documentation. For example, schoolteachers and directors, who were at an SJM
meeting, complained that children came to register at school without any documentation.
At a certain level of primary school, these children need at least a birth certificate in order
to be allowed to participate in official state exams. The lack of documentation also affects
adults of various ages. For adults, the birth certificate cost is higher, as the registrar asked
them to pay a sum of money that covers all years since their birth to the present year.
People at the meeting raised another problem concerning the place that people have
chosen to obtain their birth certificates. The challenges faced by many people attempting
to obtain birth certificates in the commune of Anse-à-Pitres has led some parents to try to
acquire birth certificates for them and their children in other places, such as Thiottes or
Port-au-Prince, which causes a jurisdictional problem. For instance, one man who
participated in a focus group, declared “here (in Fond-Jeannette), people don’t have birth
certificates. Some people go to make “a piece of paper” in Thiottes. They don’t know if it
is registered or not. They won’t be able to have any service in Anse-à-Pitres.”As a matter
of fact, the change of jurisdiction does not change their nationality and their belonging to
the Haitian state, but it can affect their belonging to their local community, for example,
if they want to vote or be elected in that place. Their participation can be contested by
long-term residents.
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The SJM considered people’s complaints and promised to help them acquire a
birth certificate and probably a certificate from the national archives. However, the SJM
national representatives recognize their limits in terms of the resources available. Even
when discounting the thousands stateless in the border region, the United Nations
Children’s Fund [UNICEF] estimates that approximately twenty percent of all children
under five years of age actually born in Haiti do not have proper identification such as
birth certificates (Joseph 2015). This failure of the state has adverse and lifelong
consequences for Haitians, children and parents alike. Simply put, SJM feels compelled
to provide such parents and their children the opportunity to acquire identification in the
form of birth certificates. Children will need them to attend school in Haiti. During
interviews, one woman explained that her children were refused admission to a Haitian
school due to the lack of identity papers for her children. Therefore, at least by providing
birth certificates, SJM hopes to promote migrant integration into community life in Anseà-Pitres, where most of them already feel ostracized. To accomplish this, SJM
collaborates with representatives of other local organizations such as OJIDACA
(Organisation des Jeunes Dévoués pour l’Avancement de la Commune de l’Anse-àPitres), Espace Jeune, Kore Fanmi, and local authorities. The legal process, however, can
be complicated. Here is a typical chain of events leading to issuance of a birth certificate
by SJM:
1.

Registration of people’s personal information by an SJM promoter

and monitors in Anse-à-Pitres and in the migrant camps
2.

Delivery of the registration forms to the civil registrar, the civil

status representative in Anse-à-Pitres
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3.

Transfer of registers from the civil registrar to the public

prosecutor’s department in Jacmel
4.

Sending of these registers by the government commissioner to the

ministry of Justice in Port-au-Prince
5.

Consignment of these documents by the ministry of Justice to the

national archives, which register the birth certificates
Of note, the civil registrar of Anse-à-Pitres has publicly stated his willingness to facilitate
and accept the issuance of birth certificates for migrants and refugees who lack them.
Encouraged by this, SJM has opened an office in Anse-à-Pitres, from where its migration
and human rights monitors and a promoter spread through different camps in order to
register people and transfer the forms to the office of the civil registrar. This
humanitarian response is all happening at the local level, without intervention or interest
from the national government.
This action is nonetheless happening in relatively peaceful fashion, albeit in the
midst of serious challenges. Tens of thousands of people have escaped one hardship for
another. Their legal marginalization is likely to continue with a lack of state intervention,
in what some would call a state of “civil death.” Despite this, organizations such as SJM
and its partners continue with its mission, hoping to impart the human rights spirit to
those living in the far southeast corner of Haiti. Many of those who have crossed the
border have already suffered identity deprivation and persecution in the Dominican
Republic. For lack of documentation, some have been denied education, work protection
or healthcare (Bartlett 2012, as cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, Amnesty
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International 2007, Lozano and Wooding 2008; Wooding and Mosley-Williams 2004) or
have been expelled from the country after being discriminated against.

3.3

Statelessness and its social corollary in the lives of the displaced people
Having a nationality has been recognized as a fundamental right under

international law (Dembour 2015) because it is intertwined with the enjoyment of human
rights and integration into society. Otherwise, without a nationality, people become
stateless, which exposes them to multiple forms of vulnerability, precarity, and
displacement. In general, statelessness is referred to as the condition of having no
nationality or legal citizenship (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006). Following Kerber (2007),
I argue that statelessness may be conceived not only as a status, but also as a practice,
based on the consequences that may result from it. For instance, Agamben (1998) argues
that the rejection of a stateless person by the state makes them an outcast, taboo, and
dangerous in their own society. This rejection of stateless people seems to be apparent in
Anse-à-Pitres where forced migrants are ostracized and considered the main cause of
violence and insecurity by the Haitian state and long-term residents in Anse-à-Pitres. In
addition, the forced migrants arrived in a country that continues to strive to get back on
its feet after the devastating 2010 earthquake and ongoing social and political
instabilities.
While in Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, Hurricane Matthew hit the country and claimed
the lives of about 1,000 Haitian people (Le Figaro 2016). Although their lives were
spared and the hurricane damage was less extensive in comparison to the rest of the
country, the community is still living with fear considering the fragility of their small
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houses made of cardboard, pieces of clothes, and covered with tarpaulin; in other terms,
the incapacity of their slums to stand when natural disasters threaten. Even if being in
Haiti provides them a sense of freedom escaping Dominican fear and the reminiscence of
the terror created by the Dominican dictator Trujillo with the pogrom of the 1930s, their
lives in Haiti remain insecure and precarious. Food insecurity, poor lodging, poor access
to drinkable water, and the inability to work due to being stateless are among all the
issues they have to deal with in order to start a new life in Haiti. Medi’s statement ,
during a focus group at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, describes his experience of
displacement and the paradox of Anse-à-Pitres as a place that juxtaposes sense of
freedom and suffering when he maintains: “We are quiet. We see that we are living well
but there is no change. We have hunger in our stomach, morning, noon, and night.” It
should be noted that by “living well,” Medi is referring to the sense of freedom that being
in Anse-à-Pitres provided him, but his experience since his displacement is one of
precarity and uncertainty.
I use the expression: “having peace in their heart [sense of freedom] but not in
their stomach [meaning hunger]”to summarize the meaning people give to their transition
from the Dominican Republic to Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, where they continue to live in
precarious conditions. This peace is basic and equates to the simple fact that they are not
living with the fear of deportation. It has nothing to do with the enjoyment of social and
economic rights in Haiti. In other words, it does not palliate their needs of being legally
integrated into the community. Their situation reminds me of Breton and Yelvington
(1999), who saw the emancipation of the former enslaved as a road strewn with pitfalls
when they argued that “by the end of 19th century, if Caribbean people were indeed free,
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everywhere they were in chains.” Those chains for displaced people correlate with
capitalist-driven processes and the enactment of migration laws that rendered them
stateless, but also with their conditions in Anse-à-Pitres, where both residents and the
local state see their future as uncertain and their presence as illegitimate and flawed
(Zayas 2015).
The precarity6 of the people displaced in Anse-à-Pitres can be defined within the
parameters of those structural circumstances linked with the world of neoliberal
capitalism and the adoption of unfair laws, but also their condition of living in a state of
civil death that prevents them from reaching human development, which is the
satisfaction of their multidimensional well-beings. Without a legal identity or a valid
identity that is registered in the national archives, the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres
liken their lives to animals, or as people who are living, but do not exist. For instance, I
went to participated in a focus group about documentation with SJM staff in FondJeannette, a remote place located in the periphery of Anse-à-Pitres. During the meeting, a
man living in the area put all people’s complaints together and claimed that “Animals
6 Precarity

has been linked with ‘anomie, anger, anxiety, and alienation’ in the face of
contemporary politics, what is conceived as ‘a class-in-the-making’ (Lazar and Sanchez
2019). Allison (2013) refers to precarity as a form of suffering that is the outcome of
being trapped by the instabilities and inequalities of neoliberal globalism. For instance,
she shows how many Japanese accepted to do dangerous jobs that entail risks and death
in order to take advantage of job opportunities generated by the 2011 earthquake. In
Haiti, forced migrants find themselves in this kind of society that she describes where
hope has turned scarce and the future has become bleak or inconceivable altogether
(Allison 2013). The displaced people’s precarity and uncertainty can be defined
according to circumstances that include the migration law taken by the Dominican state
that not only displaced these people but also led to their dispossession, the absence of the
Haitian state to care for their well-being and the political and economic choices of the
leaders of that country that only increased inequalities and endemic poverty, their
vulnerability to exploitation by outsiders, and the lack of opportunities in Haiti,
particularly Anse-à-Pitres.
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have paper, but we as people, we don’t have a birth certificate.” His statement is
reminiscent of Gordillo (2006)’s observation, whereby he has shown how not having
documents discriminated against Toba and Wichi, making them vulnerable to violence.
These people simply saw themselves as animals, when they entrusted to him: "Without
documentos, you can do nothing. That's the custom of this law. We didn't have
documentos. They treated us like dogs.” The Haitian state proves to be lax in providing
its citizens with ID papers. The generalized lack of documentation of people in Anse-àPitres attests to the absence of a state that cares for the wellbeing of its people, which
consequently leads to the marginalization of a wide range of members of its population.
Forced migrants blame the Haitian state for their state of precarious existence
because according to them, the state does not support them. In Anse-à-Pitres, it is not
easy to locate the state. Upon the arrival of the forced migrants in Haiti, in a discourse
held by the former president Michel Joseph Martelly on June 2015, the state promised to
welcome the forced migrants with dignity contending: “Haiti is ready to stand up straight
to receive with dignity its children, our brothers (Alphonse 2015)”. However, I did not
notice any involvement of the state with the forced migrants. In Anse-à-Pitres, there are
two ways one may locate the state in the forced migrants’ lives. Its inefficiency creates a
vacuum for falseness and racketeering and its absence leads to the intervention of private
organizations that come to fill the gap. On the one hand, the inefficiency of the state can
be located in its incapacity to deliver legal or good documents to people, who have to
turn to a lawyer for the legality of birth certificates written by a registrar. On the other
hand, the absence of the state is expressed in people’s narratives that show the retreat of
the state from caring for people’s wellbeing. For instance, Anissa finished her journey in
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the Dominican Republic when she was deported by the authorities of this country. After
coming to Haiti, she lived with her family in Tête Source. However, those family ties do
not constitute a network that can help her mitigate poverty. She feels that she lacks the
support of the state as she contends: “I don’t find any support from the state. We are here;
we are living badly. When we find something, we take it; when we don’t find anything,
we accept. We are in our country.” By expressing her belonging to the country even
without a legal document that can establish this identification, Anissa is demonstrating
that she depends on a state which disappeared shortly after the displaced people have
arrived in Anse-à-Pitres.

Conclusion
In Anse-à-Pitres, most forced migrants continued to live without any legal
identity. The civil registry, which is endowed with the attribution to document people, is
facing many structural problems including the lack of materials and state funding. The
SJM provided the institution with some material support, but this was far from solving
the evils that erode the civil registry. These challenges can help explain why many people
in Anse-à-Pitres are undocumented. Drogue and Bertin (2012) contend that,
sociologically, many Haitian people do not value documentation because they do not see
its importance in their lives. People of Anse-à-Pitres, particularly the displaced people,
develop a different behavior towards documentation though. As people who are crossing
the border frequently, they consider having an identity document a door to the freedom of
movement and job opportunities.
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When seeking to understand the causes behind the generalized statelessness in
Anse-à-Pitres, while some think that the lack of documentation is attributable to the
parents who do not declare their children after birth or to the illiteracy problems in Haiti,
the majority consider it to be the state’s fault. The state is represented by the civil status,
which is the institution invested with the power to issue birth certificates. However,
through the structural aspects I explained earlier, the state demonstrates a lot of
deficiency in this role of documenting people. It is by referring to the weakness of the
civil status in Anse-à-Pitres and the intervention of organizations in the lives of the
displaced people that we may locate the state. First, people could not understand why the
state, represented by the civil registrar, delivered birth certificates that are not good to
thousands of people. Second, people maintain that they did not see any willingness of the
state to contribute to the functioning of the civil state. For instance, the civil registrar of
Anse-à-Pitres maintained that for a long time the office had been running out of materials
such as registry forms, which should be provided by the National Press, a state-owned
institution. According to the registrar, the state owes the National Press many million
Haitian gourdes, which made people at a meeting ironically say “the state owes the state.”
The incapacity of the Haitian state to meet the needs of its population forces it to
comply with the rules of organizations that are often accountable to their donors and their
funding state rather than to local people. For instance, SJM received funding from CRS
and the US department of labor (USDOL) for the documentation program. While the
SJM develops direct proximity to the local people that it is supporting, at the same time,
it has to be accountable to its donors; this was visible to me through the visits made by
CRS representatives in Anse-à-Pitres to obtain a report of the documentation program
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executed by the SJM. The intervention of private organizations in matters of
documentation is an outcome of the inefficiency of the state in making social, political
and economic choices, including providing people with a legal identity that could help
them integrate into society and benefit from basic services. As Bhabha (2011) suggests,
legal identity does not guarantee a good life, but its absence is a serious impediment to it.
As I argue in this chapter, the absence of a legal identity or a nationality puts the
displaced and stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres in a state of civil death, that is, the
impossibility to enjoy basic social and civil rights, which contributes to their
marginalization.
By exploring the materiality and the interactions between people and the state, I
show that documentation can constitute a form of governmentality. This contributes to
anthropological inquiry into documentation. This legal dimension of documentation can
be expanded to a larger perspective where documentation and borders intersect to
broaden our understanding of the interactions between people and the modern state, but
also our understanding of how documentation governs the lives of both documented and
undocumented people. As I discuss in the next chapter, because of the lack of legal
documentation, many forced migrants found it necessary to seek opportunities in the
informal economy.
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CHAPTER 4: THE INFORMAL ECONOMIC PRACTICES OF THE FORCED
MIGRANTS AND EMANCIPATION

I was sitting at the SJM office helping the staff with the registration of people for
the documentation program I described earlier. It was at that time I met Bonèl, a man in
his late fifties, who went to the Dominican Republic in 1992. He entered Haiti during the
mass expulsion in 2015 and took up residence at the camp of Maletchipe in Anse-àPitres. With six children, Bonèl had to work hard to start a new life. During our
conversation, he told me: “We have a family. We can’t stay home. I need to do
something to earn the bread to give to the children. Someone can give you 50 gourdes but
it is not every day. You need to do something.”
Bonèl shows the struggle the forced migrants endure just to survive from day to
day, in spite of the poor access to resources. As an old man, Bonèl may not be able to
work as hard as he used to in the past, but he understands the obligation to do something
in order to not be dependent on other people. In Anse-à-Pitres, the only way he can create
a livelihood to support his family is through the informal economy. This is the same
desire that defines Bonèl and many forced migrants as agents of their own development,
in the absence of support from the state and organizations.
This chapter examines the everyday survival practices of the forced migrants. I
argue that the displaced people exercise important forms of agency in and over their lives
by mobilizing resources through undertaking informal economic practices instead of
relying on the increasingly strained resources in Anse-à-Pitres. I show how using the
informal economy as a source of survival brings meaning to the displaced people’s lives,
and that this meaning is more valuable than the money they generate from it. The
97

meaning that these people found in the informal economy includes values and beliefs that
infuse their everyday matter of living (Browne and Milgram 2009).
The informal economy refers to economic activities that are not regulated by the
state (Neve 2005) and are generally used by poor people who face barriers to their
participation in the formal economy. While the informal economy is to be found in north
and global south countries, it has become very important in global south countries with
the collapse of the state (Meagher 2010). As Saskia Sassen (2014) argues, this expansion
of the informal economy may, in some ways, be considered an outcome of diverse forms
of expulsions in the global economy causing displacement, unemployment and
impoverishment. The engagement of forced migrants in the informal economy can be
understood within this context, as their expulsion from the Dominican Republic also
excluded them from a Dominican economy driven by global capital and neoliberalism,
which has spread throughout the global south. For instance, neoliberal measures adopted
by the Bolivian state led to disastrous effects such as the destruction of agricultural
production and the discontinuation of subsidy programs for farmers, which forced the
majority of the population into poverty and unemployment. As a consequence, Bolivia
has become home to the largest informal sector of any country in Latin America, with
nearly 80% of employment in both rural and urban areas being in the informal economy
(Goldstein 2016: 33). The informal sector includes activities that many people engage in
daily, including unregulated commerce and more illicit activities such as drug dealing,
smuggling, and prostitution (Goldstein 2016). In Haiti, the informal economy constitutes
the main sector of activity for the majority of the population, who suffers from high
unemployment. The informal economic practices of the forced migrants are part of the

98

Haitian informal sector. However, for the forced migrants, they take place both in and
beyond their communities in Haiti.
In this chapter, first, I demonstrate that colonial history has shaped forced
migrants contemporary informal economic activities. Working on the side has been used
by Caribbean enslaved people as a strategy to reproduce themselves and avoid being
dependent solely on poor nutrition provided by colonizers.
Second, I trace the economic practices of the forced migrants while they were
living in the Dominican Republic. I refer to their past economic experiences to examine
how they shape present dynamics.
Third, I look at the picture of the local economy in Anse-à-Pitres, which rests
upon fishing, commercial activities, and, to a small extent, agriculture. The deficiency of
these sectors of activities demonstrates the lack of production in Anse-à-Pitres and
explains why the local economy is mostly about consumption.
Fourth, I discuss the activities the forced migrants undertake in the Dominican
Republic, and how these activities allow them to generate sources of income that help
them sustain their lives.
Fifth, in the absence of state support, the SJM has intervened in the lives of the
forced migrants, providing some development aid to them in the form of microcredit that
consists more of a form of aid than a credit.
Finally, I show that forced migrants’ informal economic practices are far from
helping them achieve material well being. What really helps them survive is the meaning
that the engagement in those activities brings to their lives.
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4.1

Present economic behavior and colonial history
Colonial history has shaped the present-day informal economy of Caribbean poor

people, including the forced migrants, in particular ways. The slave-based economies in
the Caribbean region were part of the capitalist system with the Caribbean people as
producers for the European market, making this region an appendage of the world
economy (Bonham 1992). In this form of global economy, the producers, in their position
of colonized, were powerless in comparison to the wealthy consumers. They were simply
accumulating capital for European colonizers. As a result, they did not own their labor
and were marginalized. In order to survive, these enslaved people were forced to develop
informal economic practices outside the plantations. For instance, Wolf (1982) suggests
that former slaves worked personal gardens and later, following emancipation, employed
their labor as market forces of production for their own subsistence.
Furthermore, some scholars have documented how slaves have developed
underground economies out of the main economic stream of the plantations in order to
respond to their needs. Their informal economic practices included dedicating themselves
to agricultural activities and trading that allowed them to compensate for the lack of
support they received from the colonizers. For example, slaves developed household
economies by devoting their free time to activities such as tending gardens, collecting
firewood and making charcoal, repairing houses, making handicrafts, engaging in food
collecting activities, and marketing and trading (Handler and Wallman 2014: 448).
According to Forret (2004), many slaves diligently raised and sold their own crops, and
tended horses and livestock throughout the antebellum South. They also traded a wide
range of commodities stolen from their masters or produce from their gardens that
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included chickens, turkeys, beef to poor whites, and, which helped them to acquire
nonessential luxuries or specialty foodstuffs that were not as readily obtained on the
plantation (790-791).
Finally, after emancipation, white elites of the Caribbean region continued to have
an upper hand on major economic resources. As a result of these colonial and neocolonial
processes that made and continue to make resources the prerogative of small dominant
groups, former enslaved tried to develop several different income sources such as
working for wages on the plantation, or renting or squatting on small pieces of land
which would be cultivated by the women and children, and which helped them to carve
out new lives on their own terms (Bridget and Yelvington 1999: 6). These examples,
rooted in colonial history, highlight the agency of marginalized people. In the same vein,
forced migrants show combativeness and agency despite economic and social constraints,
drawing upon informal economic practices that range from selling their labor, making
charcoal, logging, and gardening in order to build lives of their own making in Anse-àPitres, Haiti.

4.2

Economic activities back in the Dominican Republic
During a visit to the camp of Parc Cadeau, I met with Anicia, a woman in her

forties, who was born in Altagracias, Dominican Republic. Her father died and left her
undocumented. She complained to me about her situation of having neither Dominican
documentation nor a Haitian ID card. She has a deep regret that as a Dominican born, she
could not secure a Dominican legal identity and it was because of this that she was
deported to Anse-à-Pitres. I was interested in knowing how she made a living in such a
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situation. We were sitting on a bench at the entrance of the camp Parc Cadeau #2 on a
sunny day, talking. Physically, Anicia appears strong and determined even though she
was pushed by the deep poverty in the camp. Anicia agreed that her life was not the same
in the Dominican Republic. She remembered her life just two years from the time I met
with her: “In the Dominican Republic, I worked at people’s houses. My husband did
agricultural work. Sometimes, I did small commerce but it is not big thing. I used to sell
small sweets on the street.” Without any legal document, the economic activities
performed by Anicia and her husband were part of the informal sector. They were the
strategies she used to provide for the family. Interestingly, her sources of income were
diversified because of her husband who engaged in agricultural labor. Now, sitting in
Anse-à-Pitres without undertaking any economic activity, Anicia does not feel
comfortable. Even though she was not earning much in the Dominican Republic, she
could have done something to “make do.” Many Haitians who were living in the
Dominican Republic had a similar experience, where they managed to make a living
through working off the books.
The displaced population found in Anse-à-Pitres is composed of many young
people in their twenties who were born in the Dominican Republic, and adult men and
women between their thirties and sixties originating from proximate areas such as BelleAnse, Thiottes, and Fonds-Verretes, who migrated to the Dominican Republic during the
twentieth and twenty first century to work mainly in the agricultural sector. The majority
of their labor was informal and uncontrolled, as most crossed the border without legal
documents and integrated into the unregulated work available in the country (Wooding
and Bridget 2004: 15). However, some migrants entered with temporary work permits, as
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the Haitian government signed agreements with Dominican companies to recruit Haitian
workers, among other West Indians, as a source of cheap labor. Emigration fees and
recruiting permits became the Haitian government’s largest internal source of revenue
(Martinez 1999). For example, in 1980 around 200,000 Haitians were permanently
residing in the Dominican Republic, of which 70,000 were workers in various sectors, but
especially in agricultural work (Grasmuck and Pesar 1991). This suggests that before
being driven out of the country, forced migrants’ labor was a significant contribution to
Dominican agriculture. This trend is confirmed by Lauren Derby (1994: 516), who
argued that Haitians constituted the very center of economic life in the various
Dominican border economies, which were rooted in agriculture and pastoralism. In the
Dominican Republic, most forced migrants lived in the mountainous regions and worked
the land and could have their own gardens even though they had to share the harvest with
Dominican landowners. Besides this, they raised cattle and owned horses, pigs, goats and
chickens. Therefore, the forced migrants have not always been totally dispossessed. Even
though they earned very little, many of them attested that their life was better in the
Dominican Republic than in Haiti. Economically, they had more opportunities as they
could work in the agricultural sector, have small businesses, and perform domestic labor.
They felt that they had some control over their lives and were able to take care of
themselves and their families.
Mina was brought to the Dominican Republic by her mother when she was a
child. She was forced to leave the country in the summer of 2015 because of Dominican
threat and is living in the camp of Parc Cadeau with four children. She arrived in Anse-àPitres with nothing: “I didn’t take anything. I came with nothing. The gardens I did
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stayed down there, my old animals stayed behind; robbers took them. We came like this
with our empty hands.” Being displaced in Haiti in such a state of material
dispossession, her situation went from bad to worse. In the Dominican Republic, she had
different sources of income with her husband. She told me: “In the Dominican Republic,
I used to do commerce. My husband did agriculture.” These activities allowed the family
to survive in the country and support themselves in the face of marginalization.
Some forced migrants who had a family contend that, in the Dominican Republic,
they were able to combine salaries from agricultural work and other activities. For
instance, sometimes, the husband cultivated the earth while the wife managed a small
business. She could sell at home or in the street as a mobile merchant. Lwiz is living at
the camp of Tête-à-l’Eau, which is located on the Anse-à-Pitres-Pedernales border. She
was brought to the Dominican Republic when she was only one year old by her mother,
who went in search of a better life in the 1980s. Lwiz had spent her entire life there, from
being raised to giving birth to her four children, before she was displaced to Anse-àPitres, Haiti in 2015. When she was living in the Dominican Republic, the family’s
income came from both her selling and her husband’s agricultural labor; as she put it:
“When I was in the Dominican Republic, my husband was working the land. Me, I was
doing small businesses. I used to sell rice, all things, flour, and oil. I sold in wholesale.”
She felt good about her life experience in the Dominican Republic: “We were good
because we were working doing businesses, gardening, harvesting our peas, many
quintals of peas. We used to get money.” Lwiz was able to diversify the household
economy rather than depend only on agricultural work, which helped the family survive.
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For Anicia and other forced migrants, living in the Dominican Republic had both
positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the Dominican Republic offered them
some economic opportunities, as they could perform some informal odd jobs and raise
cattle, but on the other hand, this country remains in their memory as one that
marginalized, excluded, and materially dispossessed them, and that, in return, took back
what it economically gave them. Carmelia translates this situation of the Dominican
Republic as both positive and negative for the forced migrants. Her entire life was spent
in the Dominican Republic and her contribution to the Dominican agricultural economy
bears indelible prints as she had an active life working, gardening: “In the Dominican
Republic, I used to cultivate the earth planting fruit trees. We had a big yard with
avocado trees, coffee, and mango trees.” In this sense, in the Dominican Republic, she
could generate some income in the margins of the formal economy. However, she was
forced to leave on the spot. When a Dominican soldier asked her to leave, she said: “How
should we go without any money? We gardened and it was lost.” The Dominican
Republic represents the country that gave them something and at the same time that
brutally dispossessed them. This dispossession is apparent through the system of
sharecropping, which consists of working on the property Dominican owners and also
giving the owners a fifth of the harvest.
The conditions of the sharecropping system between workers and their
landowners vary. If, for example, the worker bought the seed himself/herself, he/she
could keep a great part of the harvest, but if, on the contrary, it was the landowner who
gave the seed, the worker would obtain a very small part of the harvest after the
landowner had retrieved their profit and the equivalent of their investment. In 2016, I met

105

Ruben, a man in his fifties, at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. He went to the Dominican
Republic in 2003 and was forced to return to Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. During his 12 years
in the Dominican Republic, he worked as a sharecropper on Dominican land: “When I
was in the Dominican Republic, I grew peas and corn. The landowner gave me the seed.
He put everything on his notebook. During the harvest, he took off everything that he
invested. You almost had nothing left. You only had something to eat.” In the case of
Ruben, the landowner was the one who decided to retrieve his part of the harvest. Some
Dominican owners did not strictly observe the one-fifth rule though. According to some
forced migrants who worked in the system, even though they provided the seed, some
landowners left everything to the discretion of the workers as far as the sharing of the
harvest is concerned; the workers decided the quantity they wanted to give to the
landowners. Anous’ Dominican boss was good because Anous could borrow money from
him to buy the seed. However, after getting his money back from the harvest, there was
almost nothing left for him. These kinds of unequal relationships demonstrate how it was
hard for Haitian agricultural workers to make a profit from their own labor. Entering into
a contract with a landowner was the only way they could have access to the land, which
gives Dominicans total control over the labor of these workers. This control of workers’
labor by owners makes the Dominican Republic look a society, where the transition from
slave labor to free wage still persisted after emancipation (Martinez 1999). This idea is
also reinforced by the fact that the Haitian laborers were constrained to sell the harvest
either to Dominican wholesalers, who came to pick them with their trucks, or at the
binational market controlled by Dominicans. As Anous said, “the harvest was sold in
Pedernales at the binational market. Dominicans also came to buy our goods with their
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trucks. Then, we could go to the market to buy what we need.” This means that the
Haitian workers sold their products for a cheap price to Dominican buyers and earned
very little from their participation in agricultural labor.
As discussed above, the displaced people explain that the Dominican Republic
offered them economic opportunities, especially in the agricultural sector. Both men and
women were engaged in informal economic practices that allowed them to live on a dayto-day basis. However, these opportunities were often eclipsed by exploitation by
Dominican landowners and the constant fear they were going through. Despite
everything, they did not stop to compare their lives in the Dominican Republic with their
lives in Anse-à-Pitres, where the economic opportunities are lacking.

4.3

Sector of activities and economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti7
The Anse-à-Pitres local economy rests upon fishing, commercial exchange with

the Dominican Republic, and, to a lesser extent, agriculture.
Because of its accessible coasts, some peasants of Anse-à-Pitres are able to
practice artisanal fishing. Requiring only low-technology such as small boats and nets,
this activity can primarily be considered part of fishermen’s own subsistence and sales,
whereby they feed themselves and sell the surplus at the local market. There does not
exist an installed fishing industry in this border city, nor any sort of funding for people

7

Anse-à-Pitres is located in the south-east of Haiti and close to Pedernales, Dominican Republic. This
proximity facilitates commercial exchange between the two cities, which constitutes a great part of the
local economy.
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who undertake this activity. The fishermen work in both Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. In Anse-à-Pitres, this activity mainly takes place in an area called Récif, and to
a much lower degree in Anse-à-Pitres downtown area. A significant number of coastal
people of the city live on fishing. In the Dominican Republic, Haitian people in Anse-àPitres, who have the Dominican identification called cédula, or Haitians with the
complicity of Dominican friends, can have their fishing boats registered by the
Dominican local state. This allows them to conduct fishing activity in the Dominican sea.
I had a conversation with a local fisherman in Anse-à-Pitres, whom I call Natan. At that
time, he was preparing a fish trap. He said: “I work with a Dominican. I stretch out my
fish trap in the sea and go to retrieve it after many days later. The Dominican boss shares
the fishing harvest with me.” Despite interdiction from the Dominican state, some
unauthorized people from Anse-à-Pitres circumvent Dominican soldiers and go to fish at
night. According to local people, because of the implementation of fishing regulations,
the Dominican sea is less exploited, and as a consequence, is richer in fish than the
Haitian side, which is why it attracts Haitian fishers. Sometimes conflicts happen
between Haitians and Dominicans. In January 2015, Dominican soldiers arrested seven
Haitian fishermen and confiscated their boats. Haitians retaliated by closing the
Dominican consulate in Anse-à-Pitres. The situation escalated to violence between the
two peoples, whereby Dominican authorities prevented Haitian businessmen and women
from crossing the border to conduct their commercial activities (GARR 2015) until they
found an agreement. This situation affected the border economy, including fishing, that is
vital to the two peoples.
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Generally, local fishermen sell their products to wholesalers in Anse-à-Pitres,
who, in turn, sell them to other cities such as Jacmel and Port-au-Prince. Dominicans also
buy from Haitian fishermen, but they only buy the most expensive marine products such
as lobsters, crab etc. There are very few Haitian merchants selling seafood at the
binational market. According to Makdo, an SJM monitor, who was born and raised in
Anse-à-Pitres, seafood is one of the many products that Dominicans forbid Haitians from
selling at the binational market. Artisanal fishing constitutes a survival strategy for some
peasants in Anse-à-Pitres, who sell their marine products. Even though the fishing
activity helps local fishermen generate individual income, it does not dramatically
strengthen the local economy due to the lack of a well-established industry and the
regulations set by Dominicans that ban Haitian products at the binational market.
The other sector which constitutes the backbone of the local economy is
commercial activities with Pedernales, Dominican Republic. The binational market,
which brings together people from the two cities of Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales, is the
place where most of these activities take place. On a particular Monday and Friday, if
someone is crossing the border from Haiti to the Dominican Republic to go to the
binational market, they will encounter the following. On one’s way ahead, motorcycles
are sounding the horn constantly, carrying bundles of merchandise for Haitian merchants
from the market to their home in Anse-à-Pitres. In front of the gate on the Haitian side,
many currency traders, who change Haitian gourdes and pesos, take their seat in the open
air next to the taxi moto station. Generally, people have to change their gourdes into
pesos to enter the market because, ironically, even Haitian merchants (with some rare
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exceptions) do not accept the Haitian currency. A small bridge gives access to the
Dominican side where the binational market is located.
Of all commercial transactions, the commerce of Dominican-manufactured
second-hand clothes called pèpè in Creole ranks first. The commerce of Pèpè (basically
all kinds of clothes and shoes for men, women, and children) is vital to the economic life
in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Every week, it is possible to see trucks of second-hand clothes
crossing the border from Pedernales to Anse-à-Pitres. Most of this merchandise goes to
warehouse storage to be unloaded. People from Anse-à-Pitres buy pèpè from Dominican
textile industries to resell to other places in Haiti. These pèpè, once they have arrived in
Anse-à-Pitres, they are wrapped up and sent to be sold in other cities such as Jacmel and
Port-au-Prince. Sellers also bring them to the binational market where both Dominicans
and Haitians purchase them. Actually, second-hand clothes are the most imported
products by people in Anse-à-Pitres, who also display them at the binational market.
Third, besides fishing and commerce, agriculture is understood as one of the most
basic economic activities of Anse-à-Pitres. However, agricultural production in Anse-àPitres and its surrounding areas is almost negligible, such that local people have to buy
Dominican food products such as vegetables, plantains, and other tubers. Anse-à-Pitres is
composed of plateaus and mountains. One of the biggest obstacles to agricultural
exploitation in the area is its lack of irrigation facilities. There is one canal, that was
drilled from the Pedernales river and that runs straight through Anse-à-Pitres downtown,
but it is overused by people, who rely on the water for household tasks such as laundry,
dishes, bathing etc. Practicing agriculture in the mountains requires using motors to drive
the water up there, but local agricultural workers do not have access to this technology.
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However, people who live close to or in the mountainous areas, such as Bois-d’Ormes,
Fond-Jeannette, or Tête-Source practice limited agricultural activities that include the
production of coffee, market gardens, and vegetables. Most of the land in Anse-à-Pitres,
plateaus or mountains, is arid, and during my research it rarely rained. Therefore, laborers
could not rely on the rain for gardening, and when it rains, like all the coastal cities in
Haiti, the risk of flooding is high, which is not good for the harvest. In such
circumstances, undertaking agricultural activity in Anse-à-Pitres is not a credible option
for forced migrants. Moreover, the land does not belong to them and nothing was done by
the local state to employ the forced migrants as a productive force, something that many
wished for. In the end, forced migrants turned towards the Dominican Republic to do
agricultural work and collect wood to generate some income in order to make a living
Anse-à-Pitres.

4.4

Agriculture and wood collection as sources of income
Agriculture constitutes one, if not the dominant, source of income for the forced

migrants who go to the Dominican Republic on a daily basis to work the land. The
weight of agricultural work in maintaining most migrants’ families in Anse-à-Pitres is
considerable. Many displaced persons maintain that if they do not put in a day’s work,
they and their children will not eat, as many forced migrants rely on selling their labor to
make a living. In the Dominican Republic, they can clandestinely work for Dominicans,
who pay them in cash to avoid state regulation. The significance of these incomegenerating activities is evidenced by Canine, who stated: “here (Anse-à-Pitres), there are
no means of livelihood. There is no way to sell a day’s work. My husband always goes to
sell a day’s work. Our survival depends on that.” For those days of work, forced migrants
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are often underpaid or not paid at all by Dominican bosses who know that they are
undocumented. Mérinord, who works in the agricultural sector to make a living, explains
this exploitation: “we are obliged to work for 125 gourdes a day to make a living. It is not
what they were supposed to pay us because you work from 6:00 a.m. to 4 p.m.” In fact,
not all migrants were as lucky as Mérinord to find a place to put in a day’s work, despite
the underpayment. As a result, they ended up gathering wood or making charcoal so that
they could earn a little something.
Wood gathering has always been a significant survival strategy for forced
migrants. They go to the Dominican Republic to look for dry firewood to sell to people in
Anse-à-Pitres for cooking with or for dry-cleaning businesses. They also make charcoal
out of the pieces of wood they have collected, which they sell to local businessmen in
Anse-à-Pitres who export it to other cities, particularly Port-au-Prince. Many forced
migrants maintained that they were looking for wood in the Dominican Republic when
Dominican soldiers ran after them. For instance, Fanie was complaining to me about the
fact that they no longer receive support from organizations. Their only alternative to this
abandonment is to continue to take risks crossing the border. However, loggers and
charcoal makers are warned by Dominican soldiers watching the border and the forests,
who are capable of the worst. Fanie showed much concern about this situation, as there is
no work in Anse-à-Pitres and going to gather pieces of wood on the Dominican side is
risky as she said, “If your husband goes to look for a package of wood, Dominican
soldiers run after him.” During a focus group with forced migrants in the camp of Parc
Cadeau #2, people related the story of a man who went to make charcoal in the
Dominican Republic, and who was apprehended by the soldiers. According to people at
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the camp, they beat him, attached him with a rope to a truck, and pulled him. The wood
can be sold for different prices, including 50 HT gourdes (USD 0.83) for a small package
of wood and 750 gourdes (USD 12.50) for a sack of charcoal. For example, Kannèl often
collected wood and sold to people in Anse-à-Pitres in order to earn some money to buy
basic food for his family: “People from Anse-à-Pitres may need a package of wood; they
take it. They give you 25-50 gourdes.” Recently, the migrants discovered flanbo (Figure
6), which are dry branches that come from a Dominican tree called Cornel according to
some local people8. In comparison to the other kinds of wood, flanbo is more expensive,
and it constitutes a rare item that loggers look for in the Dominican Republic.

[Figure 6 Packages of Flanbo assembled to be sold].

8I

talked to different people in order to find out the exact name of the tree that flanbo comes from, but it is
not known to them. According to some local people in Anse-à-Pitres, Dominicans call it Cornel Tree,
something that I could not confirm though.
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4.4.1

Flanbo in the informal economy

Flanbo is not a piece of wood like others used for fire or charcoal. Flanbo has a name
and it costs money. Flanbo is a dry piece of wood, which for some reason is not found in
Haiti, but in the Dominican Republic. Almost everywhere in the camps, especially at Parc
Cadeau #2, a package of flanbo is erected in front of each migrant’s home. At first sight, I
thought it was forced migrants’ wood to prepare fire to cook their food. Later, I learned
from them that it was flanbo, the new gold for wood collectors. The “considerable” price
of flanbo and the interest of factories from Port-au-Prince in it make the flanbo the most
wanted type of wood by the forced migrants on their trip to the Dominican forests.
According to migrants, flanbo is used to make perfume, plywood, and a kind of oil for
airplanes (which I could not confirm). It is recovered in the Dominican Republic, brought
to the camp where forced migrants assembled it to sell by meters with one meter worth
up to 3,000 HT gourdes (USD 50). With self-employment as the principal mode of
employment in the informal sector (Breman 1996), flanbo offers some forced migrants a
strategy to undertake an activity that is not based on wage-earning. It palliates the lack of
formal jobs on the agricultural fields, which primarily attract the forced migrants.
One morning, I visited the camp. I stopped by Lijan’s home. In a typical morning,
his wife was in the kitchen and the smell of the coffee perfumed the place. Lijan was
sitting in front of the house, neighboring three other tents, talking to friends and family
members. He invited me and Zamy to join and gave me a seat. A while later, his wife
brought coffee to everyone. Around us, people were cutting pieces of wood, packing and
arranging them properly to be ready to be loaded onto trucks. In front of Lijan’s house, a
package was already prepared. When I asked him about the gathered wood, he said that it
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was the new business in the camp and if customs detected them, they would make their
owners pay.
The commercialization of flanbo involves better-off long-term residents of Anseà-Pitres, who buy it from forced migrants. Therefore, in the flanbo business, the forced
migrants can be considered simple workers located at the bottom of a hierarchy, while at
the top are people who have direct contact with factories in Port-au-Prince to deliver the
merchandise. At least, flanbo creates jobs for migrants who cross the border to gather it,
truck drivers, and those who sell it to companies. Once forced migrants have arrived in
the camp with the flanbo, they pack it for trucks to pick up. According to forced
migrants, they are paid 2,500 to 3,000 HT gourdes per meter, a price that has very much
increased; at the beginning it was a much lower price. Even though forced migrants
showed that they were satisfied with their pay, flanbo is a profitable business for the
buyers. Some buyers/sellers go to Port-au-Prince and resell it to companies in US dollars.
The connection that the flanbo business creates between the forced migrants and people
in the city of Anse-à-Pitres and others such as Port-au-Prince demonstrates that the
informal sector is also part of the urban economy (Breman 1996). When considering what
forced migrants have risked in bringing this piece of wood to Anse-à-Pitres, they are very
much under-paid in comparison to those who bought it from them to resell to factories in
Port-au-Prince. This dry piece of wood that used to be disregarded by Dominicans, as
they were scattered on the ground, began to be important to Dominicans as they saw
Haitians were recovering the wood, and clearing their environment. According to forced
migrants, Dominican soldiers clearly warn them of the consequences if they are caught
gathering flanbo. Some people said that the sanctions could go up to 30 months in prison.
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People have already started to feel that, as Rita said, “Now the bush is hot (there is
trouble). We are forced to sit down in the house because there is nothing to do.” For
example, Likilik, a 20-year-old boy, who was born in the Dominican Republic, is now
living in the camp of Parc Cadeau where many members of his family are also living. He
was already caught by Dominican soldiers while going to pick off wood in the
Dominican Republic; he explained: “they took me and put me in jail. I paid 2,000 pesos. I
didn’t have money. Some friends collected money for me in the camp.”In downtown
Anse-à-Pitres, one day, a man crossed the border but did not come back home. When
people were informed, they learned that he was arrested because he went to collect
flanbo. His wife was worried. However, one day after his arrest, he was freed. Some
people said that he must have paid to be released. As a result of this threat, people are
very careful when they are crossing the border with their flanbo. For instance, during a
visit to the camp of Parc Cadeau, I ran into two men cutting their pieces of wood. They
said that the pieces came from Pedernales and arrived in Anse-à-Pitres at night when the
soldiers are not there, because if they are apprehended, they will spend up to thirty years
in prison.
The significance of wood selling as part of the informal economy has been
demonstrated by Yadav (2018). In the examination of Gonds’ livelihoods in the Indian
village of Mahalapur, Yadav shows how forest-based activities such as the collection of
wood play an important role in these people’s lives. The Gonds use wood for different
purposes including cooking, making homes and making fences in their agricultural fields
but also for selling. Yadav contends that it is mostly woman’s job to collect forest wood
and then sell it next day by walking 10 km to Panna town, carrying it on their foreheads.
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Selling wood helps to keep Gonds’ cost of living low and to raise their children. Flanbo
plays a similar role in the lives of forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres for whom flanbo
constitutes a source of income. However, it is mostly a male activity. This may be
explained by the risk that collecting it entails. Outside the formal economy, flanbo, like
other pieces of wood, help the forced migrants diversify their sources of income, but at
the same time wood collecting has the potential for severe violence and risk, which
impedes people with limited mobility to engage in those economic practices. In addition
to these income generating activities, in 2016, the SJM decided to provide forced
migrants with some financial support through a microcredit program so that a few people
can run small businesses.

4.5
Starting your own small business, micro-credit allocation, economic
independence
Many poor countries, including Haiti, rely on foreign aid to stimulate their
development. However, the efficiency of these countries in contributing to the
improvement of poor people’s lives remains questionable, as very often, development
money does not benefit the persons being targeted. An innovative and promising new
direction in development that consists of making small loans, sometimes only a few
dollars, directly to poor individuals and families, which they can invest in their own
products or businesses (Eller 2009), has appeared since the 1970s. At the heart of this
approach is microcredit: a way to foster self-reliant individuals rather than persons
dependent on charity (Watanabe 2015: 470 citing Austin 2007; Robinson 2001).
Microfinancing has become a global phenomenon in international development circles
since the Grameen Bank launched the microcredit model into global debates about
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poverty, aid, and the inclusion of the poor in financial markets (Schuster 2014: 564). For
instance, according to Karim (2001), Bangladeshi NGOs have made impressive strides in
microcredit alongside non-formal primary education, sanitation, reproductive healthcare,
and potable water provisioning. However, microcredit has been strongly criticized by
scholars, including anthropologists.
Specifically, the critics call into question the goal of microcredit as a way of
empowering poor people, especially women, who comprise the highest number of
beneficiaries, on the view that they have restricted access to the wage labor market or are
more responsible borrowers than men (Pitt et al. 2006). Women are also considered
flexible in accepting informal, precarious work and juggling family obligations with
outside economic activities (Schuster 2014 cited by Huang 2017: 607). One critique
raised against microcredit is its attribution to a form of governmental strategy or
‘subjection’ in so far as it aims to align the personal goals of individual women with
those set out by economic reformers (Katherine Rankin 2001: 30). Effectively,
microcredit is a replication of neoliberalism ideals tied with open market, accumulation,
freedom, and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, research indicates that microcredit
constitutes an entanglement of people into cycles of indebtedness in which individuals
come to adhere to neoliberal principles of market entrepreneurialism and self-help,
unmoored from social binds of relationality, and individuals are usually not better off
than before they were indebted (Watanabe. 2015: 471). I suggest that in the case of the
forced migrants of Anse-à-Pitres, who were granted small loans by the SJM, microcredit
is more about providing people with a form of aid to help themselves, than it is about
credit. In order to understand the results of microcredit in the lives of these displaced
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people, it is important to conceive of microcredit as not just an “economic” arrangement
(Moodie 2008) or a form of economic empowerment, but also as a form of cultural
empowerment for people. For instance, the involvement of women in microfinance
programs has expanded their agency in the development process with the diminishing
role of the state (Fernando 2006).
4.5.1

The SJM micro-credit program
The SJM office, through the intermediary of its promoters and monitors in Anse-

à-Pitres, implemented a program of financial assistance for the forced migrants by
selecting a few of them, mostly women, to be the beneficiaries. For SJM, it was a pilot
program that will later be extended to more people, depending on its success. Members of
the national office of the SJM organization, headquartered in Port-au-Prince, went to
Anse-à-Pitres to gather information about the selected forced migrants and discuss with
them the conditions and the management of the loan.
The SJM gave a loan that comprised between 10,000 HT gourdes (USD 166) and
12,500 HT gourdes (USD 208) to the selected forced migrants. Each month, they had to
give back 2,100 HT gourdes (USD 35) until they finished repaying the loan. They also
had to give another 125 HT gourdes to a special fund, which would be saved for the
forced migrant to use in case of emergency. With this money, many people started a
small business or invested in agricultural work. For those who undertook a small
business, they bought small items from shopkeepers or wholesalers and sold them at the
binational market, in front of their house, or simply turned themselves into mobile
merchants. Their small business is a bit of everything: from rice, bread, candies and
cookies to detergent and soaps for laundry. Magda, who received a loan, understood that
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she had to do something with this money, unlike some people who simply spent the
money on their basic needs without investing it. She tried everything in order to make the
little money progress, and so that she could pay it back: “when I owe, I can’t sleep. I
bought small things to put in front of the house and took part in money rotation9.” Even
though it does not help Magda make any profit, it helps her save and manage her money
to be able to repay it on the due date. Many of the forced migrants’ small businesses are
portable as they can carry them on their head and sell them in the street. For instance,
while crossing to Pedernales one day, I met with Vilna. She was carrying a small basin.
When I stopped to talk to her a while, she told me that she came from selling in
Pedernales and now she was on her way back home. The empty basin that she carried
under her armpit is the size of her small business. The varying activities the forced
migrants undertake in order to meet family needs and repayments are typical of
microloan borrowers, who invest in several different activities at once to mitigate risk,
expand their social networks, fill income gaps, and meet microloan repayment deadlines
(Hayes 2017: 25). Even though all borrowers do not sell the same products, they enter a
local market full of microbusinesses, which creates an environment of hypercompetition
among small vendors (Hayes 2017). The forced migrants use their loans to buy and resell
mostly food products such as rice, oil, and vegetables, which already abound on the
market. I found that that the engagement of these forced migrants in microcredit
enterprise provides them little as income according to what they described to me during a
focus group, but it does allow them to be dynamic in their constant search of seeking to
offer something to themselves and their families.
9 Money rotation

is a system of cash to cash cycle very common in Haiti that consists of rotating money
among a group of people until everyone receives their part.
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Coping strategies through these economic practices are very common among poor
Caribbean people, which Senior (1991) refers to as ‘making do,’ meaning ‘make
something from nothing’ in order to show how women in the English-speaking
Caribbean, for example, develop strategies to meet their needs and support their families.
Forced migrants’ strategies are similar in that they started with almost nothing hoping
that they could generate some income to keep them afloat in the face of their precarious
economic conditions in Anse-à-Pitres. Manrèz is a skinny woman, who must be in her
early 60s but still looks strong. Her example is very inspiring and motivating. Manrèz
received a small loan from SJM. She took this money and started a small business buying
from Haitian shop keepers and re-selling at the local market. On my walk, I already met
Manrèz carrying a box of rice on her head and a gallon of oil in her hand. Thanks to this
activity, she managed to pay the rent and survive. She could have made more progress,
but the death of her brother made her spend almost everything she had. She is one of the
rare persons who have finished paying back the money. Even in times of adversity, she
was able to develop a kind of flexibility that helped her fulfill her family needs.
Sometimes, these people are also lenders, as they sell their products to other people on
credit. For instance, Simone was participating in a focus group I was organizing. She had
many problems. IOM did not renew her rent and she was uncertain about her future in
Anse-à-Pitres. Worse, her husband borrowed 250 HT gourdes from her loan, but ran
away, leaving her with the debt and the children. She said: “he borrowed 250 HT gourdes
from me leaving his card and saying that he will give me more money. Tomorrow the
14th of February will be exactly two months since he took the money. Yet I need this
money to go to reimburse my loan.” What Simone describes typifies the reality of some
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women who may be the bearers of credit but not its users (Karim 2001); the users of the
credit are often none other than their husbands. Manrèz’s experience illustrates the
courage of most female forced migrants involved in microcredit. They earned very little
income from this microcredit enterprise, while they have to satisfy multiple needs. Above
all, it only constitutes an activity that motivates them to keep going amid the fundamental
challenges of everyday life.
4.5.2

The use of the loan
Many forced migrants showed that the loan was beneficial in helping them feed

their children and survive. Duvercia was in a precarious situation and her money was
almost entirely consumed for household needs. IOM rented a place for her, but did not
renew the rent. Therefore, she took from the loan money to pay the rent in order to avoid
expulsion, to pay for the children’s school, and buy food and soap: “I still owe a part of
the money. I thought it was a gift. Each 100 gourdes profit I made out of the little money,
the children ate them (spent for the children). I don’t have a husband. I paid 6 months of
rent.”
Like Duvercia, many forced migrants explained that they encountered difficulty
reimbursing the money, as they were in need even before they got this money. Between
paying the rent and children’s school, providing food in the household, and going to the
hospital, forced migrants found out that the money disappeared in the blink of an eye,
while they still owed part of it. However, the SJM staff never took action to force people
to pay back the money, which seems to confirm what Inès said to me, that is, the money
was not a loan although this was not revealed to the forced migrants in order to encourage
them to work with it. As these narratives showcase, the loan was practical in helping the
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beneficiaries with some fundamental needs, but it put people into debt and could not help
them recover from their economic dispossession. The microcredit experience of the
forced migrants reflects Feldman (2010) who argues that projects such as self-help and
others that were meant to transform often ended up looking more like relief projects.
However, above all, I suggest that the engagement of the displaced people in the informal
economy, in general, produces social lives beyond economic logic (Moodie 2008). These
dynamics are translated in a philosophy I call “ti degaje or m’ap degaje m” that infuses
their daily lives with meanings and dynamics.

4.6

“Ti degaje, M’ap degaje m:” the philosophy of life of the forced migrants
“Ti degaje, m’ap degaje m” is a common expression in Haitian larger society that

basically means “a little something, I am doing a little something to survive.” People
often resort to this expression to convey that they are coping with life despite
fundamental challenges. For example, when I saw Manrèz and asked her how she was
doing, she answered: “n’ap longonni.” Manrèz undoubtedly wants to highlight that things
are hard but she is keeping going. “N’ap Longonni” is literally that life is agony for her,
as a forced migrant who entered Anse-à-Pitres with almost nothing where she has to
settle or start from scratch. However, this does not mean she is a defeatist. On the
contrary, she clings to her new environment with all her strength as an agentive woman.
The vigor in her became visible to me when I noticed all that she was undertaking despite
the weight of her age: buying items with that little money she had, carrying her business
on her head, and always on the move, even though people bought her products on credit
and did not pay her. This expression translates a willingness to survive at any cost or
making a living in bad times. This can be understood with a migrant who, for example,
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said: “Si nou pa degaje nou (if we don’t do a little something), the children won’t eat.”
Degaje is “making do,” a rule of survival, a philosophy of life. You cannot be loafing
around. You “gotta” move yourself. For Titine, when she received financial aid from the
IOM to rent a place, she started a ti degaje with it (a small business) in order to provide
food for her family.
“Degaje” can be equated to debrouillardism, a concept used by Browne (2004) to
express the capacity for one to use his or her intelligence to transform possibilities into
opportunities. When forced migrants received a little financial loan, their first goal was to
start a ti degaje (small business) enhancing their debrouillardism, their capacity of
management and entrepreneurship. For those who did not receive any loan, they did not
hang around but looked for a ti degaje (small jobs). Maude is an example of someone
who felt disappointed, as she could not get any support for her life while she was hungry
in her new place of settlement. Her life story is telling. Maude is the mother of seven
children, who are spread throughout Anse-à-Pitres. She was living with her youngest son
when I visited her at her house. This son developed cholera when she entered Anse-àPitres in 2016, a period that reminds a bad memory to the Haitian people. Cholera killed
some of the forced migrants after they settled in the camps in 2015 (Bonicet 2015). The
vibrio virus responsible for cholera has been linked to the Nepalese UN battalion present
in Haiti (Mazzeo and Chierici 2013), and was reported to have killed thousands of
Haitians in the wake of the devastating earthquake of January 2010 (Schuller and
Morales 2012). Fortunately, Maude’s son recovered from the disease. While living in
Anse-à-Pitres, she walked to the camp of Maletchipe, which is three to four miles from
home, almost every day, where she spent the entire day hoping that the aid apparatus
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would stop by. When this strategy did not work, she looked for alternatives. She started
to look for ti degaje (small jobs) in order to not starve. She then crossed the border to go
to do laundry for Dominicans, an experience that is sometimes disappointing according to
her: “They may say that they are giving you 300 pesos but they finally give you 150
pesos. After two trips to this person’s house you still don’t get the rest of your money.”
Despite fundamental challenges, hunger, poverty, insecurity, and uncertainty, forced
migrants keep their spirits up and develop survival strategies to create and reconstruct
livelihoods in their living communities, showing that human agency is not the property
and privilege of political and economic elites, but an equal opportunity (Kottak and
Kozaitis 1999). This is evidenced by Maude’s experience working for Dominican
employers who profit from her situation of poverty and precarity, but she never gives up
trying and is constantly moving across the border in an attempt to improve her life.
Browne argues that Creole economics endows Martinicans with moral permission
to violate (2004: 132), as it constitutes a means of survival for many people outside the
formal economy. Similarly in Haitian culture, degaje has moral value when referring to
the saying: Degaje pa peche, meaning literally doing something outside the formal to
help ourselves is not a sin. For example, when people go to the Dominican Republic to
look for wood, they know that they are violating a rule doing something that they should
not. Some forced migrants think of that as stealing, but they have no choice. It is a means
of survival. Anicia contended that “I entered here on June 11, 2015. I still go to
Pedernales. I go to work as a housewife. My husband goes to do small gardens. It is
stealing but he still does it. They haven’t run after him yet.” Richard Price (2006:64)
wrote about how Martinicans assigned a double meaning to stealing when they talk about
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their past history: “Over and over, in speaking about the recent past, people stressed that
it was stealing from poor people, from other rural folk, that was criminal. Taking from a
sugar factory, or from any béké or white folks’ enterprise, was seen rather as getting
one’s due.” This way of thinking of stealing as not simply a means of survival, but also as
a due compensation may have the same resonance when talking about forced migrants’
illegal crossing to gather, for example, a package of wood in the Dominican Republic.
Under pressure, threat and fear, the forced migrants left all their belongings and goods
behind, sometimes to those who used to be their bosses and who exploited them. Stealing
may morally mean getting something back for them in a context of total dispossession.
As stated in the framework of the chapter, it is also important to refer to colonial history
in order to really understand the meaning of these strategies employed by the forced
migrants. Similarly, when studying the economic activities of former slaves, historians as
well as archaeologists have found evidence of a slave underground economy that
consisted in the trading and marketing of products that came from their independent
gardens, and also of articles stolen from the plantations where they were working. Forret
(2004) describes how slaves of the rural Carolinas supplemented their inadequate diets
with produce from their gardens, but also with foodstuffs secretly taken from their
masters or their neighbors, which they also sold to poor whites. These practices, that are
part of marginalized people’s survival strategies, can better be compared to what Scott
(1985) called the ordinary weapon of the weak, which is a constant struggle for them to
create livelihoods, but also to resist those who worked to extract their labor.
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Conclusion
Finally, in addition to being a philosophy of life as it guides people in their daily
actions, ti degaje can also be considered a means of survival, as it pushes people towards
micro-entrepreneurship and economic engineering. Far from discouraging them, the lack
of support and state abandon motivated them to create and mobilize resources for selfreliance. They try everything that lies in their power to create livelihoods in Anse-à-Pitres
showing a lot of debrouillardism and dynamic. One forced migrant contended that he
went to the seaside, gathered stones, and sold them to local residents, who exported them
to the Dominican Republic. Another migrant bought a motorcycle using the financial aid
he received from one organization and gave it to someone to ride. When the driver paid
him, he managed to buy food for his household. Others went to the garbage where
wholesalers threw away the zaza (unwanted second-hand clothes), salvaged them and
resold them to make a little money. This is the case of Felicia, who lives in Parc Cadeau
#2. Felicia was born in the Dominican Republic, but did not hold any Dominican
documentation when she was forced in a truck to Haiti by Dominican soldiers. She
categorically refused to leave because she had never been to Haiti before, but she was
powerless to resist the soldiers. People informed her about the camp and she made a
small tent in which to stay. Her worry can be understood for someone who was born in
the Dominican Republic and had to leave everything behind to go to a new environment
where she does not even know how to locate and mobilize resources. In such a
complicated situation, her only weapon remained her capacity for agency, which she
never hesitated to make the best of. Even though she is far from recovering from her
displacement, she has never given up trying to make ends meet. One of her strategies is
to collect zaza (the unwanted second-hand clothes by wholesalers of Anse-à-Pitres) and
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resold them at the Haitian-Dominican border; she said: “I went to sort out old pants, old
shirts, old things and I made a big package. I went to the door (the border); I sold small
pieces for 20 or 25 Haitian HT gourdes.” People call this very small activity ti degaje or
vire men meaning something that is worth almost nothing. “Ti degaje” is about showing
debrouillardism, exercising agency by finding disjunctures or holes in the formal
economy in order to transform very few possibilities into opportunities. As these
examples show, the economic practices of the forced migrants is not about how much
someone makes for their survival, but about how people learn to be agentive, resilient,
and to live with hope amid social and economic precarity, insecurity and uncertainty.
They live because of the philosophy that is behind everything they do in their daily lives.
This philosophy makes sense and when combined with local and moral values, it simply
constitutes a form of social capital for forced migrants. Survival for the forced migrants is
not simply about earning a lot of money, but a state of mind or a philosophy.
The forced migrants are aware that the Dominican Republic offered them better
economic activities than Haiti. However, they were under constant fear of persecution
and deportation. Therefore, they considered that they were not free. It is only in Haiti that
they felt a sense of freedom despite hunger, precarity, insecurity and uncertainty of life;
as Charles put it: “For me, I feel that my country is better even though when I was in the
Dominican Republic, I found work more easily and I ate better. You were in a place
where you were eating well but you couldn’t sleep well. Each time you were sleeping,
you were thinking.” Like Charles, many other forced migrants express their sense of
being independent in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, even though limited economic resources are
available to them. The creation of ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the
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Repatriated of Anse-à-Pitres) is set to rally their interest and formalize their claims for a
descent life. The forced migrants have goals and know what they want for their lives.
Living a precarious life in Anse-à-Pitres does not take away their sense of being
emancipated and liberated. Their multiple ways of creating living strategies suggest that
they are not hopeless people or victims, but agents of their self-development. Getting
involved in neoliberal enterprises through micro-credit or self-help programs, gardening
on Dominican plots of land, and doing other casual work selling their labor allows them
to exercise some kind of agency and set goals for their self-reliance through a philosophy
of life ingrained in a series of expressions, such as ti degaje, degaje pa peche, vire men,
found in Haitian larger culture. Their tactics and ingenuity for survival despite constraints
appears in their engagement in everyday labor mobilities between Anse-à-Pitres and
Pedernales.
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CHAPTER 5: EVERYDAY LABOR MOBILITY: FORCED MIGRANTS ACROSS THE
HAITIAN-DOMINICAN BORDER
“It is because of a lack of economic resources. If I had the resources, I
wouldn’t cross to the Dominican Republic. I was supposed to be working at home
(Anse-à-Pitres). In the same way as I am going to work in the Dominican
Republic, I would be working at home. I would cross only a day but not the way I
am crossing to the Dominican Republic morning and afternoon. It wouldn’t be
like this.”
Louman clearly describes his experiences with border jumping between Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. Louman is from Tête Source, which is very close to the region of
Pedernales, specifically Lamencer, where he had been living since he migrated to the
Dominican Republic. After his displacement, he continued to return to Lamencer to
work, moving back and forth between Tête Source and Lamencer. Louman’s story
demonstrates three dimensions of our study in this chapter: mobility, forced mobility, and
place. First, his story shows how someone’s life can involve daily back and forth
movements across borders translatable in a local expression monte desann (literally going
back and forth) that describes the constant instability and mobility of the displaced people
for labor purpose. Their engagement in daily mobility evidences their capacity to make
decisions to transform their lives. I consider this a form of power and agency. Second, his
story shows that mobility is not something that people feel free to choose but something
that they are forced into because they do not have viable alternatives with which to build
lives. Therefore, mobility is also about constraint. Third, Louman suggests that he would
not go to the Dominican Republic should he have better choices. He would stay in Anse-
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à-Pitres. This means that mobility does not eclipse the importance of place, which
symbolizes not only immobility, but also stability and settlement for the forced migrants.
In this sense labor mobility is important in order to help them acquire the resources to
achieve this goal of getting settled.
In this chapter, I am concerned with mobility as something imposed upon the
forced migrants (Gill, Caletrio, Mason 2011) and as a form of power which is reflected in
the capacity of the displaced people to transform and act in the world despite dangerous
obstacles. Accordingly, mobility is undertaken under constraints that can be explained by
the risks it entails. Despite all constraints, the forced migrants make labor mobility a
significant livelihood strategy. I argue that the engagement of the forced migrants in
everyday labor mobility is an exercise of agency and power. Building on Miller and
Tilley (1984), I refer to this form of power that consists of relying on mobility in order to
pursue specific goals in their lives as “power to” that constitutes the precondition of
agency (Thomas 2002). This form of power describes the ability of these people to take
actions. For both the men and women of the displaced population, everyday mobility
becomes a means to create survival strategies and an attempt to settle in Anse-à-Pitres,
which is a new place to most of them. If generally, men are seen as the agents of
mobility, among the displaced people, in the same way as men, women draw upon
mobility as a resource with which to pursue income for their households, which
empowers them and increases not only their visibility in labor migration, but also their
agency.
Besides using mobility as a means to survive from day to day, forced migrants
also have long-term goals that include buying a piece of land to establish themselves in
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Anse-à-Pitres; mobility sits side by side with place that symbolizes immobility and
emplacement. This notion of emplacement is underexplored in the mobility literature
(Chell 2000), which, I suggest, may be an outcome of a new mobility paradigm that
undermines theories that conceive of place as normal stability (Sheller and Urry 2006),
and which is reinforced by the world’s celebration of a liquid modernity that redirects
research away from static structures of the modern world (Bauman, 2000). However,
mobility is never simply about moving across borders, it is also about regrounding
(Ahmed et al. 2003 cited by Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006 ), reterritorialization
(Laguerre 1998), and attachments of various kinds (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006
citing Shurmer-Smith & Hannam, 1994; Sheller, 2004a). Therefore, both mobility and
place have meaning in the displaced people’s lives.
Forced migrants’ involvement in labor mobility was visible to me when I went to
the camps. During visits in the camps, especially in the morning, I mostly found children,
sometimes with women. Many people were absent because they went to work in the
Dominican Republic. Some people may go and stay for a short period of time, especially
if they are plowing fields or harvesting their gardens. Many people stated that they often
went in the morning and came back in the afternoon. Effectively, in the afternoon, there
was a more vibrant life in the camps. At this time, I often saw people who were coming
back from work wearing used clothes, a pair of boots, machetes in a sheath, and other
digging tools, with sometimes a package of wood or a sack on their back. Later, some
people sat down in groups socializing, playing dominoes while listening to the music. On
the other hand, women were preparing food in a small kitchen made of bundles, rags,
pieces of cloth, and twigs with the rise of smoke. Sometimes, they had to prepare food so
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that the husband could find something when he came back from work. Some women
complained when they could not do that. For example, Yverose’s husband supports the
house through his agricultural labor. Like her, many women attested that the household
or the kindred was maintained by their husband’s agricultural work in the Dominican
Republic. Polòn, who was born in the Dominican Republic but now finds herself in the
camp of Parc Cadeau is clear about how much the husband’s labor mobility weighs in the
maintenance of the family, as she is doing nothing herself. She said: “I don’t have money
to do a small business or to cultivate a garden. I have nothing. If the man (husband)
doesn’t go down there (in the Dominican Republic) where soldiers are running after
them, you won’t get a Haitian gourde. I feel that I am not at ease because if the man
doesn’t give you five gourdes, you don’t eat and you don’t drink.” As indicated in these
narratives, men are at the forefront of labor mobility in most families of the forced
migrants. However, women are also actors and increase their visibility through their
movements across borders. In the end, nothing can stop forced migrants from getting
involved in crossing the border between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales to go to work
regardless of facing violence, arrest, and deportation.
Despite constant surveillance, border patrol, and the establishment of checkpoints
by the Dominican state in order to control the movement of illegal migrants across the
Dominican-Haitian border, forced migrants manage to be hypermobile between the
Haitian city of Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican city of Pedernales. Even though their
everyday border crossings aim to fulfill many functions in their lives, the nature of their
mobility is mostly economic; they go to sell their labor in the Dominican Republic. While
they move daily to the Dominican Republic to work in different sectors, such as domestic
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work and selling goods, agriculture constitutes the main sector in which they work. In
their agricultural practices, the displaced people continued to work as waged day laborers
and according to the system of sharecropping regulated by Dominican landowners.
Besides working on a particular land, forced migrants also sell their labor working, just
during a day, for a person, who pays them in cash on the spot, or may owe them the
money. All of them are engaged in the same types of job they had before they were
displaced from the Dominican Republic. The lack of jobs in Anse-à-Pitres forced them to
undertake these labor practices in order to meet the daily challenges of their lives. The
mobility of the forced migrants constitutes both a form of agency and constraint. On one
hand, their involvement in labor mobility expresses their capacity to challenge
marginalization and forced displacement. In this sense, it is an expression of power
which, in a way, constitutes a form of agency. On the other hand, the forced migrants
long for a stable life in Anse-à-Pitres and conceive of their border crossings as a form of
constraint considering that mobility is a risky adventure into which they are forced as it
represents the only option available for them to create survival strategies.
In the first section of the chapter, I examine everyday labor mobility as an
exercise of power and agency for the forced migrants because it shows their ability to act
in the world.
In the second section, I show that mobility is not an expression of freedom for the
forced migrants, but something that is imposed upon them and that they manage to use to
improve their lives.
Finally, I demonstrate that forced migrant men and women gain agency using
corporeal mobility across borders in an attempt to support themselves and their families.
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Their risk-taking is an expression of their ability to make choices despite constraints and
of combativeness when it comes to fulfilling their households’ multiple needs.

5.1

Everyday labor mobility as an exercise of power and agency
With contemporary global dynamics, millions of people are involved in

movements across border; Urry and Sheller (2006) proclaim that all the world seems to
be on the move. Creswell (2006) makes a similar observation by arguing that mobility is
everywhere. In the mobility literature, mobility has different meanings. For instance,
mobility is sometimes construed as an expression of progress, freedom, or liberation from
space and place (Sheller and Urry 2006). It is also conceived of as a resource that
reinforces power (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006 citing Skeggs, 2004; Morley, 2002) and
that implies forms of social control described in a concept of power geometry (Gogia
2006; Massey 1994). This means that mobility constitutes a resource to which not
everyone has an equal relationship (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006). For instance, Gogia
(2006) demonstrates how the mobilities of Canadians travelling to Mexico for tourist
purposes and those of Mexicans migrating to Canada for labor purposes are not created
equally because of unequal juridical regulations that shape the ways these people move.
These latter attributions convey a Marxist meaning of power as something associated
with domination and what the archeologists Miller and Tilley (1984) refer to as “power
over,” as opposed to “power to.”
I draw on this literature regarding mobility, but with an understanding of mobility
as an expression of power and agency. However, the power I am engaging in this chapter
differs from its association with coercion or domination. Power is an expression of the
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capacity of forced migrants to initiate actions that engage their everyday lives in spite of
marginalization. Miller and Tilley (1984) conceive of this form of power that enables
people as “power to,” which, according to them, constitutes an inherent component of all
social interaction and also a feature embedded in all social practices. This form of power
differs from power over, for example, that is embodied in the exercise of the legitimate
means of violence by Dominican soldiers. As such, unlike “power over,” “power to”
describes the ability of the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres to draw on everyday
mobility to make decisions that impact their daily lives. Forced migrants’ practices,
which include crossing dangerous borders even if it means being arrested, fined, or killed,
are expressions of power and agency because they evade established border power. As
suggested by Foucault (1982 cited by Miller and Tilley 1984), this form of power that
enables people to act is something that belongs to everyone and that forced migrants
exercise through daily movements across borders despite surveillance and “illegality,”
following several ‘devious paths’, which avoid official checkpoints in the border zone in
order to avoid state officials at the entry and exit point (Musoni 2016).
The engagement of displaced people in everyday labor mobility is a matter of
being in charge of their own lives and being self-reliant. It represents a strategic resource
for the forced migrants to carry out their goals of surviving in Anse-à-Pitres whatever it
takes. Most forced migrants I talked to recognize the danger involved in crossing the
border to go to work in the Dominican Republic, but they maintain that this choice is
imposed upon them. Taking actions in the face of threats to safety and menace is what
defines forced migrants’ labor mobility as a form of power and agency. Frequent
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movement to pursue labor in the Dominican Republic shows how their lives are
intertwined with constant mobility and instabilities.
Despite the absence of juridical and spatial conditions that could facilitate their
mobility across the border (Gogia 2006), the forced migrants manage to make mobility a
defining factor of their daily lives. The ability to move beyond geographical borders
represents the daily experience of various categories of the population of the forced
migrants, young and old, men as well as women. The continuous moving back and forth
for daily accomplishment and goals appears in a forced migrant’s statement: “For any
small thing, it is in the Dominican Republic to go to look for it; from the small piece of
wood, it is over there to go to look for it. To sell a day of labor to feed the children, it is
over there to go.” These words come from Renaldo, who lived at the camp of Parc
Cadeau# 2 with eight children to feed; he conveys that his life is an everyday experience
of constant mobility which he relies upon for economic purposes. The daily dynamics of
forced migrants describe not only the instability of their lives, which are not located in
particular spaces or within particular boundaries (Verstraet, T Cresswell 2002 citing
Malkki 1992), but also “power to” that enables them to take actions and use labor
mobility as an imposed choice according to their own will. Moving on a regular basis is
the materialization of “power to” and creates life dynamics, which is expressive of the
local expression “monte desann.”
5.1.1

Monte desann as “power to”
Forced migrants’ everyday labor mobility is translated in the common expression

of “monte desann” meaning “coming and going back and forth.” The lives of the forced
migrants are a daily exercise that monte desann, as a process of labor mobility, describes.
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Monte dessann is “power to” because it is about being active in order to stimulate change
in their lives. This exercise requires people to develop the ability to run so that they can
be ready to run away any time circumstances require them to do so. For example, during
a focus group with some forced migrants who had relocated to downtown Anse-à-Pitres,
people were talking about how making charcoal in the Dominican Republic is not safe
and sometimes they have to abandon their charcoal and run away. A woman in her fifties,
Alouna, made people laugh as she maintained that: “my husband can’t run, neither can he
speak Spanish.” Alouna’s story demonstrates the risks of getting involved in those
practices that require physical strength and the capacity to negotiate with Dominican
soldiers, who can catch them in the forests. Even though her husband still goes to the
Dominican Republic to work, his incapacity to run obviously limits his labor mobility.
Monte desann also means that even though forced migrants are able to connect with
Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales thanks to their corporeal mobility, neither of these two
places offer them security or stability. Anse-à-Pitres lacks opportunities, so they cannot
create a stable life there, and the Dominican Republic is a dangerous place for them in
which they are only a bird of passage. Therefore, their life is more a construction of the
in-between than a construction of one specific place, because of constant back and forth
movements across the border to locate opportunities.
Living close to the border contributes to the instability created by monte desann,
which, despite everything, constitutes a strategy of empowerment for forced migrants.
Louman is a forced migrant who lives at the camp of Tête Source. Originally from
Mapou, another part of Haiti, but in the same geographical department as Anse-à-Pitres,
he recognizes that the proximity to Tête Source is essential to his major activities across
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the border. For five years, he has been in a process of monte desann, i.e., a back and forth
movement between Tête Source and the mountainous region of Pedernales, in search of
making a living: “M’ap monte desann (I am coming and going). I come to Haiti but there
is no work; I am going back and forth in the Dominican Republic to look for an activity
(work). I am coming and going back and forth between the two sides of the border to see
what life has in its store.” As Louman explained, his life is tied to these back and forth
movements which change the dynamics of his previous life when he was in Mapou:
“when I was in Mapou, I stayed put.” His statement suggests that he was not used to such
frequent labor mobility, let alone connecting with places across borders. Being in Anse-àPitres endows him with this capacity of movement, which becomes an integral part of his
habitus and his subsistence strategy.
Back and forth movements across borders and the expressions that forced
migrants use, such as monte desann, to describe their daily labor mobility demonstrates
their determination in pursuing their goal to change their lives in a world of economic
precarity and uncertainty. Everyday labor mobility is a way for them to create a glimmer
of hope using their corporeal and mobile ability as agents amid their precarious social and
economic conditions in a place that does not offer them much. The everyday mobility is
constitutive of “power to” in that it is used as a resource by the forced migrants with the
aim of being self-reliant and sustaining their lives. As Urry (Gogia 2006 citing Urry
2000) argues, mobility is becoming the defining factor in the reconstitution of social life.
This is reflected in the way that the forced migrants embrace mobility as a vital resource.
However, mobility for them is not an expression of freedom, but something that is
imposed upon them, which is discussed in the next section. Here, I make a distinction
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between freedom and agency. I do not consider the movement of the forced migrants an
expression of freedom because getting involved in labor mobility is risky and dangerous
for them. Rather, labor mobility is a form of agency because it goes against established
structures such as border power and is used according to the forced migrants’ own agenda
in order to create survival strategies in Anse-à-Pitres.

5.2

Mobility as constraint and a survival strategy
Forced migrants do not engage in labor mobility because the Dominican Republic

is attractive to them, but because of life’s demands. While mobility expresses a form of
power and agency as I demonstrated, it is also the result of a form of constraint. This can
be explained in various ways. Considering past working conditions, the kinds of
relationships they developed with Dominican owners, and the risks that their mobility
across the border entails, returning to the Dominican Republic for labor purposes simply
represents a necessary evil for the displaced people. Their previous experiences do not
encourage them to go back to the Dominican Republic.
According to some former workers, Dominican bosses needed only their labor
power. For instance, if they were sick and were not productive, they were not taken care
of, but sent to Haiti to finish their days. In a sense, this indicates that while Haitian
workers were contributing to increasing the wealth of Dominican landowners and
boosting Dominican economy, they were not provided with the means to maintain and
reproduce themselves, something that is related to Marx (1867)’s criticism of the
capitalist system whereby workers are simply used as commodities. Simmons (2010) has
described the situation of Haitian agricultural workers as horrible. Haitians were reported
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to be living in the worst conditions in the Dominican Republic with no basic
infrastructure such as potable water, electricity, no means of waste disposal, constant
surveillance and policing by Dominican authorities, and endemic diseases such as
dengue, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and malaria to name a few (Simmons 2010:11).
Before being displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, the forced migrants experienced all the awful
working conditions in the Dominican Republic where they did not have any form of
social security in the workplace. Tiva exemplifies how Haitian people’s bare lives were
totally exposed to all forms of danger and torture. In the Dominican Republic, Tiva was
working and living with his wife and children on Sergo’s estate. Sergo is a Dominican
landowner. One day, a stone hurt Tiva’s leg while he was working in the field and he
could not stand up. His child’s godmother took him to the hospital in a distant city called
Barahona where he had surgery. People at the hospital, sometimes patients’ families,
shared their food with him and gave him a little money during his stay at the hospital.
When he left hospital, a pastor paid the trip for him and he went back to the estate where
he was working and living with his family. However, Sergo, the Dominican boss, was
totally indifferent to him and forced him to leave for Haiti. Tiva explained to me: “My
child’s godmother who was working on the same estate as me took me to Barahona. I had
no one, no family to help me. People in the hospital helped me. When I was leaving the
hospital, a Dominican pastor paid the bus for me to go to Pedernales. There, I took a taxi
to Aguas Negras. When I arrived at the estate, Sergo (the Dominican boss) said that he
was not keeping me and he sent me to Haiti.” As a result, he had to be separated from his
wife and his children who stayed on the estate. I visited him twice during my research in
Anse-à-Pitres; he was living alone and was still in pain. Because of the lack of money, he
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was never able to return to the hospital. The lack of social and legal protection for these
workers makes the workforce the most vulnerable to mortal accidents in Dominican
society, which, for the most part, result in temporary incapacity (Baez Evertsz 1985 cited
by Simmons 2010). In the end, the relations between forced migrants and Dominican
bosses deteriorated during their last days on Dominican soil, even though there were
exceptions whereby some landowners tried to hide them in the bateys (plantations) in
order to not be sent to Haiti. Some people I talked to admitted that they left the
Dominican Republic because their landowner forced them to do so. For example, after
her 33 years living in the Dominican Republic, Jezula understood that she had to leave
after a message communicated to her by the Dominican boss: “if you don’t live, you go
to hide instead, I’ll be in prison and I’ll have to pay 50,000 pesos.” These words could
not be clearer to Jezula. Besides past experiences that are not conducive to undertaking
labor mobility to the Dominican Republic, there is also the securitization of the border
that instills fear in the forced migrants.
Going to the Dominican Republic is one of the most humiliating experiences for
forced migrants; it is a place where they are exposed to all kinds of danger, violence,
torture, and even death. Many people admitted that Dominicans never treated them well.
To put it another way, forced migrants are not welcomed in the Dominican Republic, and
they are under constant fear of having to run; sometimes they worked for Dominicans but
did not get paid. Calixte, a young man in his mid twenties, and a woman mentioned to me
respectively that they were the victims of one or another of these kinds of abuse. Calixte
contended that “sometimes, I work, they delay in paying me or I may finish working with
them, they may take the little money, they don’t give it to me.” The woman talked about
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the violence that her husband suffered at the hands of Dominicans: “They took my
husband in the neck and beat him with machetes.” These experiences are discouraging,
and they give evidence that people are simply forced into labor mobility. According to
Cresswell (2001 cited by Gogia 2006) corporeal mobility is embedded in specific
geographies and economic conditions that produce how people move and are received
differently across the globe. Forced migrants’ corporeal mobility is a result of not only
political institutions that work to push them down, but also of economic precarity that
produces how and why they move.
Effectively, the lack of economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres constitutes a
significant push factor that explains the displaced persons’ labor mobility. Many
maintained that they would not go to the Dominican Republic should they be able to
build their lives in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Due to the lack of resources in the communities
where they are displaced, they are forced to turn towards the neighboring country in an
attempt to improve their lives. To summarize, life circumstances oblige them to get
involved in everyday labor mobility. The determination to cross the border is shown by
Roussell, who insisted that “I will always cross the border looking for a better life until
they kill me.” For forced migrants involved in labor mobility, their lives do not exist
outside the activities they are undertaking. For Resias, the Dominican Republic is at the
center of her survival, as it is the place of economic activities for Haitians in Anse-àPitres: “Well, there is no life in Haiti. I can say that there isn’t even food. So you must go
to the Dominican Republic; everything is in the Dominican Republic.” In this context,
people, who are engaged in daily movements across the border, have little to no choice.
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Rejected and abandoned by the Dominican and the Haitian state, and with the
withdrawal of many nongovernmental organizations, forced migrants can only rely on
themselves and what they have at their disposal as resources, which demonstrates their
capacity to challenge displacement, marginalization, and statelessness in the form of
“power to’. This situation leaves them little choice about how to sustain their livelihoods.
For many of them, the choice is either staying in Anse-à-Pitres where their existence
remains a gray area or risking their lives crossing to the Dominican Republic. Either
choice is evil; many choose to draw upon forced mobility and exercise a form of power
by acting in an uncertain world to strive for improvement and stability. Everyday labor
mobility for them is a matter of survival strategy. Their mobility is forced and risky,
something in which they would not get involved should they have a better situation in
Anse-à-Pitres. Louman expressed: “If I had resources here in Anse-à-Pitres, I wouldn’t
cross to the Dominican Republic. I would be working at home. I wouldn’t have to cross
to the Dominican Republic every morning and evening.” His everyday labor mobility is
not a deliberate choice, but something imposed upon him in an attempt to improve his life
and that of his family.
In this way, many forced migrants maintain that if they do not pursue labor
opportunities in the Dominican Republic, their children or the family will not eat. Gilo, a
man in his late fifties, had spent almost his entire life in the Dominican Republic where
he was brought by his father as a child, and came to Anse-à-Pitres in June 2015. During a
focus group, the stories he shared demonstrated the ways in which his life intertwined
with everyday labor mobility and how it was essential to support his family:
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“It is in the Dominican Republic to do all you have to do to find a little
food to give to the children and to earn a little money to buy small soaps. I can
say that I work on Dominican land. All I can do now is on Dominican land in
order to earn two HT gourdes. Me, as a poor, it is on Dominican land I make a
living to give something to the children.”
Gilo’s experience tells us what labor mobility means in the attempt to survive. Despite
being undocumented and not legally authorized to cross the border, the life of his family
depends on his clandestine trips to the Dominican Republic, particularly in the
mountainous region of Pedernales, to work in the agricultural fields. Therefore, labor
mobility represents the most viable yet imposed choice for forced migrants to support
themselves and their families.
The role of everyday labor mobility for families hanging by a thread is described
by Molina, a roughly 20-year-old girl, who still lives with her parents in Tête-à-l’Eau.
Molina underlines the importance of those crossing practices for the family or the
household when she maintained that “I live badly. If my parents don’t go out as day
laborers to give us food, we don’t find food.” This example shows that these labor
practices offer a double challenge to the agent, both changing their life and that of the
whole family. When the man goes to the Dominican Republic to sell his labor, the rest of
the family waits. For many families, it is a daily routine. Their daily bread is the fruit of
the man’s labor mobilities. While forced migrant women contribute to maintaining the
household either by their labor mobility or by their unwaged labor in families and
households that produce laborers themselves (Collins 2013), they acknowledge the
weight of the movements undertaken by their husbands, who maintain the whole family.
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Solène, a woman, who lives in the camp of Tête Source, felt tired of life after
losing all her means of livelihoods in the Dominican Republic, and she now has nothing
with which to generate income in Anse-à-Pitres. She is one among so many other women
who are living with fear for their husbands who have to cross the border for labor
purposes, but also who have to sit down on the threshold of their small tents every
evening to wait for the family’s daily bread. As Solène said, she could only rely on her
husband’s everyday labor mobility: “If the man doesn’t go to look for a place to sell his
labor, we can’t buy a can of rice. Merchants won’t sell us a can of rice.” Even though the
Dominican Republic seems to have become repulsive to Solène after her forced removal
and the loss of her possessions, she is being fed by her husband’s forced labor mobility.
In that sense, the role of labor mobility in the lives of the forced migrants is reminiscent
of Fouron’s experience, a scholar of transnationalism who shows how a migrant can
become a central support to their family. Fouron experienced this firsthand as an
immigrant in the United States; while he was living abroad, he considered himself a
support for both his family and his nation by contending that “I represent the whole
nation, not just my family. Your obligation to the nation begins with the obligation to
improve yourself and your family (Fouron 2001).” In this sense, the men’s labor mobility
aims to improve the whole family’s lives, as they do not have other economic
alternatives.
As shown through these examples, forced migrants use mobility as a resource
with which to create livelihoods, because for many, mobility is the unique thread to
which they hold. The upkeep of the family depends on those trips to the Dominican
Republic, in activities such as gardening, gathering wood, making charcoal, selling their

146

labor, and selling goods in the street. This mobility was imposed upon Roussel. He was
born in Los Arroyos, Dominican Republic and raised by a Dominican who did not
provide him an identity document, which led Dominican migration agents to deport him
to Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. Since then, he has taken residence in a small house that he built
himself with wood and straw at the camp of Parc Cadeau, a place in which he has to
make a living. He does not know anyone in Haiti to whom he could reach out for help.
With all the fundamental challenges of living in the camp, he has no choice other than
sharing his life between Haiti and the Dominican Republic through labor mobility.
Despite humiliation and threat by Dominicans, forced mobility to the Dominican
Republic becomes his strategy to survive: “It is on the Dominican side you have to go to
make a living. You will always find Dominicans who will do unpleasant things to you but
you have to fake that you accept the shame. When this happens, you feel bad but it is on
the Dominican side that you have to go.” Forced migrants are in a very different position
from privileged travelers who may see mobility as freedom or liberation from space
(Sheller and Urry 2006). The push factors of the everyday labor mobility of the forced
migrants are located in their poor economic conditions and the lack of viable alternatives
in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti.

5.3

Women in everyday labor mobility: peddlers and other informal activities
Among forced migrants, as I have described in previous sections, men tend to

move more than women in order to work in the Dominican Republic. The unequal
frequency of mobility between genders may be explained by the danger involved in
crossing the border illegally. However, a few women also rely on everyday labor
mobility as a resource for empowerment. These women do not get involved in everyday
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mobility as "followers" of their migrated husbands and male relatives, but they go out on
their own to find work, leaving their families behind (De Regt 2010). Their daily
movements show their willingness to escape the patriarchal structures that make them
subjects of male dependency (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000) and attest to the great
responsibilities they assume in supporting their households (Rasmussen 2002). Their
involvement in everyday labor mobility as an attempt to meet the needs of their daily
lives challenges studies that often describe labor mobility as an activity dominated by
male breadwinners who migrate to save or remit money home (Paerregaard 2012). In
Anse-à-Pitres, the experience of women in labor mobility is diverse, as they cross the
border to do different work in the Dominican Republic. They cross the border to go to
sell their labor in agricultural work, to do domestic work, or to sell their own
merchandise by turning themselves into mobile merchants. The diversification of their
work gives more space to women's agency in terms of how they make choices and the
strategies they employ to improve their living conditions (De Regt 2010).
Similar to forced migrant men, but at a much lower scale, a few women cross the
border to the Dominican Republic in order to work in gardens. Many women used to
work in the Dominican Republic prior to their displacement in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. They
did not stay at home, as, when they did not run their small businesses at home, they
usually accompanied their husbands to the agricultural fields. In Haiti, they participate in
labor mobility, not in relation to men, but in their own right, which demonstrates their
capacity to make independent choices and look for practical solutions to their precarity.
Luciana, a woman in her late forties, was displaced in Anse-à-Pitres after having spent 31
years in the Dominican Republic, where she used to do agricultural work. At the camp of
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Parc Cadeau, she was getting through a natural calamity when she arrived. The roof of
her small makeshift house became a watering can when it rained, which prevented her
from sleeping at night and attending to the household tasks during the day. As a woman
who already had experience working in the Dominican Republic, she was obliged to
cross the border, despite having to face the danger of crossing illegally, in order to sell
her labor so that she could repair her small house. It was through monte desann, a
constant back and forth movement across the border, that she earned money to
materialize her project of repairing her small house. She reported this to me during an
interview: “I don’t get wet thanks to God because I, as a woman, made this old house
crossing the border to sell my labor to Dominicans for 200 pesos every day so that I
could cover it with some sheets of metal.” As this example demonstrates, women are
equally agents of everyday labor mobility. They experience the same challenges as men
taking the risks of crossing the border, which shows their ability to exercise forms of
agency drawing upon everyday labor mobility.
In addition, women draw upon labor mobility to create not only survival strategies
but also self-autonomy. In many cases, women are struggling but do not want to depend
on other people. They use their able-bodies to make and remake their lives. Through
hardship, suffering, and precarity, they try to ‘make do’ braving the danger and risks of
crossing the border in order to reach the Dominican Republic through corporeal mobility.
This situation describes the experience of Manchina in the camp of Parc Cadeau #2. Born
in the Dominican Republic, she was raised watching her father do agricultural work and
her mother run a small business. When Manchina became older, she started to manage a
small business, like her mother, in the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, her business
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did not last; she was a victim of racism from Dominican people yelling at her telling her:
“Morena (dark-skinned woman), go to your country.” She could not spend all her life
hiding in her home to avoid being discriminated against. With the abrupt removal of her
Dominican citizenship and her displacement by the Dominican state, she decided to
follow other forced migrants, and she became displaced in Haiti at the camp of Parc
Cadeau where she built a small tent to be able to sleep with her six children. Without any
help, Manchina had to find ways to support herself and her children. She was forced to
return to the Dominican Republic, but this time it was not as a resident of the country she
was born in. Rather, it was as a transnational woman whose life became entangled with
everyday labor mobility across borders to go to do domestic work for Dominicans as she
explained:
“I still go to the Dominican Republic even though you go secretly as you
can’t make a living over here. For instance, me, I have six children with me. I
don’t have a husband. I must still go secretly to find something to give to the
children. Sometimes, I go to do laundry for Dominicans; they give us small food.”
Manchina was forced into everyday labor mobility to help her household and assume her
responsibility as an independent woman. The women involved in domestic work are
often the victims of abuse by not being paid by their employers. For instance, a woman I
call Kerline, who crossed to work with Dominicans, maintained that:
“I worked with many Dominicans. Some people you work for pay you, but
others don’t pay you. When they don’t pay you, you look for another work. After
you finish working, the person may say that they couldn’t pay; they don’t have
money. If you go to the police, they won’t say anything.”
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Kerline raised an important issue when she underlined that even though they report the
abuse to the state, no further action is taken. The denial of these women’s claims is
because their work takes place in the informal economy and is based upon verbal
agreements with employers. This gives room to the employers to control the labor power
of female domestic workers; migrant domestic workers are not just "victims of
globalization" but also of power dynamics involved in paid domestic labor (De Regt
2010). However, besides domestic labor, women draw upon mobility to develop other
strategies to sustain their livelihoods. For instance, many women rely on their
experiences back in the Dominican Republic and everyday mobility to run small
transnational businesses.
Despite limited economic resources available to them, some women find ways to
start small transnational businesses going from Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti to Pedernales,
Dominican Republic. They may go to sell their goods at the binational market on the
Dominican-Haitian border on Mondays and Fridays or turn themselves into peddlers
wandering the street of Pedernales with their products on their head. For example, one
day as I was in Pedernales with two friends, Mirta and Inès, we met with a woman
walking with a bundle of merchandize displayed on her arms and her head. She mainly
had clothes and belts. That was her small business. It was a transnational woman who
crossed the border trying to attract buyers in the streets of Pedernales. Usually, these
women go to the Dominican Republic on an everyday basis, except during market days,
when they can stay and sell their products at the binational market. That is also the
strategy used by Mata, a long-term female resident of Anse-à-Pitres, but also a temporary
migrant. I met her for the first time at the binational market and continued to see her
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twice a week on market days. She became a seller from whom Inès and I bought
vegetables such as carrots, onions, cabbages, garlic, and pepper. Originally, some of
those products that she was selling were bought in Port-au-Prince; she had to hide these
products because Dominican soldiers watch the type of products being sold at the market.
Mata does not stay in one place because during other days of the week, she turns
herself into a mobile merchant and keeps moving. Her whole life and that of her family
depend on those everyday mobility practices to keep going. Even though her situation as
a long-term resident is quite different from many forced migrant women, as a migrant
and a transnational woman, her back and forth movements and her combativeness show a
lot of similarities with forced migrant women who are involved in everyday labor
mobility. Mata’s description of her mobile life across the border can be considered a
summary of what being a transnational migrant in Anse-à-Pitres is, and how those
women straddle two spaces simultaneously through everyday corporeal mobility in an
attempt to create survival strategies. Mata explained what everyday labor mobility does
for her and the family:
“Monte desann (coming back and forth) between Anse-à-Pitres and the
Dominican side is not bad for me. It is from that, with my basin, I pay the school
of the children. They are always mistreating men. They may have some
consideration for you as a woman. It is better that you, as a woman, go for this
fight.”
Despite humiliation and stories of violence and torture against Haitians in the Dominican
Republic, nothing prevents Mata from expanding her life across the border. Being a
transnational woman requires a lot of strength and perseverance. When Mata compares
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these movements of monte desann (back and forth) as a fight, she means that everyday
labor mobility for a woman is about determination, combativeness and bravery to face
dangerous situations, which symbolizes the power and agency that those women exercise.
These labor mobilities are constitutive of power and agency. Their unsettled lives
produce new forms of social life (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006) and challenge ideas of
dependency and resignation to despair and uncertainty. This is the form of power that
describes the ability of these women to act in their daily lives using corporeal mobility as
a reliable resource. By pointing to all the risks that those daily practices imply for a
woman, Mata’s example shows that mobility is not an expression of freedom, but only a
strategic tool that is imposed upon forced migrants and that they are required to use
according to their agendas to attempt to reconstruct their lives. When the situation really
gets worse and they are forced to stay away from the border, it is a hard blow to these
women who live off everyday labor mobility. Everyday mobility remains an imperative
to them to weave in and out between small spaces that become their battlefield and their
field of economic activities. While getting in mobility increases their agency, there is a
price that comes with it, which is assuming the main responsibility for their own and their
children’s survival (Pauli 2008), because most of these women are either single mothers
or wives who must complement their husbands’ meager income if the their husbands ever
had income. Therefore, everyday labor mobility is the strategic tool for these women to
accumulate the necessary resources to meet their multiple needs, which include
improving their lives, feeding their children, and sustaining the livelihoods of the whole
family.
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Conclusion
Everyday labor mobility defines the way of life for many forced migrants living
in Anse-à-Pitres. Their daily crossings constitute the choice imposed upon them as they
attempt to create new ways of life in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti and allows them to exercise
some kind of power and agency. In addition, these dynamics lead to a form of
emplacement, that is, re-territorialization as opposed to displacement, which is
deterritorialization. I conceive of this emplacement as a form of immobility in
comparison to a need to be constantly moving under constraints and threat. As such, both
place and mobility have meaning in the lives of the forced migrants.
Furthermore, their involvement in labor mobility shows how the forced migrants
are engaged towards shaping the direction of their lives, something that is attested by
their creation of an alternative form of citizenship that I conceive of as substantive
citizenship.
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CHAPTER 6: FORCED MIGRANTS AND CITIZENSHIP FORMATION BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF THE JURIDICO-LEGAL
“To me, I am Haitian but I can say I am half Dominican and half Haitian
because I drink water in Haiti and I eat in Saint Domingue. I eat in Saint
Domingue and I drink in Haiti, too. Even though I am in Haiti, I still go (to the
Dominican Republic) because I don’t have any job to do here. If I found a job, I
wouldn’t go. But it is in Saint Domingue that you earn a living. Even though
Panyòl (Dominicans) are humiliating you, it is there you can have a better life.”
During my fieldwork in Anse-à-Pitres, I made weekly visits to the camp of Parc Cadeau
#1 but one day I decided to have one-on-one interviews with individuals in order to have
more insight into their experiences. It was on that occasion that Medi made the point I
highlighted above. Medi was born in the Dominican Republic, but he did not have the
right to a Dominican birth certificate or a cedula (Dominican ID). Yet, at his age (he was
in his forties), he should have automatically been considered a Dominican citizen,
according to the Dominican constitution that was in force before 2010, which recognized
the jus soli. The exclusion of children of Haitian parents by the Dominican state
prevented him from having legal citizenship. Despite not having legal citizenship, Medi
feels a sense of belonging in Haiti, but also in the Dominican Republic. This sense of
belonging is part of a kind of citizenship construction outside the legal category that may
be conceived of as substantive citizenship. There is an important transnational dimension
in what Medi said: “I am half Dominican and half Haitian.” Therefore his sense of
connection is not only with Haiti but also with the Dominican Republic, with which he
develops a form of economic citizenship. Moreover, considering this shifting in social
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and economic belonging between the two countries, this is a transnational substantive
citizenship. It is this notion of substantive citizenship that this chapter examines,
particularly how Dominican-Haitians, who have been the victims of a politics of
exclusion put in place by the Dominican state, create citizenship beyond the legal
category though personal and collective practices in Anse-à-Pitres.
In its legal aspect, citizenship is generally referred to as a set of duties and
political rights granted to an individual by a state. Accordingly, the state has the capacity
to regulate its population and to define who belongs and who does not belong to the
national territory. In its regulation of legal citizenship, the state often adopts a political
asymmetry, excluding many people residing within its territory. Therefore, legal
citizenship, at its most basic level, constitutes a mechanism for inclusion and exclusion,
and thus a means for establishing or prohibiting membership in political entities that
varies in scale from supranational to local (Somers 2008: 21). These mechanisms of
exclusion can be seen in societies such as France and Italy, where legal citizenship
encourages inequality, racism, and exclusion.
Silverstein (2008) demonstrates how, historically, French citizenship has been
exclusive. While citizenship was determined by the principle of jus soli, which allowed
someone born in French territory to become a French citizen, the process for obtaining
this citizenship was guided by a logic of morality and loyalty. For example, in colonial
Algeria, Silverstein contends that Muslims were denied French citizenship on the basis of
their religious “local civil status” in spite of the fact that Algeria was part of France after
1880 and thus subject to the same juridical regime as the metropole (2008: 27). Today,
racial exclusion is still manifest where discourses of race are an integral part of processes
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of belonging to the French nation-state (Danahay and Brettell 2008). Distinctions
between white rooted French and racialized French or paper French remains a mainstay
of French political discourse, which outlines different forms of political belonging for
first- and second-generation, as well as other racially or ethnically hyphenated men and
women (2008: 25). Similarly, Stanley (2008) demonstrates how italianness is used to
define belonging in Italy and broadly in the European supranational territory.
Following Stanley (2008), italianness has become a marker to distinguish not only
Italian identity, but also legal and political belonging, which is expressed through the
exclusion of those who do not look and act Italian, especially, non-Italian and nonEuropean immigrants. As a result, if one’s nationality is assumed to be non-Italian, then
one is most likely to be not only a non-Italian noncitizen but also a non-European
noncitizen.
Divisions around the racial line and discourses such as these exclude people from
nation-states and from citizenship. Dominican-Haitians were the victims of similar kinds
of exclusion in the Dominican Republic, where the state adopted a constitutional
amendment to officially strip people of Haitian origin of their Dominican citizenship and
displace them to Haiti.
In my examination of these people’s building of citizenship, I go beyond the legal
category in which citizenship is considered to relate someone to a state, extending the
definition of citizenship to include people’s daily practices and their acts of organizing
themselves in their communities as an expression of being in common. I use the notion of
substantive citizenship to conceptualize this alternative form of citizenship that is not
granted by the state, but results from people’s experiences that attest to their belonging to
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society. This substantive citizenship is an alternative form of citizenship that is built by
the forced migrants in a collective and individual making process. The collective
substantive citizenship making happened with the creation of ODRA (Organization for
the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres) that serves as a voice for them to express
themselves as concerned citizens. In its role of disciplining and training, ODRA sets to
educate its members as substantive citizens for society. ODRA negotiates with local and
international organizations in order to make the displaced people’s claims heard. This
provides these people with some recognition. On their own making, stateless people take
actions, whereby they resist systems of power, particularly the local state that wanted to
arbitrarily displace them from the camps. Through these social dynamics, stateless people
create substantive citizenship rather than formally through the enactment of law.
In this chapter, first, I look at the daily practices of the stateless and displaced
people living in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti and how their actions demonstrate a kind of
substantive citizenship.
Second, I demonstrate that these people meet and interact with local and
international organizations, which not only provide them with assistance, but also
incorporate them in their activities. This process contributes to legitimating their
substantive citizenship.
Third, I show that while the organizations on the ground participate in the
legitimization of the forced migrants’ substantive citizenship, they also contribute to
making them unequal substantive citizens through the creation of inequality and
processes of exclusion.
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Finally, through their involvement in practices that go beyond their communities
in Anse-à-Pitres, I show that these people are transnational substantive citizens. This
transnational substantive citizenship is defined by a mitigated feeling of belonging to
Haiti, their new country of residence and to the Dominican Republic.

6.1

Substantive citizenship through people’s practices
People lacking legal citizenship create substantive citizenship through exercising

socio-economic and cultural rights (Holston 1999, Vora 2013). For instance, Vora (2013)
has shown how the impossibility of obtaining legal citizenship for members of Dubai’s
Indian diaspora places them outside of the Emirati nation. However, the economic rights
they acquire through their participation in the formal economy, forms of narratives and
practices of belonging, and their claims to historic-cultural and geographic impacts in the
city of residence produce forms of substantive citizenship. In the context of stateless
people in Anse-à-Pitres, their substantive citizenship follows a different logic. It is based
on narratives of belonging but also on claims to rights to the city, protests, and the
recognition these people receive from organizations. I understand belonging as both a
human and a social right for the displaced people in that it involves the enjoyment of a
certain freedom of being in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, but also the claim to the right to
participate in the city life like other legal citizens. According to Bloch (2014), citizenship
is culturally contingent and inextricably linked with ‘partial citizenship’ or
‘noncitizenship’ and ideals about belonging. According to this logic, forced migrants’
substantive citizenship is an outcome of social practices (Isin and Wood 1999) that result
from personal and collective enterprises that express belonging to and engagement with
their living communities.
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Stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship through the
informal and outside of the juridical or political realms of citizenship (Canning 2008).
This substantive citizenship is a complex bundle of practices that includes the forced
migrants’ attestation of membership in the community and a common vision (Lazar
2013), even though they lack political rights (Holston 2001). Unlike Indian substantive
citizens in Dubai, forced migrants cannot draw on the formal economy to enjoy special
social and economic rights. Their creation of substantive citizenship is an individual and
collective making process of which they are the initiators and the finishers, meaning that
they are the ones who seek to establish new social cultural orders that allow them to
assert a presence in society (Olwig 2005). Therefore, this alternative citizenship is
defined by the displaced people’s actions and formed through daily experiences and
narratives that ensure them an “absent-presence” (Witberger 2014) within the public
space, i.e., the city, their resistance to projects of displacement and relocation that are
imposed from above, and the collective actions undertaken through their organizations
that make them visible to other non-governmental organizations and agencies that work
with them. By transcending both Haitian and Dominican society, these personal and
social actions challenge discreet boundaries around what it means to be a citizen of a
single state (Bloch 2014). In what follows, I outline the facets of substantive citizenship
as a personal and collective action, starting with the creation of ODRA (the Organization
for the Defense of the Repatriates) which attests to the displaced people’s sharing of a
common vision, then their actions to protest local systems of power, and the visibility
they acquire through other organizations.
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6.2
Networking and organizing as a claim of citizenship: the Organization for
the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA)
A few weeks after I arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, I went to visit the Catholic Church
and found myself talking with Evanès and Cator, two young men serving at the church. It
was about 5 p.m. and suddenly, I saw a group of people coming and gathering in the yard
of the church. Evanès told me they are people who usually come to see Father Leconte,
who frequently organized food distribution for them. I approached them, presenting
myself and asking them some basic information. I found that they were migrants. That
day, they stayed a long time but Father Leconte did not come out. They showed a strong
interest in me when they learned that I was doing research with the displaced people. One
man I will call Miguel told me: “you have to come to our organization; I am the founder
and the promoter.” He gave me a phone number and the address where they gathered.
Later I met him one day in a meeting at the organization. It was through Miguel, a sixty
year-old man, that I discovered the forced migrants’ organization created in 2016.
On a Sunday afternoon, I was dropped off by a moto taxi driver in front of a
relatively nice, pink and white church made of concrete, with a spacious yard that also
houses a restaurant. I was already some minutes late, so I inserted myself gently and took
a seat at the back. I remember the first words I heard from a committee member “We
have to be dynamic. If we are a part of an organization, we have to help one another. If
we have an organization, other organizations (international) will collaborate with us and
help us. We have same ideas, same thoughts, and same words. We have to behave well if
they have to help us.”
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The assembly applauded but I could also hear the murmur from the attendees that
followed. While I paid attention to these first words, during my first visit I was mostly
concerned about taking a look at the physical space. The church is very spacious and well
ventilated thanks to its doors and windows that let the fresh air in and help with the
sweltering heat and the dust. The church is arranged in two rows. During the meetings
women sit on the left row and men on the right. I cannot determine why the physical
space is gendered, but according to what I have seen, this way of distributing people was
at least helpful for members of the committee when they are selecting between men and
women for external meetings. ODRA stands for Organization for the Defense of the
Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres and it was the only migrant organization I noticed in Anse-àPitres during my research between 2016 and 2017. Even though the name of the
organization states “repatriates,” the organization also includes stateless DominicanHaitians. Talking about repatriates in this context may be problematic as many
Dominican-Haitian forced migrants have never been to Haiti and cannot be considered as
repatriates. Most members of ODRA live in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, where they
relocated after the IOM granted them the financial support to rent a room. The
organization has a board composed of five members: a president, a vice-president, a
secretary, a treasurer, a counselor, and a delegate. The president is not a migrant. He is a
well-known citizen of Anse-à-Pitres. According to members, they chose him because of
his support when they were living in the camps where the organization began its first
activities. The president, who is a pastor, is the owner of a church and allowed forced
migrants to gather in the premises, for free, every week. Therefore, the organization
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meets at the church based on the existing relationship that was built in the camp, not
because the forced and relocated migrants were members of the church.
The speech I heard during my first visit highlighted three dimensions that can
help understand the raison d’être of the organization. First, the statement demonstrates
that the organization constitutes a way for forced migrants to be socially productive and
dynamic in their community. Second, members expect that the organization will give
them some visibility through, for example, collaborating with international organizations.
Third, the organization is set to articulate members’ vision and form them as citizens for
society. As such, ODRA serves as a place to meet and to network, but also to coherently
put their life goals together.
As far as networking is concerned, many forced migrants have lived all their lives
in the Dominican Republic and do not have ties in Haiti. It is one of many reasons they
stayed in the camps. For instance, Matilda was born in Abila, Dominican Republic and
arrived in Haiti on June 2015. During an interview, she said: “I don’t have any contacts
with people in the Dominican Republic. I didn’t have contacts with people in Haiti before
I came here.” When I met Matilda, she had already left the Dominican Republic about
one year ago, so she had lost her Dominican contacts. She still found it difficult to
identify herself with Haiti, except with the Haitian flag. She considered herself a lost
sheep in this new country. She added: “What makes me feel I am at home it is because I
am under my flag but I am not in my land.” In fact, this lack of identification with the
country is in part due to the fact that Matilda was not born and raised in Haiti. Like her,
many Dominican-Haitians remain marginalized in Anse-à-Pitres by living apart and not
being integrated into the larger community. As a consequence, they do not develop any
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networks with local citizens. Their isolation is reinforced by long-term residents, who
have accused forced migrants, particularly those who reside in the camps located on the
main road that lead to the entrance gate of the city, of being an element of insecurity or
physical attacks against passengers going to the city. This criminalization of the forced
migrants contributes to destroying their reputation and narrowing their network to fellow
forced migrants who were in the Dominican Republic and who also experienced
statelessness and displacement. In such a situation of loneliness and marginalization,
ODRA offers opportunity for the forced migrants to network and interact with fellows
and eventually with outsiders.
The organization represents a second family to many members. Some forced
migrants I interviewed said that ODRA is the only group they attend. For example, I
visited Jean Mars, a man in his early fifties who is on the committee, to talk about his
experience in Anse-à-Pitres, a new place for him. He lives in a small house, which I
found empty and dark, with one door, but without windows, and with no furniture except
a small bed. According to him, ODRA is the only place he goes to besides church. He
showed me his church card and said: “I don’t have families here. That’s why I go to
church and ODRA.” Jean Mars is not from the city of Anse-à-Pitres and is alone there.
Often, he went to spend time at the SJM office or at a friend’s house. This lack of
community led many displaced people like him to become a member of the organization.
At the ODRA meetings, men and women of the displaced population gather every
Sunday and socialize among themselves in a very congenial atmosphere. Getting together
encourages people to have informal conversations with each other and share basic
information. People often share stories about the Dominican Republic, informing each
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other of potential risks and threat. Following meetings, many people would look for a
friend to talk with before going back home, or would seek to make acquaintance with a
new person. Some people would wait for me and come to speak with me in a corner at
the church or outside. I walked around to greet and meet people and sometimes
accompanied them to their home. People were always asking me to visit their homes. The
networking role of the organization is emphasized by a board member I called Brevil. He
sees the organization as an important place for forced migrants to define their goals and
compensate for the absence of ties in Haiti. He states: “The organization is for the
repatriates who have nobody, no father, and no mother. When we are members of an
organization, we are one family.” Like Jean Mars, Brevil conceives of the organization as
a family. I would go further to perceive the organization as a way to build relationships
with others and create community. For Caglar (2004), the community and the relationship
that exists between members of society are fundamental to the construction of
citizenship. For the stateless people, ODRA offers them a space to build this citizenship
by being able to gather and put their goals together.
6.2.1

The goals of ODRA and the agency of citizenship
Through ODRA, the forced migrants define their goals, which include having

legal documentation, education for their children, housing, and jobs in Anse-à-Pitres.
They identify those elements as the fundamental needs to realize their potential as human
beings. The president justifies those goals in a statement he made during an ODRA
meeting:
“The most important thing to consider is the person. The biggest problem
is having a home and helping the children. Food is also important but education
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and a place to live are important. These people are human beings. They deserve to
live like everybody. These migrants are workers. They were working in
agriculture, construction, and hotels. Dominicans would like to have them again.
The state has to invest in construction, land, beaches, and the environment. If
there is work, these problems will be solved. If they are working, there won’t be
any problem.”
These are the main claims of ODRA; forced migrants want to avoid dependency and give
evidence that they believe in long-term development. Despite their limited economic
resources, the forced migrants contribute towards this achievement by mobilizing their
own scant resources through raising money during ODRA meetings. ODRA asks each
member to pay a contribution of five Haitian gourdes (USD 0.083) with the aim of
creating a fund for the organization and appealing to other organizations’ generosity.
Even though displaced and stateless people have to solve their problems of housing and
food insecurity in the short-term, they understand that the improvement of their lives can
only be the result of a durable project that differs from being provided with little food.
Establishing specific goals demonstrates their role as responsible citizens, who feel the
right to live as decent human beings.
ODRA is the only significant space of freedom where many forced migrants can
express themselves like legal citizens and decide their future. The creation of this
organization emphasizes their agency in carrying social projects to change their lives.
They do not want others to define their goals and seek to avoid intruders among them.
The president warns the organization against including false migrants among them,
stating: “be careful of people you are putting on your list. There are so many false
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repatriates. Their house is here in Anse-à-Pitres and they go to sleep at the camp of Parc
Cadeau. They are abolochos (false migrants).” As the president said, I learned about this
situation where long-term residents often go to build their tents at the camps in order to
benefit from humanitarian aid. The critical poverty in which people are living and the
lack of economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres encourage this behavior, whereby people
are trying to take advantage of the migration crisis that led to statelessness and
displacement. Above all, by grouping themselves and displaying their vision about their
future in Anse-à-Pitres, the forced migrants think of themselves as agents of their own
destiny and show their sense of responsibility and their willingness to be autonomous in
their movement. This autonomy is defined by the organization as the possibility for
forced migrants to work in order to have resources and be self-reliant. For instance, they
want to force the state and organizations to create job opportunities for all the forced
migrants. This claim is expressed by committee members:
“The international organizations should create jobs. Those people (forced
migrants) practiced agriculture when they were in the Dominican Republic. They
should help people in these kinds of activities: job creation, education, housing
etc. It is not just giving them little food. When you receive a salary each 15th of
the month, you expect something. You can go to a bank and borrow money.
That’s what the state and organizations have to do. If you don’t have 250 HT
gourdes to go to Thiottes, you are not independent. You are not free. It is when
you have money that you are autonomous.”
In accordance with the committee’s definition of autonomy, being independent for forced
migrants is tied to an increase in their ability to make decisions over their lives, such as
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enjoying the same rights and economic opportunities as legal citizens. Even though
forced migrants are conceived of as unauthorized in the community (Sassen 2002),
ODRA offers them some kind of freedom that allows them to make their voice heard by
the state and demonstrate their valuable membership in society. ODRA does not simply
provide a place for members to make claims on basic human rights (such as having the
opportunity to educate their children, to work, and to have a place to stay), but it also
works towards making its members better substantive citizens through disciplining them.
As such, ODRA’s focus on the development of the person does not reduce wellbeing to material belongings; the organization also works to discipline its members in
order to make them better citizens. The organization, through its actions and its
discourses, exercises some forms of power over its members. The members become
dependent subjects that can be managed, disciplined, or simply ignored (Striffler 2002)
by the organization. For instance, one of the committee members reveals the disciplining
and punishing role of the organization when he maintains:
“If you don’t have discipline, you can’t be a member of an organization.
In the organization, you must be respectful. You are under control. If you aren’t,
we will take the member badge from you. When you are a member of an
organization, you can’t do whatever you want. If you have a problem, before
going to the court, you have to talk to the founder of the organization. We will
judge you. If you do things on your own, we will reject you.”
As a result, ODRA can be defined as a space of citizen-making. ODRA’s goal of
educating, managing, and controlling people is central to the building of their substantive
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citizenship. Members have become more dependent on ODRA than the local state, with
which they seem to have a distant relationship in Anse-à-Pitres.
ODRA seeks to make people new citizens by providing them training based on
church ethics. Accordingly, members are expected to attend church services to be imbued
with moral guidance that will form the proper social conduct desired by the organization.
For instance, the president contended: “We do training for people on how to live in
society. I will tell you farewell if you don’t want to go to church and I won’t be part of
the board of the organization. If you are church people, you don’t fight. You must report
your conflicts to the organization and the church.” As such, the training offered by the
organization is deeply rooted in moral principles. The implications of this coercive
attitude of ODRA constitute a way of making forced migrants into new people,
substantive citizens, or responsible subjects for society (Zigon 2010). This appears in a
statement made by a member of the committee: “When people come at the organization
such as the mayor, they are observing us. We must behave well if they have to help us.”
ODRA members understand their role in substantive citizenship making, which includes
working on the self in order to become docile, respectful, and thus, better citizens. This
way they can prove they have the sense of responsibility for themselves and for their
community. This also shows that members seem to support the organization in its leading
role and its goal of impacting their lives in the external world, influencing decisions they
are making and negotiating on their behalf.
The organization wants to be the representative of members in negotiations with
outsiders by being their voice and speaking on their behalf. Some migrants went to see
the local priest, who usually organizes food distribution at the Catholic Church. When
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they heard this, board members of ODRA were not happy because the priest dealt with
forced migrants directly without consulting ODRA. The president stated: “He (the priest)
could meet with the committee of the organization. We would give him a list of migrants
and he would prepare food Kitts for them. But if going to his office, people are being
whipped, it is not good. People are already in misery. They can’t be whipped. People
have to be respected.” In this respect, I have assisted with food distribution at the
Catholic Church; I did not see people being whipped, but there were three police officers
who were reprimanding people and forcing them to stay in line. ODRA attempts to
reduce people’s autonomy and also promotes a form of paternalism, whereby the forced
migrants’ well-being can only be decided by ODRA. First, forced migrants must submit
themselves to the authority of the organization, which then exercises power and
domination over them. Second, ODRA members are advised against making decisions
themselves, which makes them dependent subjects. The ODRA board requires members
to inform the organization of all potential negotiations with outsiders about projects or
programs from which they can benefit. The constant need to inform ODRA of personal
activities reinforces the subjectification of forced migrants towards the organization.
However, the organization’s attempt to reduce the freedom of the forced migrants does
not prevent the forced migrants from making independent choices; displaced people
continue to look for aid without informing the organization. By acting deliberately as
autonomous individuals the displaced people demonstrate that they have obligations
towards a bigger community than ODRA, a society of which they are part as equally as
legal citizens, even though they do not enjoy the same rights. While ODRA plays a
significant role as a maker of substantive citizenship through disciplining and training
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people to prepare them for society, forced migrants also act independently to make
themselves substantive citizens, such as when they opposed a relocation project imposed
by local authorities, thereby resisting a form of power.

6.3

Resisting displacement and relocation: the making of substantive citizenship
The forced migrants, especially those who resided in the camps, found a way to

break their silence and raise their voices by refusing to collaborate with local authorities
on a project that aimed to displace them from the camps, demonstrating that they have
rights to the city of Anse-à-Pitres just the same as other local citizens. In 2017, the SJM,
in a partnership with the City Hall, proposed a project to relocate the forced migrants
from the camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2. Project goals included helping
the residents of these camps to travel to their places of origin in Haiti and settle into a
new life there. While the SJM was in charge of carrying out the program on the ground,
UNICEF, USDOL, and Cross International were listed as the potential sources of
financing. With vulnerable migrant families as its target, the project aimed to improve the
conditions of the migrant population, which had already been displaced from the
Dominican Republic. The project envisaged offering socio-economic support to 67
vulnerable migrant families in the two aforementioned camps in order to enable them
travel to their places of origin in Haiti. The City Hall, with which SJM partnered in the
program, was responsible for providing the technical support on the ground. National
representatives of the SJM from Port-au-Prince went to Anse-à-Pitres to discuss the
project with the City Hall, specifically who would benefit from the project and how much
money would be allocated to the selected persons. The City Hall answered these
questions and provided its responses to SJM.
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First and foremost, there is the issue of identifying the recipients of the project. In
the description of the project, SJM listed people in the camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc
Cadeau #2 as the potential beneficiaries and intended to reach 67 vulnerable families.
However, after meeting with ODRA president, the City Hall also included forced
migrants living in downtown Anse-à-Pitres who, in 2016, had been relocated by the IOM.
The City Hall promised to provide these people with the financial assistance needed to
renew their expiring rent as IOM had withdrawn from helping them. Through ODRA, the
mayors invited the relocated people to produce a document with their names and the
receipts with which they were provided by their landlords. The president of ODRA then
informed the relocated forced migrants of the agreement about the renewal of their rent
with the City Hall. However, this conclusion between the two parties is in conflict with
SJM’s definition of the recipients of the project.
The second issue is that while SJM wanted to provide socio-economic support to
people, it did not stipulate the amount of money assigned to relocation funding.
Therefore, it remained at the discretion of the City Hall to decide how much to allocate to
each person being displaced from the camps. In the description of the project, the SJM
stated that the project would cost USD 27,143 and that they had requested USD 25,000,
but the amount allocated for each recipient was not confirmed. The City Hall calculated
allocation amounts to reflect the transport fees for a forced migrant to travel from Anse-àPitres to their place of origin, but this did not match the goal of the project, which
originally intended to help people improve their lives. One of the mayors simply
imagined an amount that each person should be given for their displacement, but it was
not realistic, as people complained that the sum of money announced did not cater to their
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transportation need, let alone help them live in a place they had left many years ago and
where they often did not have any ties.
In addition, there are stateless displaced people among forced migrants, who have
never been to Haiti and who did not have any connection with a place in Haiti that they
would consider their place of origin. People in this category seem to have no other choice
than to stay in the camps. After the difficulties to put the project into operation, the City
Hall became the sole true executor.
6.3.1

Execution of the project
The relocation process did not go the way SJM intended in its project roadmap;

there were many contradictions between the project described and what the local state did
on the ground.
First, while the project emphasized the two camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc
Cadeau # 2 as beneficiaries of the program, the City Hall decided to displace only people
of the camp of Parc Cadeau #2, maintaining that people in Parc Cadeau #1 were from
Anse-à-Pitres and were not migrants. Hence, according to the City Hall, they could
return to their homes.
Second, according to a few residents I talked to at the camp of Parc Cadeau #2,
the City Hall adopted an arbitrary method to expel people from the camp instead of
relocating them. People claimed that the city hall came unexpectedly to the camp with a
minibus and a driver. They prepared envelopes that contained about 3,000 Haitian
gourdes (USD 50) each and gave one to each person, forcing them to get on the minibus.
One of the goals of the City Hall through the project was to prevent the re-construction of
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the camp or the construction of new tents once the forced migrants left. People
maintained that the City Hall hired people and burnt their small tents after the forced
migrants had been given the envelope containing their money. I talked to a group of
people who stayed at the camp and they contended:
“The City Hall came to expel us. They gave each of us 3,100 HT gourdes
(USD 52) and burnt our houses. They came with gas. They said that the owner of
the land asked for it. Each person they gave the money, they destroyed their
house. They said that the money was for transportation and they would give extra
money but they didn’t do that.”
Thus, the project of relocation has become one of expulsion. The way the event occurred
meant that the City Hall’s only goal was to get rid of the forced migrants. Some people
explained that they were expelled from the camp because the camps projected a bad
image of the city of Anse-à-Pitres. They were informed of this allegation by
representatives of the City Hall, who said: “We are worried because people are saying
that the city has problems.” For the city hall, this relocation had nothing to do with
supporting the displaced persons and improving their lives. Relocation simply
represented a way to destroy the camps in order to erase the image of desolation and
poverty of the city of Anse-à-Pitres. The project went from “resettlement with
compensation” to “resettlement with impoverishment” (Cernea and Maldonado 2018).
Despite the City Hall’s pressure to displace camp residents, the forced migrants opposed
the project.
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6.3.2

Collective consciousness or substantive citizenship engagement
The forced migrants’ reactions to contest the power of the local state enhanced

their agency and their status as substantive citizens. Some of the forced migrants refused
to take the money and get on the minibus that was set to take them to their place of
origin. Others, who took the money, did not go, despite pressure from those who were to
displace them, because they did not believe in the project. A group of people, who chose
to stay in the camp and did not get money from the city hall, maintained:
“From the 3,100 HT gourdes, the driver took 1,000 HT gourdes. He was
going to drop us in the middle of the road. The driver pulled out his weapon and
threatened us. They were forcing us to get on the minibus. Everybody got off the
bus. They kept the money. They didn’t give the 1,000 HT gourdes back to us.”
The local authorities used a top down approach, making decisions for the beneficiaries
without consulting them. This resulted in violence, and the residents totally objected to
their forced displacement from the camps.
The residents of Parc Cadeau #2 blocked the road as a way to protest, causing
tensions between them and people who were hired by the City Hall to displace them and
destroy the camp. A group of residents explained the situation, “the same day, we
blocked the road to traffic. In order to open the road, a man offered us 10 boxes of rice.
He and the driver also offered us 7,500 HT gourdes but we didn’t take them. The driver
pulled out his weapon at us.” On the surface, this way of displacing the residents while
the state pretended to welcome them when they first arrived in the city is reminiscent of
the expulsions of Haitians from the Dominican Republic that took place not only in 2015,
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but also in past decades. In the 1990s, for example, while conducting a round-up,
Dominican police and soldiers forcibly took many Haitians from their houses and
violently pushed some of them onto buses destined for Haiti (Camejo et al. 1992). This
brutality was also repeated in 2015 and led to the forced migration to Haiti. These
experiences suggest that the everyday life of these people, whether in the Dominican
Republic or in Haiti, has always been rife with challenges.
The camp residents also resisted by taking the money from the city hall and
faking going to their place of origin. After a few days, they returned to the camp from
which they were evicted and started to rebuild their tents. A young man in his late
twenties has parents from Jacmel, a Haitian main city located in the southeast but far
from Anse-à-Pitres. He took the money and he traveled to Jacmel, but returned quickly to
the camp. He explained: “They gave me 4,330 HT gourdes. The same day, I went to
Jacmel. I returned because I have my friends and my activity in the bush where I can
gather wood. Here, the bush is public but in Jacmel, you can’t cut down trees.” The
strategy employed by this young man demonstrates his ability to circumvent the power of
the local state, which attests to a form of personal agency.
I met with residents of the camp Parc Cadeau #2 in order to learn more about their
refusal to leave, despite the intervention of the local state. They gave many reasons. First,
the money offered to them was not enough to pay for transportation when they needed
support so that they could start small businesses in their new homes. Therefore, people
preferred to stay in the camp so that they could continue to take advantage of border
activities. Melia lived in the Dominican Republic all her life, but had been in Parc
Cadeau #2 since she came to Haiti. She said:
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“When you left a small land 27 or 28 years ago, what do you know about
it? Wherever you are you can live. They say they will give us 3,000 HT gourdes,
which can’t even buy sandals. Where will I put in a day of work in Marouge, my
place of origin? Here my husband can put in a day of work in the Dominican
Republic. If I have some money, I can buy a small land. I can do business to give
food to the children. 3,000 HT gourdes are nothing. When the money was higher,
people didn’t leave, and now they expect them to leave for 3,000 HT gourdes. I
come from very far; the transportation fee is more than 3,000 HT gourdes.
According to me, 3,000 HT gourdes are like 15 Dominican pesos considering my
responsibilities.”
Melia’s statement summarizes the arguments made by many camp residents to explain
their opposition to the project of dislocation. People expressed a feeling of being settled
in the camp in comparison to going to a place they left many years ago and where they
would have to start from scratch to make a living.
Second, forced migrants who were born in the Dominican Republic or who
arrived in the Dominican Republic when they were a child, like Melia, doubted that their
families in Haiti would welcome them without money, something revealed in Yanick’s
statement: “I prefer to live among foreigners than to live among family. The family loves
you as much as you have something.” Despite their challenges, the displaced people
avoided having a project imposed upon them when that project did not contribute to their
human development.
We may refer to the forced migrants’ forms of resistance—that include refusing to
take the money that is offered to them, blocking the road, faking displacement, or
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responding negatively to local authorities—as a way to boycott the dislocation project as
outright protest. The reactions of the stateless and displaced people express both a social
and a human right that translates the desire of belonging to the city of Anse-à-Pitres as
members like legal citizens and the freedom to live in a place of their choice by refusing
choices that the local state attempts to impose on them. By these dynamics, the displaced
and stateless people also express their capacity to take actions that come from a collective
consciousness the same way as any other citizens of the city. This is what may be
conceived of as the agency of citizenship (Lazar 2013. Their substantive citizenship has
found some recognition from organizations that attempted to negotiate and collaborate
with them.

6.4
The role of organizations in legitimating the stateless people’s substantive
citizenship
Indeed, forced migrants’ substantive citizenship has been validated by
organizations that collaborated and negotiated with them and by the local state in the
personage of the mayors who also entered into discussions with the displaced people
before intervening to displace them. In this section, when referring to NGOs, I am simply
considering at how NGOs endow the forced migrants’ substantive citizenship with some
form of recognition. For instance, the SJM sought to establish direct contact with the
forced migrants, inviting them to their meetings, supporting them in the defense of their
human rights, and working for their social and economic integration. The president and
the vice president of ODRA took part, stood up, raised their voices and asked questions
in meetings organized by the SJM. Both ODRA representatives asked SJM to make a
plea for the force migrants. In the course of the documentation program, PwoKontram,
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representatives of the SJM from the national office headquartered in Port-au-Prince
organized focus groups with the forced migrants, asking them for advice in order to serve
them better. In this way, ODRA is considered an important participant in the execution of
the documentation project in Anse-à-Pitres with SJM. The participatory approach that
included sitting with the SJM attests to the role that forced migrants play in the
community and, specifically, in their own development as substantive citizens.
The SJM is not the only organization that met and negotiated with the forced
migrants as a way of legitimating their citizenship. One day, during a usual meeting, two
representatives of GARR on behalf of UNHCR came to meet with ODRA members to
discuss a project that aimed to reunify separated families and decrease the global number
of stateless people. Representatives of ODRA also met with the City Hall in order to
negotiate the future of the forced migrants. The president of ODRA had met with local
authorities many times before the execution of the relocation project, when many forced
migrants started to be expelled by landlords in Anse-à-Pitres. ODRA intervened to help
the tenants, assuming its leading role in the migrant community and seeking an
alternative to the IOM’s refusal to renew the forced migrants’ rent. Furthermore, ODRA
has a delegate, who can represent the organization in meetings. However, the delegate is
not authorized to make decisions on behalf of ODRA. The delegate is only responsible
for reporting to the board and to members of the organization. Although these actions did
not bring a solution to the problems of the forced migrants, they contributed to helping
the stateless and displaced people become engaged in negotiating and renegotiating their
lives, despite their lack of legal citizenship. These examples attest to forced migrants
impact upon communities and the recognition of a limited form of citizenship for them.
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The capacity of the forced migrant organization to expand their claims beyond the
local community illustrates the refusal of the forced migrants to restrict themselves to a
state of illegality and their ability to renegotiate statelessness. The rapport they built with
a society outside their world of displacement has brought some small victories; after
meeting with representatives of organizations, they have obtained various kinds of
support. According to the president of ODRA, Fondasyon pou Lapè (Foundation for
Peace) has provided financial aid, which he confirmed during an ODRA general meeting:
“Fondasyon pou Lapè gave us 12,000 Dominican pesos, and Dr. Lamothe also helped us.
We (as the head of a local school) paid school fees for 100 children and we gave 4,000 to
4,500 Haitian gourdes to teachers. This is how we get money to pay teachers for the
children.” The organizations, such as the SJM, IOM, and Fondasyon pou Lapè, which
negotiated with forced migrants, granted them a significant form of collective agency,
giving them the ability to act together and to plan their future, and also endowing them
with certain visibility and recognition in the community of Anse-à-Pitres; this may be
considered a form of limited citizenship. The possibility of earning citizenship through
contexts other than the law has also been demonstrated by Tsuda (2006) in his study of
local citizenship in countries such as Spain, South Korea, Japan, and the like. He shows
that in Japan, for example, the national government is more concerned with controlling
its borders than integrating immigrants defined as temporary residents and considered as
not assimilated enough within the nation-state. As a result, it falls to local governments
and NGOs to take care of these immigrants by granting them limited rights such as health
care, language classes, and public housing. Unauthorized immigrants experience poor
working conditions and low wages; they lack standard worker rights and protection, and
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have no access to adequate medical insurance or care because the local government does
not recognize them. While they are unrecognized by the local government, NGOs do
provide these undocumented migrants with basic services such as human rights
protection, which grants them a limited form of local citizenship. I suggest that while
nongovernmental organizations play a significant role in supporting stateless people in
their absence of legal citizenship, they are also instrumental in promoting inequalities in
the lives of poor people through, for example, their role as administrators of humanitarian
aid to refugees.
NGOs have been subject to criticism that views them as increasing inequalities
among the population they are serving, creating economic elites (Yarrow 2011), who
appropriate resources based on the idea that they are the skilled ones. For example, in
Haiti, Schuller (2016) examines how Haitians working for NGOs were aware of socioeconomic inequalities between them and their foreign counterparts with the latter
enjoying great economic privileges and also seeking to exercise their power. The power
of NGOs in Haiti has been prevalent after the 2010 earthquake. Foreign donors have
chosen to rely on NGOs and contractors to lead the reconstruction of the country, for
which 9,9 billion dollars were pledged, while the state only had to vet projects, inspect
progress, and resolve land-title disputes (Farmer 2012). According to Farmer, leaving
reconstruction solely in the hands of private contractors, including large international
NGOs is to continue the same dysfunctional cycle. The only way that money was
reported to move from the donors to survivors of the earthquake was through the creation
of jobs. However, the UN reported that agencies only created only thirty-five thousand
jobs while five hundred thousand or more were needed (Farmer 2012). In this sense,
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money does not always go to those in need. In Anse-à-Pitres, the relationship that the
stateless people build with organizations in the field help them earn a limited form of
citizenship or a kind of “local citizenship,” which is part of their substantive citizenship
construction, but the NGOs, at the same time, make these people unequal substantive
citizens. This was evidenced by the inclusion of some forced migrants in local projects
and the exclusion of others even though, in some circumstances, this process was
inevitable.

6.5

Producing unequal substantive citizenship
Unequal substantive citizenship results from the unequal treatment of citizens that

become officially or unofficially institutionalized in a nation-state. For instance, the state
has recently developed a new type of citizenship tied to “firms and markets, located not
in individuals or citizens, but in global economic actors” (Hansen 2005; Sassen 1996,
38). Ong (2006) explores this form of economic citizenship and the role of the state in
promoting inequality among its citizens, examining how the nation-state has realigned
itself with market-driven institutions in order to promote an economic logic and at the
same time define and redefine citizenship. As a result, citizenship has become something
less fixed, or more flexible, and able to incorporate the disruptions and flows of
globalization. This rupture in citizenship or disaggregation, according to Ong, is related
to the dynamic and varied conditions engendered by mobile neoliberal technologies of
governing and self-governing (16), which is done in many ways. One way is the
intervention of the state, which practices a politics of differentiation towards its
population by deliberately favoring certain categories of subjects over others. According
to Ong, through this approach, only bearers of marketable talents can enjoy special rights
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and benefits. Those who are not marketable are excluded. Hence, being simply a member
of the polity as a legal citizen does not guarantee one the access to these special rights
and benefits. This neoliberal logic has reconfigured the territory of citizenship. In Anse-àPitres, one may also observe a process by which people are making differential citizens,
but with a different logic, which is established not only by a state that treats its population
unequally, but also by organizations on the ground. These organizations provide forced
migrants with some support, but at the same time create inequalities among them. In
addition, the capacity to mobilize resources also differentiates the forced migrants. By
examining how both external and personal factors contribute to this process of
differentiation, my research develops an understanding of differential citizenship as
something both created and involuntarily self-provoking.
First and foremost, differentiation among the displaced people begins with the
IOM and its program of relocation. In 2016 in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, the IOM
relocated about 200 forced migrants, according to the local community and ODRA.
Despite its efforts, the IOM program neglected many displaced people, who were living
in the different camps, but in the same conditions as those who were selected. I had not
yet arrived in Anse-à-Pitres when the program was implemented. However, I found many
residents in the camps, who complained about the arbitrariness of a program that did not
explain the rationale behind its choices. Even though some forced migrants contended
that they were not selected because they were absent on the day of the census, others
believed they deserved the IOM assistance in the same way as those who received the
assistance. Standing in front of the SJM office one afternoon, I met a Dominican-Haitian,
a man in his late thirties, who resided in the camp of Maletchipe close to the camp of
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Parc Cadeau #2. During a short conversation, he told me: “We were nine families in
Maletchipe. Then IOM relocated three, and six of us were left in the camp. I have four
children; two are with me and two are with their mother. Their mother left me because
she saw that things were not good.” This man was not unique in complaining that he was
left out of the IOM relocation program. Other residents in the camps made the same
remark, maintaining that they may have been working outside their homes when the IOM
staff passed through the camps, and false migrants were selected in their stead. A worker
from another organization also pointed out the fact that some false migrants were selected
to benefit from the program of relocation. He stated: “There is some money being given
but I don’t know anything. We (our organization) were here before the IOM. When they
were giving the money, they put us out and put in false migrants.” As this example
denotes, financial aid does not always go to whom it is intended and may divide the
population. In Anse-à-Pitres, almost everyone is poor and vulnerable, which may explain
why many long-term residents seek to take advantage of aid opportunities using a false
migrant identity. However, at least these people belong to the land and appear to be in a
slightly better situation than the forced migrants, who are experiencing displacement and
statelessness. In this sense, helping the poor can sometimes produce unexpected results,
such as inequalities in excluding impoverished people. The inability of the IOM to satisfy
all the forced migrants’ needs contributed to differentiating them. Other organizations
serving people in the camps also received criticisms by the forced migrants.
Some forced migrants contend that some organizations favored one category of
people over others in their programs of assistance. They cited physical appearance and
being a woman as privileged criteria for receiving support. When visiting the camp of
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Parc Cadeau #2 some residents reported: “In the camp, beautiful women eat and goodlooking men eat. Ugly women and ugly men don’t eat. GARR gave 10,350 Haitian
gourdes (USD 172.5) but only the beautiful women got this money. The project is for
women.” A man was more direct, when he stated that: “IOM and GARR came and gave
some money, but it was based on partisanship.” These reports suggest a double standard
or gender inequality promoted by the two organizations. My presence on the ground did
not allow me to confirm these people’s statements and this gender inequality because
these programs no longer existed by the time of my arrival. However, I heard from
workers of organizations that financial support has not always been fairly distributed,
maintaining that many needy residents in the camp were excluded. I did observe that the
majority of people of Anse-à-Pitres are involved in everyday migration, which
complicates the task of organizations to distinguish recently displaced migrants from
long-term resident migrants. In this sense, creating inequalities through giving financial
assistance may result when organizations use a top down approach, do not use local
people to help them identify the recently displaced people, or when they do not explain
the rationality behind their choice. Even though these organizations may not intend to
create differentiation among people, their approach, lacking rationality and transparency,
promotes this process and encourages unequal substantive citizenship.
The creation of differentiation also arose with the micro-credit program, launched
by the SJM. When I arrived in Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, SJM was one of the most loyal
organizations to the forced migrants. While the mission of this organization is to
accompany and defend the rights and dignity of migrants and those who are the victims
of assaults, abuse, and violence, it also gives economic support to the forced migrants.
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Through the micro-credit program, SJM granted loans of 10,000 HT gourdes (167 USD)
to a few forced migrants in order to start small businesses. Those who did not benefit
from the program were not happy, considering that they were qualified to receive the loan
but were snubbed. I met two board members of ODRA and they showed concern about
not being selected as beneficiaries of the program. They discussed the matter with me and
one said:
“I heard that people have received money. There are some people who
can’t do business, who don’t know how to manage the money. Unfortunately the
givers don’t work with ODRA. We could have told them who could be a good
person to manage and work with the money. I deserve to have that money because
I have a large family and I can work.”
Individuals frequently try to differentiate themselves from others in order to justify why
they should be the selected beneficiaries. In this example, the two forced migrants
expressed their capacity to manage a business while ignoring others’ capacity to do the
same thing. In this way, differentiation is not only created by the organizations, but it is
also created by the people, who see themselves as different substantive citizens from
others. The state also played a role in promoting inequalities and differentiation among
the displaced and stateless people, especially through the program of relocation, of which
it was the executor on the ground.
The relocation program sought to displace forced migrants from the camp of Parc
Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2. When it came to implementing the project, the City Hall
decided to exclude residents of the Parc Cadeau #1 maintaining that they were from
Anse-à-Pitres and could return to their home without any economic support. While this
186

may have been true for some residents in the camp considered as false migrants, there
was no survey that clearly said who the true and false migrants were and where they were
from. Moreover, the hyper-mobility of people in the region to the Dominican Republic,
especially to Pedernales, made it difficult to distinguish migrant status in Anse-à-Pitres.
The majority of people in Anse-à-Pitres are in the same precarious economic condition
and draw upon practices of everyday ‘border jumping’ in order to create livelihoods. The
decision to include one camp and exclude another appears to be arbitrary and aims to
create differential substantive citizens among the displaced. Most people who were
excluded had been in the camps for a long time and have been facing the same social and
economic challenges as people in Parc Cadeau #2.
As a matter of fact, the development of differentiation among the displaced
people is inevitable, as organizations are not generally able to satisfy everyone’s needs.
As Fassin (2010:51) argues, referring to nongovernmental workers, “we therefore cannot
hold these groups entirely responsible for the complex tensions and insurmountable
problems with which they are confronted. But we can expect them to be more clearsighted than they often appear.” In this sense, SJM and IOM have limited resources and
are only filling a gap left by the state, which has contributed to promoting differentiation
among citizens. By considering that residents at the camps are factors of insecurity in the
city, the state qualifies them as undesired people, or people out of place, who are not
equal to the long-term citizens of Anse-à-Pitres. Throughout Anse-à-Pitres, rumors have
also spread that some long-term residents have a positive reaction concerning the burning
and the destruction of the small houses of forced migrants in the camps. I talked to
residents of the city informally have heard them articulate that people living in the camps
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are the cause of insecurity and theft in the area; in this sense, the differentiation among
citizens can be the result of how the displaced people are perceived compared to others.
Differentiation is also an outcome of where one stands economically in society; some
forced migrants were able to respond to displacement better than others, which is visible
among the residents in the camp of Parc Cadeau #1.
Some forced migrants do better than others because of their ability to mobilize
and manage resources in order to improve their lives. This differentiation is reflected in
the residents’ small houses in the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. While the majority of houses
are made of straw and cardboard, there are a few houses that are bigger and covered with
iron sheets. Some of these houses are located on an isolated piece of land and they are
inhabited by a very small group of forced migrants. They are bigger and better built than
those on the rest of the main camp. While some people explain that they were given iron
sheets by an organization, which makes their houses look different than others in the
camp, I learned that a few people bought their pieces of land from someone they consider
to be the owner of the land. Josemar whom, people consider the head of the camp, has his
house on this secluded piece of land, away from the main camp, although I consider it an
extension of Parc Cadeau #1. During a visit, I stopped at the first yard where there was a
garden of corn, a big house, and a small tent in front of which I met Karl, who is the
home owner. Karl was in the main camp and benefited from the IOM relocation program.
He explained, “When IOM gave me the little money, I didn’t eat it (spend). I bought this
piece of land. I moved from the camp to here. People who are providing assistance don’t
know this area. They don’t come because they say that people who live here are well off;
they don’t need help.” Moving from the main camp meant two important things for Karl.

188

First, it equated to a social and economic mobility, which in turn guarantees his
independence and some kind of stability. Second, this mobility puts Karl in a position
that allows him to enjoy substantive citizenship to a different degree from the rest of the
displaced and stateless people living in the main camps. Furthermore, Karl extended his
activities to the Dominican Republic, as he said: “I continue to go to the Dominican
Republic. I make gardens. I plant squashes, which I sold to build this house.” This
transnational aspect of Karl’s life is significant, as it is extended to two different realities
involving two distinct societies, making him a transnational substantive citizen.

6.6
Transnational substantive citizenship: A continuum between life in Anse-àPitres (Haiti) and Pedernales (Dominican Republic)
Forced migrants’ lives are split between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It is
difficult to define belonging for forced migrants because of their everyday “jumping
border” practices. While many assert that they feel better in Haiti because they are not
running to escape soldiers, they continue to go to work in the Dominican Republic on a
daily basis. Their constant movements between the two countries make it difficult to
locate them in a specific space where they belong. Even though their feelings are
important in defining their belonging, we cannot ignore the significance of their daily
practices in making them substantive citizens. As Lazar (2013) suggests, citizenship is
tied to what people do in their daily lives. Indeed, the daily activities of the forced
migrants are intertwined with both Haitian and Dominican societies. This makes them
transnational substantive citizens, which suggests a sort of belonging that is defined
through their being subject to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Schiller (2005: 52)
argued that the adoption of dual citizenship by an impressive number of states has
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contributed to the development of a transborder form of citizenship (transnational
citizenship) that also goes beyond legal citizenship into the subject of cultural and social
citizenship and its transnational extensions. Similarly, the displaced people’s
transnational substantive citizenship is formed outside the legal category, but expressed
in two ways: first, through residing in Haiti, a country that offers them a sense of freedom
and second, through crossing to the Dominican Republic, where they go for their
survival.
The forced migrants feel at home in Anse-à-Pitres because this is the place that
guarantees them a sense of physical security. In the Dominican Republic, many contend
that they were worried about their lives because they were persecuted by soldiers and
Dominican civilians. While leaving the Dominican Republic was involuntary, some
migrants feel less worried about their lives since their arrival in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti.
Zalo, a young man in his twenties, was born in the Dominican Republic, but had never
been able to obtain a Dominican identity card (called cédula). According to him, living in
the Dominican Republic was an experience of insecurity and fear, as Haitians were
constantly attacked in the street and at their homes. For Zalo, coming to Haiti was a
relief; he said: “I feel good where I am now. I feel good because I sleep at ease. I get up
with happiness and I go to sleep with happiness. No one will tell me ‘go to your home.”
The feeling that being in Haiti gives Zalo is one of belonging to Anse-à-Pitres because
the city offers him security for his life. In this sense belonging equates to freedom, which
can be considered an element of substantive citizenship for Zalo, who became stateless
after he was stripped of his citizenship by the Dominican state. His experience of
belonging is inflected by his experience residing in the city and his identity, something
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that is directly related to citizenship (Bloch, 2014). Zalo, who lived his whole life in the
Dominican Republic, did not reject his past experience, though, as he considers himself
half Haitian, half Dominican. Even though he said that he felt better in Haiti, he has still
kept a door open to the Dominican Republic. He said: “I can say that I am not on my land
but I feel at home.” Being on “his land,” for Zalo, would mean being in the Dominican
Republic, where he was born. When considering Zalo’s notion of land and home, it is
possible to deduce that the meaning of Haiti as a place of freedom, belonging, and home
can be perceived differently by people.
For some people, being free also means feeling at home in Anse-à-Pitres. Resias
was born in Barahona, Dominican Republic but did not have a Dominican cédula. Since
the Dominican state adopted the 2010 migration law that led to displaced people’s
statelessness, being born in the Dominican Republic is no longer a condition to be
Dominican. Like other people who became “illegal”, she was not allowed to reside in the
Dominican Republic; she became displaced in Haiti. When I asked her in an interview if
she felt at home in Anse-à-Pitres, she answered:
“Well, we feel that we are at home because we are all together. In the
Dominican Republic they are threatening us. When someone crosses and comes
over here (Anse-à-Pitres), you feel a little bit more peaceful. In the Dominican
Republic, each time there is something happening. When there is a tumult, you
are not at peace because Dominicans do not care about you.”
Resias describes her feeling toward Anse-à-Pitres through an expression of being at
home that is synonymous with peace, which may, in a certain way, be interpreted as a
sense of belonging.
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For another group of people, feeling good or free in Anse-à-Pitres does not mean
being at home. This is the case for Renaldo, a Dominican-Haitian, who considers being in
Anse-à-Pitres only an object of peace. He contends: “I am not at home. As I am in my
country, this makes me a bit quiet but when I am over there (Dominican Republic), I feel
more at ease. Here (in Haiti), I am just suffering.” Whatever feelings people develop
about their presence in Anse-à-Pitres, their impact as temporary residents participates in
the creation of substantive citizenship. In the same vein, Vora (2013) showed how
members of the Indian diaspora, who are denied Emirati citizenship, participate in the
history of the country through being residents in Dubai, which makes them worthy of the
status of substantive citizens. Despite the fact that displaced people do not share the
same opinion of their relationship to Anse-à-Pitres, almost all of them have something in
common. Their lives continue to be a continuum between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales.
Anse-à-Pitres represents a place of residency that attests to their belonging to Haiti,
regardless of their feelings toward this place, and Pedernales, where they cross every day
to sell their labor, depicts a place of economic influence for them. While going to the
Dominican Republic is considered a survival strategy for the forced migrants, their
border jumping is also constitutive of substantive citizenship.
Although the displaced people consider that being in Haiti gives them a sense of
physical security because they are not being harassed by Dominican soldiers and
civilians, the Dominican Republic still plays an important role in their lives. Manchina
was born in the Dominican Republic. After living her whole life in the Dominican
Republic, she struggled to adapt to life in Haiti. While she likes Haiti, the country of her
parents, she missed the Dominican Republic, where she still feels she belongs. She said:
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“I am at home. That’s true because I am in my country. However, I am more familiar
with Dominicans. My moves are with Dominicans. I can’t humiliate my country but the
true place I come from is Abila (Dominican Republic).” Manchina’s belonging in Haiti is
defined through her parents who are Haitian and her residing in Anse-à-Pitres, but her
daily activities take place in the Dominican Republic. Even though she was rejected by
the state of the Dominican Republic, she considers the Dominican Republic is still
important to her. Similarly, Jadana, a Dominican-Haitian, who was in Haiti for the first
time, is connected to Haiti through her Haitian parents. However, she expresses her
attachment to the Dominican Republic, the country where she was born and raised, even
though she does not legally belong there. She stated: “It seems that life is better in the
Dominican Republic. Here, I don’t do anything. I want to return to St Domingue
(Dominican Republic) because it is the country I know.” While Jadna resides in Haiti, she
feels that the Dominican Republic offers more opportunities, especially for making a
living. Her transnational substantive citizenship cannot be defined out of those two
experiences.
For the majority of the displaced people, the importance of the Dominican
Republic resides in the role it plays in the creation of livelihoods. Jeannel, who was born
in the Dominican Republic, feels better in Haiti because he feels free. However, he
cannot erase the Dominican Republic from his life. Moving across the border to create a
livelihood continues to be a prerequisite for him as he stated: “To have the resources to
survive, you must go to the Dominican Republic. Haiti has no resources. If Haiti had
opportunities, you would be so at ease. It is in the Dominican Republic one must create
livelihoods. I still go. It is there I must go to put in a day of work. Haiti has nothing I can
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do.” Crossing to the Dominican Republic is a way for forced migrants to make a living.
Those daily practices also count as life experiences and show the impact they have on
both Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican Republic. Forced migrants undertake other
significant activities in the Dominican Republic besides going to work. Fabioloa sent her
children to school in Pedernales while she resides in Anse-à-Pitres. She crossed the
border everyday with her children or asked someone to take them to school when she was
blocked by soldiers on the border. Granting her children a Dominican education
constitutes a way of preparing them for Dominican citizenship. Fabiola continued to go to
the Dominican Republic to do domestic work. With these kinds of life dynamics and
experiences, forced migrants actively participate in and contribute to both societies.
Through forms of engagement such as going to work, selling, or sending children to
school in the Dominican Republic, those stateless people residing in Anse-à-Pitres create
substantive citizenship that goes beyond borders. This is why they can be conceived of as
transnational substantive citizens. Transnational substantive citizenship is an outcome of
the exclusion from legal citizenship that produces multiple logics of citizenship. What is
at stake here is that being able to produce belonging in more than one society gives the
displaced people some flexibility that they can take advantage of amid all the constraints
that structure their lives.
Finally, while the state may deploy multiple forms of governance to regulate its
citizenry, it also proliferates several types of citizenship (Vora 2013: 21). Accordingly,
the emergence of an alternative form of citizenship for the stateless people in Anse-àPitres is a consequence of a selective politics of the Dominican Republic that consisted of
excluding people of Haitian backgrounds, but also of the failure of the Haitian state to
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legally integrate these people into the Haitian state. As an alternative to the absence of
legal citizenship, these people trigger actions that emanated from both personal and
collective consciousness, such as organizing themselves and resisting the power system
in Anse-à-Pitres, enhancing claims of belonging to the city, and freedom, all of which are
social and human rights. These strategies produce a kind of substantive citizenship
outside the juridico-legal category. Substantive citizenship, as something that can be
formed by people’s social and economic actions in a city, shows how people can be
productive members of society despite the absence of legal connection with the state.
Furthermore, their involvement into two societies makes them transnational substantive
citizens, which gives them some flexibility in a context where they are politically and
socially constrained.
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Conclusions
In this dissertation, I have examined how displaced people mobilize resources
within and across their communities as a survival strategy and how they create a form of
substantive citizenship in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. I have shown that in order to develop an
understanding of the displaced people’s experiences of displacement and statelessness, it
is fundamental to go to where their journey started: the Dominican Republic. Indeed,
while the expulsion of thousands of people of Haitian background from the Dominican
Republic was sudden, all the mechanisms that led to this brutal decision were already at
work in Dominican society. A series of internal and external factors that have their origin
in Dominican and Haitian history and in current world development need to be taken into
account. Like many Caribbean countries, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have
been shaped as nations by shared experiences of colonialism, postcolonialism, slavery,
class, racial and gender stratification. However, their two distinct colonial experiences
make them not an undifferentiated whole.
The two countries used to be one country, which belonged to Spain, before being
separated with the introduction of France on the island. For more than one century
(1600s-1800s), the two countries have been submitted to the fierce regime of the colonial
system. Haiti proclaimed its independence from France in 1804, and the Dominican
Republic proclaimed its independence from Spain in 1821, to then become occupied by
Haiti from 1822 to 1844. Dominicans have not digested this Haitian occupation, which
they refer to as “the Haitian Domination” (Martinez 2005), and which was central to the
formation of a sentiment of “anti-Haitianismo” (antihaitianism). In this racial ideology,
being Dominican has to come to be defined as not Haitian (Howard 2001). Racial
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thinking has been used in the process of Dominican nation building by the dictator
Trujillo, who finally opted for the elimination of Haitians through a state-sponsored
massacre in 1937. In recent years, the removal of Haitians by the Dominican state has
been achieved through the institutionalization of racial prejudice and the enactment of
law, specifically the Constitutional court decision in 2013 that revoked birthright
citizenship to thousands of Dominicans and forced them out of the country with other
undocumented Haitian migrants. Even though these people were not massacred as
citizens were during the Trujillo era, the process was still violent because it entailed the
separation of families, the loss of means of livelihoods, material dispossession, and the
forced displacement of people of Haitian backgrounds to Haiti, a country many had not
known before or had left many years ago in search of a better life.
These people entered Haiti, a country that had been devastated by the 2010
earthquake and was struggling with continuous political and economic instability; their
arrival in Haiti collided with grave social, political, and economic challenges including an
absent or quasi-inexistent state, which could not even provide them with the ID papers
they needed to enjoy, at least, some basic social and human rights. This means that from
the Dominican Republic to Anse-à-Pitres, the displaced people found themselves
between Scylla and Charybdis. In Anse-à-Pitres, the only real contact that the Haitian
state developed with the displaced people was intervening in their lives, such as when
local authorities were expelling them from the camp of Parc Cadeau #2 to erase their ugly
image from the city. Legally, the state retreats from the well-being of these people, which
makes them dependent subjects more of themselves than of the state.
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Despite state marginalization, displacement, and statelessness, the forced migrants
have strived to improve their lives by looking for opportunities where there seem to be
none. As I demonstrated throughout this dissertation, they have undertaken many
informal economic activities that include selling goods, selling their labor, taking
microcredit loans, or going to do agricultural work in the Dominican Republic, drawing
on daily labor mobility that I described in the expression of monte desann, in order to
capture their back and forth movements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. All
these survival strategies are poor income generating activities for the displaced people.
However, what counts in those practices is more the meaning they bring to these people’s
lives than the money they earn from them. They endow them with a philosophy of life
that is conveyed in expressions such as m’ap degaje m, ti degaje, and vire men, to
describe their lives as not static but as an ongoing process towards achieving something
with which to keep going.
The forced migrants’ involvement in everyday labor mobility, even if it means
facing the danger involved in crossing the border, is an example of their ability to carry
out actions in the world, which allows them to exercise power and agency in and over
their lives. The strength, resilience, agency and emancipation of these forced migrants
through these practices appear in one forced migrant’s assertion: “What happens is that
Haitians have something in them, wherever they are, they live. That‘s why we are here
but it is not that we have a good activity.” This forced migrant man I call Charyba implies
that the reason for their survival is not because they have a job or they are earning money,
but it is because they are an enduring people who remain hopeful.
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The conception of how people survive based on the hope that they feel can be
understood in the light of Ortner’s (2016: 59) support for an inquiry “into what gives
lives a sense of purpose or direction, or how people search for the best way to live—even
in dire and hostile circumstances.” That is to say, for forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres, it
is more their agentive, stubborn, and energy-giving behavior that helps them survive dayto-day, rather than their income. The informal economy is, in this sense, a process, or an
assemblage of practices that embrace their total life as humans. Their coping and survival
strategies, through their informal economic practices, lead us to redefine a good life not
as a state to be obtained but an ongoing aspiration for something better (Fisher 2014). As
such, Fisher associates well being with non-material qualities that embrace the hopes,
fears, and other subjective factors that define engagement with the world. Human
development is not simply defined by the material resources or stable wages and salaried
labor that are often touted as a condition of development process (Ferguson and Li, T. M.
2018). In a context where stable-waged labor is disappearing, Ferguson and Li suggest
that making livelihood is not defined by a proper job. They even argued for a renewed
political-economic analysis of life beyond the “proper job” that is both global and
differentiated. These ideas help understand the informal economic practices of the forced
migrants not as something that guarantees a somewhat material well-being, but as
something that helps them remain hopeful. This hope is expressed through the forced
migrants’ collective actions that lead them to demand their right to the city of Anse-àPitres.
Indeed, in the absence of legal citizenship, these stateless people forge a kind of
substantive citizenship, which is defined beyond the legal realm through acting
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personally and collectively in a way that demonstrates their valuable representation in
their displaced communities. Their daily activities in Anse-à-Pitres, the change they bring
to the demography of the city, what they do to build a durable life, the trial to get settled,
and the narratives they produced daily are ways by which they build substantive
citizenship. This limited form of substantive citizenship is also fed by feelings of
belonging, formulation of claims through their organization (ODRA), forms of reaction
and resistance to systems of power and daily live dynamics that have impacts in both
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which makes them transnational substantive citizens.
By doing research with these displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, I have
learned what it means to be displaced and stateless. Each time I observed them, met with
them, or interviewed them, I had the opportunity to review their journey and the storms
they have endured just to be there. Even though my understanding of their reality is very
much limited because of my positionality as an outsider, after 14 months living with
them, I have come to draw a new cartography of their lives in comparison to when I first
arrived in Anse-à-Pitres for my research. My long-term immersion into their community
has allowed me to develop a kind of cultural intuition in their lives such as understanding
their expressions, that include n’ap longonni (to literally mean we are trying to survive)
or mwen pa gen rele, mwen pa gen reponn (meaning I have no support). In this sense, I
have carved out a niche for myself not only in their reality but also in their lives. It was
evidenced in the simple words that people conveyed to me Apa w lage nou, i.e., you
forgot about us. Listening to them has made me feel more indebted to them, a burden that
weighs more than my back can bear. In the field, I was moved by their desire for
something better, their agency, and their combativeness. I see their life through a binary
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opposition that I translate as power in oppression, light in darkness, hope in despair, and
potentiality in precarity and poverty. Their social and economic dynamics in Anse-àPitres exemplify this contrasting reality.
This dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of displaced people and
the anthropology of citizenship. First, often times, economic injustice and state laws and
policies contribute to exacerbating marginalized and disenfranchised people’s
vulnerability and precarity. These practices dehumanize these people, who are often
accused of being a threat to the jobs (Lewellen 2002) of formal citizens in host countries.
My work develops an understanding of these people as not being hopeless, passive, or
inactive. Their engagement in socio-cultural practices and forms of informal or Creole
economics as an outcome of being excluded from the formal economy provides them
with the tools needed to develop survival strategies. Those practices attest to their agency
to build self-reliance and self-development in the face of precarity and displacement. In
this way, what I am developing in my work are theories that actually contest the
anthropology of the “suffering slot” by showing how displaced people strive to create
good in their lives (Robbins 2013).
In addition, these people build an alternative form of citizenship that translates
their capacity of taking actions in the world. I conceptualize this as substantive
citizenship and it goes beyond the legal scope of citizenship. This citizenship is a
personal and collective experience. First, it results from actions that people undertake in
order to direct their lives. Second, it results from how people’s common vision in the
nation-state produces actions that challenge established power structures. Through these
informal, personal, and collective channels, stateless people in the world build
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substantive citizenship that can also become transnational based on the multiple links that
they maintain with others across the world.

202

Appendix: Interview Guides
Interview Guide-English
1- Do you have any contacts in Haiti and abroad, and how do you stay in touch
with them?
2- What kind of social or economic exchanges are you involved in with your
contacts abroad and other members of the community?
3-

How do these practices help you make ends meet?

4-

In what ways are you still connected to the Dominican Republic?

5- What is this process of making a living in Haiti like for you?
6- How do you compare your life back in the Dominican Republic to your
current life in Haiti?
7- What kind of support do you receive from NGOs?
8- In what kind of community activities are you engaged? How do you feel
about them?
9- Do you feel belonging here in Anse-à-Pitres and in what ways?
10- How did you find out that you would have to leave the Dominican Republic
because your citizenship had been revoked?
B- Interview Guide-Creole
1- Eske ou gen kontak ak moun an Ayiti oubyen aletranje e kijan oufè pou kenbe
kontak avèk yo?
2- Ki jan de echanj sosyal oswa ekonomik ou gen ak moun aletranje oubyen lòt
manm nan kominote a?
3- Ki jan pratik sa yo ede w nan lavi chak jou w?
4- Ki fason ou santi ou konekte ak Repiblik Dominikèn?
5- Ki jan sa ye pou ou mennen yon vi an Ayiti ?
6- Ki konparezon ou kapab fè ant jan ou t’ap viv an Repiblik Dominikèn ak
fason w’ap viv kounya an Ayiti?
7- Ki sipò ou jwenn nan men ONG?
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8- Nan ki aktivite ou patisipe nan kominote a? Sa w panse de aktivite sa yo ?
9- Eske ou santi w lakay ou isit Ansapit ? Kòman w ka eksplike sa ?
10- Ki reyaksyon w lè w aprann ke ou dwe kite Repiblik Dominikèn akoz yo
retire nasyonalite w ?
C-Inteview Guide-Spanish
1- ¿Tiene contactos en Haití y en el extranjero, y cómo se queda Usted en
contacto con ellos?
2- ¿Qué tipo de intercambios sociales o económicos Usted tiene con sus
contactos en el extranjero y otros miembros de la comunidad?
3- ¿Cómo estas prácticas le ayudan a sobrevivir?
4- ¿De qué manera está conectado con la República Dominicana?
5- ¿Cuál es el proceso de fabricación de una vida en Haití para Usted?
6- ¿Cómo se compara su vida en la República Dominicana a su vida actual en
Haití?
7- ¿Qué tipo de apoyo recibe de las ONG?
8- ¿En qué tipo de actividades de la comunidad que se dedica? ¿Cómo se siente
acerca de ellas?
9- ¿Se siente que pertenece aquí an Anse-à-Pitres y de qué manera?
10-

¿Cómo se sentía cuando aprendía que tendría que dejar la
República Dominicana debido a su ciudadanía que había sido
revocada?
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